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A Cognitive Linguistic Study of Categorisation and Uncertain
Reasoning in the Representation of Degree Modifiers
Degree modifiers (such as very and really) are common features of written and spoken 
language. In general, their effect is to moderate the perceived strength of the linguistic 
form on which they act, making them a useful and versatile tool of expression and 
emphasis. However, the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the conceptualisation of 
degree modifiers and the linguistic aspects of their use in combination with other 
classes of words are extremely complex. The ease and fluency with which they are 
used and the extent to which their effect is commonly understood is good evidence 
that, like many aspects of meaning, degree modifiers rely on commonly held beliefs 
and knowledge about the world around us. For this reason the whole area of linguistic 
categorisation and prototypes are central to understanding the role of degree 
modifiers, particularly given that assumptions about prototypical strengths of 
adjectives are exactly what degree modifiers seek to alter.
A core part of this study is the consideration of the role of uncertainty -  not 
only uncertainty relating to the strength of the degree modifier, but also of the 
linguistic forms on which they act. More specifically, the inter-relationship between 
the perceived strength of degree modifiers and the certainty (or uncertainty) of the 
belief they express is a relatively unexplored yet intriguing area of linguistic research. 
The human mind constantly seeks to process as much information as possible for the 
least possible cognitive effort, yet this is difficult to achieve when reasoning with 
uncertain knowledge. By exploring the role and characteristics of degree modifiers, 
my aim is to illuminate how uncertain reasoning permeates many aspects of cognitive 
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Introduction
The term ‘degree modifiers’ seems at odds with the everyday, commonplace 
way in which they are used. Indeed, many people would not know what the term itself 
even means. Degree modifiers such as very, really and fairly fit neatly into the natural 
flow of sentences and serve their purpose very efficiently. As the name suggests, 
degree modifiers are intended to influence the perceived strength of the linguistic form 
on which they act (known as the header).
The view is beautiful.
The view is really beautiful.
The addition of the degree modifier really above magnifies the header 
beautiful and illustrates just how lovely the view is. Examples such as these are very 
prevalent in everyday language, and their emphatic effect can be particularly strong 
when combined with intonational stress on the modifier. Degree modifiers then are 
useful, versatile tools of expression that appear to be very straightforward in nature.
The cognitive environment in which degree modifiers operate however is very 
complex, and the meaning that degree modifiers communicate depends on a number 
of factors. For example, it is not possible to fully appraise and understand the true 
nature of degree modifiers without also exploring their relationship with other 
linguistic forms, headers in particular. Furthermore, any study of the way in which 
people reason with degree modifiers requires a detailed exploration of the key 
cognitive elements involved in this area of linguistic processing. This is exactly the 
strength of utilising a cognitive linguistic approach to the research of degree 
modifiers, as it encompasses and integrates many of the critical components required 
to fully explore this intriguing area. Moreover, it makes it easier to include the whole
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area of uncertain reasoning, which is an aspect of this study that I believe brings an 
element of added value to our understanding of degree modifiers.
Degree modifiers can also be included in a list of uncertainty markers although 
their use does not necessarily indicate uncertainty; ironically, it is this potential 
ambiguity about their role that can increase uncertainty about how the use of degree 
modifiers should be interpreted. In chapter three I will discuss various classes of 
adverbs, some of which act as degree modifiers, although it is important to point out, 
even at this stage, that my interest is in all classes of adverbs that can be associated 
with the certainty or uncertainty of a belief. For example, the word ‘maybe’ is not 
classified as a degree adverb, yet it does function as a degree modifier. A typology of 
degree modifying adverbs is discussed in section 3.2.2. The linguistic manifestation of 
uncertainty is likely to depend on the particular situation and the amount of relevant 
information available to the perceiver, but they will also be subject to existing beliefs 
and prior knowledge about the world, including culturally specific aspects.
This research is important for a number of reasons. It explores the inherently 
uncertain and often subjective nature of beliefs and provides a focused study of 
specific linguistic forms (i.e. degree modifiers such as quantifiers and intensifiers). 
The way in which I approach the subject of uncertainty in language is also an element 
of this thesis that I believe is of significance. Researchers often use uncertainty as an 
explanation for certain types of communicative failure, whereas I tend to see language 
as a communicative process that is largely successful despite its uncertain nature. The 
significance of this is that it treats uncertainty as an inherent and mainstream part of 
language, and therefore of linguistic research. It also makes full utilisation of the most 
current research available in cognitive linguistics, a fascinating area that has continued 
to expand and deepen our knowledge of language for several decades.
With all of these issues in mind my research questions are as follows:
1. What are the key cognitive linguistic elements that contribute to the 
communication of the meaning of degree modifiers, and what role does uncertain 
reasoning play in the conceptualisation and processing of these meanings?
2. What effect do different degree modifiers have on the perceptions of the strength 
of the header on which they act, and on the certainty of the belief that the degree 
modifier/header combination represent?
3. Can different headers actually influence the way degree modifiers themselves are 
perceived and if so how does this manifest itself?
4. What role do collocational or other lexical semantic aspects of language play in 
moderating the way in which the analysis of degree modifier/adjective 
combinations should be approached or interpreted?
The thesis consists of five chapters:
Chapter 1 outlines the historical context of cognitive linguistic research and 
introduces basic areas of linguistic theory relevant to this thesis. It establishes an 
initial understanding of the relationship between thought and language, and sets the 
scene for some of the work on categorisation and prototypical adjectives in chapter 2. 
It also raises the core subject of uncertainty and outlines some fundamental areas in 
which uncertainty influences the way language is represented and processed 
internally. Through this exploration it will become clear just how prevalent 
uncertainty is in language and linguistic processing, and how the cognitive linguistic 
system structures itself to cope with an element that otherwise would cause serious 
bottlenecks and monopolisation of cognitive resources.
Chapter 2 explores in some detail the key internal constructs that are used to 
represent our beliefs about the world around us. Specifically, it emphasises and 
explains the centrality of the roles of categorisational and prototypical belief structures
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in the representation of degree modifiers and headers, and their relationship to the 
manner in which uncertain beliefs are represented and processed.
Chapter 3 focuses on developing the reader’s understanding of degree 
modifiers, how and where they are typically used and the grammatical and pragmatic 
aspects that constrain or moderate their usage. In particular, this chapter deals with 
collocational aspects of degree modifier/adjective combinations, and explores the role 
of collocations in the preparation for and analysis of corpus data for the experiment.
Chapter 4 deals with the main experiment in this research. It begins with a 
detailed examination of the nature and characteristics of degree modifiers, and 
describes previous research on degree modifiers that will be used as part of this 
research. The experimental methodology is proposed and the experimental process 
and findings are presented. This experiment, based on previous methodologies 
employed by Paradis, C. (1997), measures the extent to which degree modifiers 
combine with adjectives to express varying strengths of beliefs. In this thesis I have 
modified the experiment by adding a second domain of analysis, i.e. where 
participants score how certain they feel about their score in addition to the primary 
strength score relating to their perception of the degree modifier. The precise 
experimental methodology is described in detail as is the method used to evaluate the 
results. The final results are presented and the chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the results and their implications.
Chapter 5 looks at the findings of the thesis as a whole and summarises the 
way in which this research has contributed to our understanding of the role of degree 
modifiers in the cognitive representation of social beliefs and person perception. It 
also identifies potential areas of future research and flags issues that should be 
addressed or considered in this area of linguistic research.
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Chapter 1 
Current Issues in Cognitive Linguistic Theory
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to introduce relevant areas of cognitive linguistic theory and 
to provide an overview of the most recent developments in related theory. The first 
point of explanation has to be a definition of what cognitive linguistics actually is. 
Cognitive linguistics is a highly integrated multidisciplinary area of research that 
brings together many existing area of linguistic and psychological research. It is the 
study of how mind and language work together in areas such as semantics, syntax, 
language acquisition and language processing. This integrated approach is critically 
important in facilitating the inclusion of many differing yet converging areas of study 
in this thesis, and in this regard it is important to understand more about cognitive 
linguistics, its origins and the current state of the art. The ultimate foundations of 
cognitive linguistics can be found in many more traditional areas of linguistics and 
cognitive science, particularly in topics such as language, thought and 
conceptualisation.
1.2 The Development of Cognitive Linguistics
Cognitive linguistics is a multidisciplinary area of research that gained most 
prominence in the 1990’s, although its origins can be traced back some considerable 
time. As the name suggests, the primary focus of this research area is the combination 
of linguistics and cognitive science, the latter already being a multi-disciplinary area 
of research. Cognitive linguistics focuses primarily on psychological aspects of 
language, as opposed to pragmatics, which deals with language meaning and usage in 
context. Although the exploration of meaning traditionally fell within the domain of
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semantics, semantic theory was unable to fully account for differences between 
linguistic meaning and speaker meaning. Philosophers such as Grice, Searle and 
Austin (e.g. Grice 1975, Searle 1980 and Austin 1962) were at the forefront of the 
semantics-pragmatics debate, and are generally credited with shaping the foundations 
of current pragmatic theory. Since then, pragmatics has attracted a great deal of 
research interest and has diversified into its own areas of specialisation. Although 
cognitive aspects of language have always been acknowledged, cognitive linguistics 
did not really emerge as a specialisation until the late 1980’s and the majority of 
research and publications associated with this new area have been produced from the 
1990s onwards.
The aim of cognitive linguistic research is to explore the ways in which 
language acts as an instrument for organising, processing and communicating 
information. It deals with issues such as the conceptual interface between syntax and 
semantics, the relationship between language and thought, and the psychological 
context of linguistic performance. Like pragmatics, cognitive linguistics has become 
well established with the founding of the International Cognitive Linguistics 
Association and the distribution of their quarterly journal Cognitive Linguistics, which 
has been published since 1990.
The shift from behaviourism towards cognitivism in the 1960s and 1970s 
resulted in a greater emphasis on scientific experiments with quantifiable results (as 
opposed to introspection favoured by Structuralist psychologists such as Wundt or the 
observation of behaviour employed by Behaviourists such as Skinner). The increasing 
availability of new technology coupled with more advanced research and experimental 
methodologies also added to this momentum, and researchers were in a better position 
to evaluate and measure relationships between thought, language and speech.
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Achieving quantifiable results was seen as an objective means of evaluating 
hypotheses, although the interpretation of results was often highly subjective.
1.2.1 The Early Roots of Cognitive Linguistics
Although cognitive linguistics is a relatively new approach to the study of 
language and cognition, its precursors were many and the study of language and 
thought attracted several academics, philosophers and researchers of note. For 
example, Ludwig Josef Wittgenstein (1889-1951), a British philosopher bom in 
Austria, rejected the idea that words have definite of fixed meanings, and emphasised 
the use of language in creating meaning. He used the analogy of language as a game, 
and suggested that the mere ability to express thought in the forms of words does not 
give meaning to those words, because no action has yet been performed on them. 
Wittgenstein summed this idea up in his Philosophical Investigations (Stem 1995: 
184):
“Naming is not so far a move in the language game -  any more than putting 
a piece on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far 
been done, when a thing has been named”.
By avoiding logic-based approaches to the exploration of meaning, such as 
Tarskian truth-conditional semantics, Wittgenstein was able to emphasise the 
negotiation of meaning in everyday use, rather than how meaning is represented in the 
human mind. Essentially, he took the view that mental processes in themselves cannot 
be directly ‘translated’ into language, because meaning is generated only through the 
contextualised and social use of language, where meaning becomes an entity that is 
understood or ‘believed’ between people. This in fact tends strongly towards the 
‘cognitive’ view of language, i.e. that meaning is related to our knowledge of the 
world around us (Ungerer & Schmid 1996: xi).
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An individual’s internal representation of concepts, such as objects or 
sensations, is only meaningful if other people share an understanding of its associated 
linguistic form (e.g. chair, happiness) and attribute meaning to the performance of its 
linguistic form within a given context. Wittgenstein therefore largely rejected the 
notion that mental processes are expressed directly though linguistic form or are 
constituted in linguistic rules. This is interesting in that it illustrates two points: firstly, 
that context and shared understanding about that context are critical, and secondly, that 
language does not contain absolute meanings, rather its meanings have to be 
constantly negotiated and modified through use and experience. Words can therefore 
mean different things to different people in different contexts and, by implication, 
modifiers that shift the emphasis or certainty expressed in those words are also in part 
a function of the context in which they occur.
J.L. Austin (1911 -  1960), a British philosopher, claimed “the issuing of an 
utterance is the performing of an action” (Austin 1962: 6). A valuable aspect of 
Austin’s work is the way in which it created a focus on why people use language, i.e. 
speech acts, which complimented the research of other philosophers such as H.P. 
Grice, who was interested in how language communicates meaning between 
interlocutors. Austin (1960:52) describes a speech act as an utterance and the “total 
situation in which the utterance is issued”. In essence what this means is how 
language can be used in a variety of ways to communicate the intention behind the 
utterance, e.g. (from Thomas 1995: 51) a speech act of requesting someone to close 
the door could be communicated as:
• Shut the door!
• Could you shut the door?
• Did you forget the door?
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This research marked a shift towards the exploration of the pragmatic use of language, 
and attracted increasing amounts of research. Pragmatics depends heavily on 
understanding language in context, and every individual’s definition or perception of 
context is at least partly dependent on their knowledge of and beliefs about the world 
around them. This view of language was captured by D. Geeraerts in his Handbook of 
Pragmatics (Geeraerts 1995: 5): "Language, then, is seen as repository of world 
knowledge, a structured collection of meaningful categories that help us deal with new 
experiences and store old ones". However, cognitive linguistics was yet to develop its 
own identity and in part its development was linked to the emergence of new 
technologies, particularly from the 1950s onwards.
1.2.2 The Establishment of Cognitive Linguistics from the 1950s
Technological developments precipitated by WWII coupled with the greater 
emphasis on measurable results of experimentation created new and unprecedented 
research opportunities for most academic disciplines, including cognitive linguistics. 
Never before had it been so possible to combine various academic disciplines and to 
employ their principles in sophisticated computer-assisted experiments. Although 
computers at that time were rudimentary compared to the advanced machines of today, 
the advent of research into artificial intelligence was already underway, led by 
pioneers such as John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, and Herbert Simon 
(e.g. McCarthy 1958, Minsky 1968, 1975, Newell 1993, Simon 1977, 1995). In 1956 a 
symposium was held at Dartmore College at MIT, and speakers such as Noam 
Chomsky, Jerome Bruner and George Miller led the debate on new conceptualisations 
of cognitive and linguistic processes. The symposium had a profound effect on the
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participants, and solidified the general feeling that a new science was emerging. Miller
(1979) summed up the thoughts of many afterwards:
“I went away from the symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive 
than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics 
and computer simulation o f cognitive processes were all pieces o f a larger 
whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and co­
ordination o f their shared concerns”.
Even Bruner dates the beginning of cognitive psychology from this very 
symposium (Bruner 1983). One of the most prominent and influential of these 
speakers was Noam Chomsky (Chomsky 1957, 1980, 1986, 1988), an American 
linguist whose work on the philosophy and theory of language has contributed greatly 
to linguistics. In contrast to Wittgenstein, Chomsky asserted that language is 
“fundamentally a system for expressing thought” (Windisch 1990: 18). In particular 
Chomsky was interested in the relationship between linguistic meaning, form and 
structure. This can be seen in his definition of ‘grammatical competence’, which he 
described as:
“The cognitive state that encompasses all those aspects o f form and meaning 
and their relation, including underlying structures that enter into that 
relation, which are properly assigned to the specific subsystem o f the human 
mind that relates representations o f form and meaning” (Chomsky 1980: 59).
Consequently much of Chomsky’s research was devoted to exploring the
relationship between the semantic and syntactic properties of language, and the way in
which an apparently infinite combination of words can be used within a finite set of
linguistic rules to create meaningful sentences in natural language (a fundamental
principle in transformational grammar). Chomsky also asked other interesting
questions, some of which went beyond the grammatical aspects of language:
“To what extent... does the organisation o f sound properly belong to the 
system o f language rather than to other systems? Here there are real and
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significant empirical questions concerning perceptual categorisation and its 
possible special relation to language” (Chomsky 1980: 61).
Here Chomsky makes several important points, particularly if applied to the 
pragmatic use of language. Using Chomsky’s approach to thought and language, we 
can think of speech as a process that involves translating thought into linguistic form, 
and then transforming that language into meaningful sound. But Chomsky also raises 
another important issue, i.e. the ‘possible’ relationship between perceptual 
categorisation and language. Does language somehow contain encoded representations 
of perceptions, and what in what linguistic forms might these perceptions manifest 
themselves?
Chomsky’s questions are critically important in exploring the relationship
between language and perception, and this ultimately applies to the way in which
degree modifiers are used, particularly given the categorisational aspect of their
headers. However, it is essential to bear in mind that language must serve a range of
functions (such as those proposed by Austin), and that they are used within a social
context. Windisch (1990: 23) illustrates the point that speech is more than just a
collection of sounds:
“Verbal behaviour is actually never purely verbal, it is always verbal, 
cognitive and social at the same time. Linguistic practice is indissociable 
from cognitive and social practice. A linguistic practice is a social practice”.
These views raise interesting questions. How would a philosophy of thought 
and language differ from a philosophy of thought and speech? Is speech the verbal 
expression of linguistic thought, or is it a social behaviour that uses language as a 
common currency? Clearly Chomsky and Wittgenstein differ in their views on these 
issues; Chomsky favours the idea that thought and language are closely related, 
whereas Wittgenstein takes a more socio-behavioural view of language.
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There are several areas where the relationship between thought, language and
speech is critical. One of the most important in the context of the stated goals of this
research is the way in which people organise objects, events and people into natural
categories, and the relationship between these categorisational representations and
their application in language, and ultimately in the representation of categories,
prototypes and scalar relationships between degree modifiers and headers. Fraser
(1992: 102) illustrates the point well:
“Perception is closely bound up with language and culture. Our most common 
way o f  perceiving is in terms o f the categories our language gives us”.
Cognitive structures such as categories are important and I will discuss them in more 
detail at a later stage. However, a core philosophical issue remains: are categories 
merely internal cognitive structures that can be expressed in speech, or does speech 
actually shape and activate categories? This was one of the primary interests of 
Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, two American linguists who together 
proposed the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. In 1929 Edward Sapir, suggested that:
“Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the 
world o f social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the 
mercy o f the particular language which has become the medium o f  expression 
for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality 
essentially without the use o f language and that language is merely an 
incidental means o f solving specific problems o f communication or reflection.
The fact o f the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously 
built upon the language habits o f the group. No two languages are ever 
sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality.
The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the 
same world with different labels attached... We see and hear and otherwise
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experience veiy largely as we do because the language habits of our 
community predispose certain choices of interpretation” (1958: 69).
The writings of Whorf have created more debate about the extent to which these ideas 
hold true more than the credibility of the notions themselves, although Whorf was not 
without his critics. For example, one famous example associated with the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis is the Inuit Indian’s use of many different terms of different varieties of 
snow. One major criticism of their hypothesis is its lack of empirical support. 
Schlesinger points out that
“the mere existence of such linguistic diversities is insufficient evidence for 
the parallelist claims of a correspondence between language on the one hand 
and cognition and culture, on the other, and for the determinist claim of the 
latter being determined by the former” (1991:18)
and that
“Whorf occasionally supplies the translations from a foreign language into 
English, and leaves it to the good faith of the reader to accept the conclusion 
that here must have been a corresponding cognitive or cultural phenomenon” 
(1991:27).
There remains a variety of opinions about the extent to which the systemic structures 
of a language (what de Saussure referred to as la langue, Koemer 1973) constitutes a 
linguistic influence as opposed to those associated with social and cultural norms and 
individual use (de Saussure’s la parol: ibid). Benjamin Whorf reinforced Sapir’s 
thoughts by proposing that:
“We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The 
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not 
find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the 
world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be
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organized by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic systems in
our minds” (Whorf 1940: 213-14)
The Sapir Whorf hypothesis contains two main proposals (from Kit-Fong Au 1996: 
194):
(i) Linguistic Relativity: Structural differences between two languages 
will generally be paralleled by non-linguistic cognitive differences in 
the native speakers of the two languages.
(ii) Linguistic Determinism: The structure of a language strongly 
influences or fully determines the way its speakers perceive and reason 
about the world.
The notion of linguistic relativity is less problematic as it avoids the suggestion 
that there is a direct causal relationship between language and thought, whereas 
linguistic relativity suggests no more than a parallel between the two. The more 
extreme notion however that using a particular language somehow traps the speaker in 
the same cognitive environment as other speakers of the same language does seem 
difficult to accept; but there must also be some consistency in the cognitive 
environments of speakers of a given language to the extent that scalar representation 
operates in a reasonably consistent way across a population. Furthermore, the notion 
of prototypes depend heavily on culturally specific references and experiences, and the 
idea that languages can be translated effectively on a word-for-word basis in a way 
that captured the exact notion and example of prototypes in each language and culture 
seems very unlikely (see Nida's work on equivalence 1964, 1969 and 1982).
The nature of the relationship between language and thought is an important
aspect of the research of this thesis. The role of uncertainty is critical: language itself
contains many forms of uncertainty, which raises the issue of how people endeavour to
address uncertainty in language. Arguably, the use of degree modifiers achieve this to
some extent in that they potentially offer a greater degree of precision or qualification
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of what is being expressed, but this remains to be seen. When we add other important 
elements such as the subjectivity and variability of the beliefs on which many 
perceptions are based, then uncertainty becomes an issue that cannot be ignored. 
Fortunately, the expertise vested in cognitive linguistics is particularly well suited to 
exploring the relationship between cognition and language.
Some of the most recognisable work in cognitive linguistics came from 
researchers such as Ronald Langacker (1987, 1991), Charles Fillmore (2003) and 
George Lakoff (1980, 1987), both of whom were instrumental in bringing cognitive 
linguistics to the fore in the 1970s. Langacker and Fillmore produced copious amounts 
of research and publications on the topic of cognitive grammar. Lakoff wrote widely 
on a range of cognitive linguistic topics, most often in areas of semantics and language 
and conceptualisation. His 1987 publication ‘Women, fire and dangerous things’ in 
one of the better known books on semantic conceptualisation and categorisation, a 
core element in this thesis. The 1980s in particular saw greater numbers of researchers 
devoting their time and attention to many areas of cognitive research, and linguistics 
enjoyed renewed attention and a fresh perspective as a consequence. The scene was 
now well and truly set for the expansion of cognitive linguistics to the heights it has 
reached today, and for the manner in which the cognitive aspect of language has 
become an increasingly established element of many specialist sub-fields within 
linguistics.
The birth of cognitive linguistics as a formal area of academic research was 
claimed by the International Cognitive Linguistics Association (ICLA) at the First 
Cognitive Linguistics Conference, which was held in Duisburg in 1989. Since then, 
the ICLA has been responsible for producing its journal Cognitive Linguistics, and has 
organised biennial conferences at which leading academics gathered to present and
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share developments in cognitive linguistics. Presidents of the ICLA since its inception 
have included George Lakoff and Ron Langacker, two of the most recognised names 
in cognitive linguistics.
1.2.3 Current Developments in Cognitive Linguistics
As Croft and Cruse (2004: 328) point out, cognitive linguistics began largely 
as an approach to the analysis of linguistic meaning and grammatical form in response 
to truth-conditional semantics and generative grammar. The evolution of cognitive 
linguistics has seen its application beyond the boundaries of linguistics, and the extent 
to which one area of academic specialisation influences another is always a good 
indication of how far it has progressed. Cognitive linguistics in 2005 is a highly 
developed and extensive field of academic research. Research in cognitive linguistics 
has been applied to literary analysis (e.g. Turner 1987), to the stylistic analysis of 
poetry, narrative fiction and lyrics (e.g. Semino & Culpeper 2002), and even 
philosophy and ethics (e.g. Johnson 1993). Furthermore, the findings of cognitive 
linguistic research, in particular the assertion that language is not an autonomous 
cognitive facility, has increasingly held sway with researchers in non-linguistic 
cognition, who recognise the value that cognitive linguistics has added to our 
understanding of conceptual structures.
Differing views remain about the critical question of the relationship between 
language and cognition. Sperber and Wilson argue that the essential function of 
language is information processing and that this function can be separated completely 
from language as a communicative device:
“The activities which necessarily involve the use of a language (i.e. a
grammar-governed representational system) are not communicative but
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cognitive. Language is an essential tool for the processing and 
memorising of information” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 173).
One criticism of cognitive linguistics is that it tends to focus on the internal
cognitive processes of the individual, and not enough on the linguistic discourse
between people. While I am not convinced that this is a particularly strong argument, I
would agree that it is useful to be able to link cognitive linguistic theory to observable
linguistic behaviour. In this regard I aim to include both the internal constructs
associated with degree modifiers with their usage in everyday language, particularly
with regard to their relationship to other linguistic forms and the linguistic choices
people make when dealing with uncertain concepts. Another criticism is that cognitive
science assumes that the mind has mental representations analogous to computer data
structures, and computational procedures similar to computational algorithms. This is
the compromise between an approach to cognitive science that is computationally
tractable (i.e. it can be computed mathematically) and cognitively plausible (i.e. it
accurately reflects how the human mind actually works). Debate continues in other
key areas, and answers are likely to be slow in emerging. Topics remain such as the
nature versus nurture debate, the role of the social, physical and emotional world, and
the ultimate challenge of creating a mathermatical model of human reasoning, given
that human thinking cannot be computational in the standard sense, so the brain must
operate differently, perhaps as a quantum computer, an issue that Thagard (1996)
suggests can be best explored by expanding the computational-representational
approach to researching this area of cognitive science.
1.2.4 The Cognitive Context of Language
In order to understand why people reason about language as they do, it is
essential to appreciate the processes that act upon and influence their linguistic
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behaviour. The amount of information that people have to process even to engage in 
the most basic linguistic exchange is almost overwhelming. This is especially the case 
when we consider that all of this information and the utterances produced as a 
consequence have to be managed in real time, i.e. as it actually occurs. This might not 
be so difficult if what people said was literally true and expressed their intentions 
directly and explicitly, as this would limit the work required to the simple 
understanding of words and sentences. However, in order to balance the need to 
achieve various goals while adhering to social expectations, people need to employ 
various linguistic strategies. The constant need for interlocutors to ‘think on their feet’ 
is not limited to their linguistic behaviour, although the pragmatic use of language is 
an excellent example of this ability.
The role of context in determining meaning and word sense will ultimately 
become very apparent over the course of this thesis. I would first like to look at the 
nature of context itself, and to develop at least an initial understanding of how it can 
be defined. The notion of context applies across a multitude of disciplines including 
linguistics, psychology, computer science, and artificial intelligence. Across such 
disciplines, two broad categories or approaches to context have evolved; a theory of 
objective context, exemplified by the works of Kaplan (1978, 1989) and Lewis (1969, 
1993, 1998), and a theory of subjective context, exemplified by the works of 
McCarthy (1958) and Giunchiglia (1993). These two categories of context can be 
summarised as follows:
• Context is an objective or metaphysical (ontological) state that represents a set 
of features of the world that can be expressed in ways such as time, place, 
speaker, etc.
• Context is a subjective or cognitive (epistemic) representation of the world that 
can be expressed as language, rules, axioms, etc.
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Perry (1997) also proposes three different levels of context; pre-semantic, semantic 
and post-semantic. The pre-semantic context is required to initiate a syntactic 
evaluation of an utterance, which otherwise would contain potential ambiguities. For 
example, a sentence such as “I saw her duck under the table” contains potential 
ambiguities. It could refer to a woman’s duck (the bird) underneath a table or a 
scenario where a woman is seeking cover beneath a table, depending on whether ‘her’ 
is an indexical or a possessive pronoun, and whether ‘duck’ is a noun or a verb. Once 
it has been determined which syntactic structures and meanings are being used, we 
then need to resolve the semantic context. For example, assuming that the word ‘her’ 
in the sentence above is an indexical, we then need contextual information about the 
person, place, time, etc. to decide which individual the sentence refers to. 
Interestingly, Penco (1999: 3) defines post-semantic context as what is assumed or 
taken for granted during a linguistic exchange between people. This notion is an 
element in various parts of this thesis, such as the discussion of prototypes, schematic 
beliefs and categorisational processes, many of which are reflective of the culture and 
society in which the interlocutors live.
Firth once stated that a word is characterized by the company it keeps (Firth 
1957:179). His Contextual Theory o f Meaning emphasizes the importance of context: 
the context of the social setting (as opposed to the idealized speaker), the context of 
spoken and textual discourse (as opposed to the isolated sentence), and, important for 
collocations, the context of surrounding words. Context is also an important element 
in word sense discrimination (also known as word sense disambiguation, discussed in 
section 2.2.2 below). The difficulty with word sense discrimination is to choose which 
word sense to select for that particular context. McRoy (1992: 3-4) suggests a number 
of sources that can inform word sense:
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• the analysis of each word into its root and affixes, that is, its morphology;
• the contextually appropriate part or parts of speech of each word, that is, its 
syntactic tag or tags;
• for each sense of the word, whether the sense is preferred or deprecated, either 
in general, because of its frequency, or in the context, because it is the 
expected one for a domain;
• whether a word is part of a common expression, or collocation, such as a 
nominal compound (e.g., soda cracker) or a predicative relation (e.g., take 
action);
• whether a word sense is supported by the semantic context -  for example, by 
its association with other senses in the context sharing a semantic category, a 
situation, or a topic;
• whether the input satisfies the expectations created by syntactic cues (e.g., 
some senses only take arguments of a particular syntactic type);
• whether it satisfies role-related expectations (i.e., expectations regarding the 
semantic relations that link syntactically attached objects);
• whether the input refers to something already active in the discourse focus.
To take this discussion to a deeper level would require a detailed look at areas such as 
semantic networks and clusters, and this would distract from what is intended, at least 
at this stage, to be a higher level exploration of the notion of context. What is relevant 
to now consider is how the limitations of the human mind contribute to the 
construction of context.
Aside from the surface social and behavioural constraints imposed on people, 
another less obvious yet very real constraint exists, i.e. that of cognitive economy. 
Cognitive economy is an accepted notion that the human mind constantly seeks to 
obtain and process as much information as possible for as little cognitive effort as 
possible, and consequently needs to shape information into the most efficient
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structures possible (Ungerer & Schmid 1996: 68, Sperber & Wilson 1995: vii). This 
also affects perceptual and attentional biases both in our surrounding world and the 
language we use. For example, when chatting in a room full of people, we are 
surrounded by an astonishing amount of information that we could possibly focus on 
and consider. We could focus on the light bulb that illuminates the room, the physical 
and dimensional properties of its filament and the mechanical and electrical processes 
that creates this source of light. If we were to allow ourselves to be wide open to that 
level of unfiltered detail about every item in the room, then mentally we would 
implode as the human mind is simply incapable of processing such vast quantities of 
data.
This is a rather superficial example of a process that has a significant influence 
on the way we process language and thought, and the extent of this influence will 
become apparent as the thesis progresses. In order to concentrate on the conversation 
itself, an interlocutor cannot afford to attend to environmental details other than those 
that are immediately relevant to current mental or behavioural activities. The human 
mind, despite its impressive capabilities, is limited in the amount of information it can 
process at one time. It is generally accepted that approximately seven items (known as 
units) of information can be held in short term memory (technically known as Short 
Term Storage, or STS) at any given time (Miller 1956). One cognitive process that 
seeks to address this difficulty is known as chunking, whereby individual units are 
linked together to form one single more complex unit. Ashcraft (1994: 147) uses the 
following example to illustrate the point:
BYGROUPINGITEMSTOGETHERINTOUNITSWEREMEMBERBETTER
It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to remember the above sequence 
of 40 letters and would cause difficulties in processing even if this was possible. STS
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therefore ‘chunks’ chosen letters together into words that can be more easily held in 
STS, more quickly processed and more readily stored in Long Term Storage (LTS) if 
necessary. The process of remembering these new ‘chunked’ units is known as re­
coding; the individual units such as letters are therefore automatically ignored. 
Obviously there has to be some basis for how information is re-coded, i.e. units are 
chunked on the basis of some relationship between them, and not arbitrarily.
I have already borrowed the term cognitive economy to describe the way in 
which people need to be ‘cognitive misers’; i.e. people use their cognitive resources 
only to support necessary information-processing tasks. Fiske & Taylor (1991: 14) 
described people as cognitive misers in that they are burdened with processing 
demands that far exceed their timeframes and mental capacities. The propensity of the 
human mind to take cognitive ‘short-cuts’ such as chunking and re-coding has a 
number of important implications. It indicates that information can be stored into 
meaningful collections in an organised and efficient manner, and that the storage of 
information in the human mind is based upon some associative relationship rather than 
purely arbitrarily (Srull & Wyer 1989). One of the most fundamental mental processes 
that is shaped by the requirements of cognitive economy is categorisation, a process 
which ensures that “the perceived world comes as structured information rather than as 
arbitrary and unpredictable attributes” (Rosch 1978: 274). Categorisation involves the 
classification of people, objects and events into groups which have perceivable 
similarities with each other, and which are distinguishable from other categorical 
groups.
All of these elements combine to moderate how language is perceived and 
interpreted. The way in which words are mentally classified and related is not an 
arbitrary process, but rather occurs in such a way that semantic categories are formed,
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i.e. words are categorised according to associations between their meanings. 
Individual words or phrases therefore take on added significance in that they can 
create expectations about what is about to occur in the conversation, and create a 
‘background’ against which subsequent hypotheses can be tested. Beliefs therefore are 
generated and modified dynamically in real time and the amount and quality of 
information available to the perceiver is critical in determining the strength or 
certainty of beliefs. This obviously is an important consideration in examining the use 
of degree modifiers, which themselves can be used to enhance or weaken the strength 
of beliefs expressed through linguistic forms such as adjectives or verbs. I have 
discussed the process of categorisation in detail in chapter 2.
Another basic property of language is linearity, i.e. that language has a time- 
related structure that constrains the exchange of information and meaning between 
parties to a speech event. This aspect is very obvious when reading a text, where the 
reader is constrained by linearity but benefits from the opportunity to look back at 
what has already been read, or to look at what lies ahead in the text; in speech however 
the constraints of linearity are more evident. There is a difference between the real 
time and online aspect of speech processing, a difference that is crucially important in 
understanding the pragmatic use of language. The real time element is straightforward, 
i.e. speech must be processed and produced as it occurs. This however does not mean 
that lexical choice and interpretative processes occur strictly as speech is produced and 
attended to. Unlike a textual transcription of a conversation, an interlocutor cannot 
easily access everything that has already been said (due to cognitive economy) and is 
entirely unable to access the actual sentences and linguistic behaviour that lies ahead 
(although certain predictions may be made).
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In order to maintain a fluent stream of meaningful and appropriate speech, an 
interlocutor utilises a process known as back-propagation (Altmann & Shillcock 
1993), which involves the constant backward reference to existing beliefs or 
associations that have been generated already in the conversation. This is essential in 
order to maintain cognitive economy; uncertain meanings or beliefs cannot be 
maintained indefinitely and therefore new information needs to be compared against 
existing information using this back-propagation system.
Online speech processing is not an entirely backward-looking function. As I 
have already mentioned, language usage also creates expectations about what may be 
about what might lie ahead (a process known as priming (Brooks 1987)), which can 
influence the interpretation of the speech being processed at a particular point in time. 
An example of the effect of priming can be seen in the following sentence:
Example: The astronomer married the star.
In this example the term ‘astronomer’ creates a set of assumptions and beliefs 
that moderate how subsequent language is perceived. The idea of an astronomer 
marrying a celestial body is clearly at odds with our factual knowledge of the world 
we live in, yet the reader is required to do a mental ‘double-take’ in order to make any 
sense of the sentence. Another good example of this process (known as feedforward 
(Altmann & Shillcock 1993)) can be seen in what linguists informally refer to as 
‘down the garden path’ sentences. The following examples (which I also use later in 
the thesis) demonstrate the influence of both back-propagation and feedforward 
systems in language; an initial belief is generated as the sentence is processed and this 
creates a strong expectation about the remainder of the sentence. When the new 
information is inconsistent with the existing belief, the perceiver mentally refers back 
to this belief and revises the belief with the benefit of the new information.
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Example 1: The old man’s glasses were filled with sherry.
Example 2: The crane on the building site had laid three eggs.
Clearly the interpretation of the words ‘glasses’ and ‘crane’ is critical. The 
initial strong belief (generated by ‘old man’ and ‘building site’ respectively) becomes 
highly uncertain as new information is added. By the time this new information 
becomes available, the perceiver has already travelled ‘down the garden path’, and is 
forced to re-test the initial belief in order to retrieve the correct meaning of the 
sentence.
The linear and potentially ambiguous nature of language and the ways in 
which people use language can create uncertainty about how to interpret and react to 
different potential meanings. The extent to which this is manifest in the use of degree 
modifiers is an interesting question and the research study in chapter four will explore 
this in some detail. In particular, I am interested in exploring how more ambiguous (or 
less certain) forms of degree modifiers influence the perceived certainty of their 
header, which might suggest that the perceiver would increasingly have to attend to or 
search for alternative evidence in the utterance to ascertain the intended meaning of 
the speaker.
1.3 Understanding Uncertainty and Uncertain Reasoning
Despite uncertainty, people appear to be able to use language fluently and without 
much conscious effort. Language itself is abstract, i.e. it is a tool of symbolic thought, 
and the communication of meaning between people depends on their common 
understanding of what words represent. However, uncertainty is an inherent part of 
language and people often deliberately harness this in their pragmatic use of language. 
Uncertainty can also be created in communication due to individual differences in
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perception, interpretation and beliefs, which are usually quite subjective. Resulting 
from these, a third and very fundamental phenomenon occurs, that of uncertain 
reasoning, which is the process of reasoning with uncertain knowledge or beliefs. 
Uncertain reasoning is significant in that it competes heavily for very limited cognitive 
resources; ordinarily online processing involves the efficient management of a great 
deal of information, but when uncertain knowledge is introduced this process become 
increasingly difficult to sustain, particularly given the demands of real-time speech 
events.
Uncertain reasoning at any level should not necessarily be thought of as a part 
of an individual’s deep cognitive machinery. While I have already pointed out that 
speech is often typified by the way it is produced and comprehended without much 
conscious effort, the conscious awareness and use of uncertainty in language can have 
a disproportionately large impact on the pragmatic use of language. The essential 
condition here is awareness, that an individual can consciously use uncertainty 
strategically in their pragmatic use of language, or the idea that an awareness of 
uncertainty can also adversely influence an individual’s ability to process language 
effectively. The link between cognition, context and the behaviour of social 
interactants is a widely accepted notion; Potter (1998: 40) stresses:
“the importance o f treating cognition in much the same way as other 
features o f context -  as something that is formulated, worked up, constituted 
and oriented to by participants”.
Language and speech-in-use therefore do not simply occur within a context -  
they are part of the context, and elements of language and linguistic behaviour, such 
as uncertainty and the use of uncertainty in social interaction, are essential and 
inseparable parts of the context.
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Uncertainty is an inherent part not only of language itself, but also of the way 
in which people participate in social communication. This is an important aspect of the 
context in which the specific use of forms such as degree modifiers should be 
interpreted, i.e. that uncertainty is not limited merely to linguistic uncertainty, but is 
also part of a much broader continuum of uncertainty which encompasses social 
communication, ambiguities about the intended meaning of the speaker, etc (see 
additional reference to pragmatic uncertainty in section 1.3.2.2 below). All of these 
factors (and many more) are potential sources of uncertainty, and are all part of the 
perceptual context in which language is processed and interpreted.
1.3.1 Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertain Knowledge
Uncertainty is such an inherent part of language that it is impossible to ignore.
I also believe that this study of uncertainty and uncertain reason reflects how language
is actually used in practice:
“Speakers rarely mean what they say. The direct meaning o f their utterances is 
only a clue to what they mean, and listeners have to combine such clues with 
other information and infer the intended interpretations” (Clark 1978: 319).
This reiterates two points that I have already made: that language is a form of
social human behaviour and that combinations of propositions often need to be
considered. Language is a perfect tool for those with questionable motives or those
who need to be maximally polite or evasive:
“Natural language is notorious for its vagueness, ambiguity, nonspecificity 
and indexicality. Those very properties make it relatively easy to lie, 
dissemble, obscure and confuse so that even those who are fluent in a natural 
language are easily deceived” (Smithson 1989: 227).
Clear there is more to uncertainty than the term applies; Smithson (1989) 
develops this by proposing a typology which begins with the central concept of
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ignorance, the premise for which is that ignorance, like knowledge, is socially 
constructed and negotiated. Smithson (1989: 227) suggests a loose definition of 
ignorance:
“A is ignorant from B ’s viewpoint if A fails to agree with or show
awareness o f ideas which B defines as actually or potentially valid”
Smithson does acknowledge that this definition is somewhat inadequate given 
the highly generalised nature of the term, from which many other more specific forms 
of ignorance are derived. From a linguistic point of view it is also lacking, specifically 
in the way that Smithson’s definition emphasises the elements of ‘agreement with’ 
and ‘showing awareness’. I will qualify this criticism in section 1.5.4 below. He also 
makes two important points regarding ignorance. The first is that ignorance occurs at a 
number of levels, i.e. that people vary in the extent to which they are aware of their 
own ignorance; I have already mentioned the role of second-order logic and 
uncertainty. The second point is that ignorance can occur at either an informational or 
epistemological level. Informational ignorance occurs when an individual (who 
Smithson rather unkindly refers to as an ‘ignoramus’) is in error about factual matters, 
whereas epistemological ignorance occurs when that individual, having the correct 
facts available, does not process them appropriately. Beyond this Smithson illustrates 
his taxonomy of ignorance as follows (Smithson 1989: 9):
Figure 1.1: Smithson’s Taxonomy of Ignorance
i ranee
Error Irrelevance
Untopicality Taboo  ^ UndecidatJility
Distortion Incompletenessa
Confusion Inaccuracy Uncertainty Absence
Vagiieness Probability Ambiguity 
Fuzziness Nonspecificity
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Traditional approaches to the cognitive management of uncertainty have taken 
a probabilistic view of uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty is seen either as a frequentistic 
measure of randomness or in terms of a subjective measure of confidence satisfying 
well circumscribed propositions (Krause and Clark 1993: 3). A classic example of this 
approach can be found in Bayesian probability, which is a subjective view of 
probability measured by the degree of belief of a person in a given hypothesis. This is 
often combined with the Bayesian rule of conditioning, which essentially is a 
subjective system of belief revision based on the observation and consideration of new 
evidence. The Bayesian approach however has been criticised (Krause and Clark 
1993: 16) for being normative but not descriptive, i.e. it prescribes an ideal method of 
establishing degrees of belief rather than describes how people actually evaluate 
beliefs. Give that people are poor estimators of numerical values and do not assign 
percentage probability values to each proposition, Bayesian probability therefore, 
while computationally tractable, lacks cognitive plausibility in that it does not reflect 
how people actually reason with uncertain knowledge. I have borrowed an example 
from Croft and Cruse (2004: 185) to illustrate this point:
Person A: How was the earthquake?
Person B: Quite good -  better than the last one.
The degree-modifying adverb quite above could potentially create a great deal of
uncertainty. Depending on your point of view or interpretation of the strength of quite,
this degree modifier might potentially be seen to reduce the strength of good, i.e. that
quite good is somewhat less definite or strong than good (without the degree
modifier). It is the addition of the second clause that provides the evidence, i.e. it
refers to and therefore benchmarks this earthquake against the most recent one.
Without this additional clause, it would have been very difficult to get a sense of what
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quite good actually meant. However, person A is unlikely to have assigned a
percentage belief in their hypothesis of what speaker B meant, or to have
mathematically adjusted this figure upwards when the second clause was uttered.
This thorny issue of how to ascribe measures to degrees of belief remains a
point of debate in areas such as cognitive science and logic. However, the notion that
beliefs can be adjusted (conditional probability) depending on what evidence presents
itself is important, and this point will be revisited throughout the thesis. Cheeseman
(1985: 29) summed this point up as follows:
“The conditional probability of a proposition given particular evidence 
is a real number between zero and one, that is an entity’s belief in that 
proposition, gives the evidence”.
This approach uses a non-monotonic logic, i.e. a formal framework devised to capture
and represent defeasible inference, i.e., that kind of inference of everyday life in which
reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light
of further information. Such inferences are called "non-monotonic" because the set of
conclusions warranted on the basis of a given knowledge base does not increase (in
fact, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge base itself. This is in contrast to
classical (first order) logic, whose inferences, being deductively valid, can never be
"undone" by new information.
In the context of uncertain reasoning, first order logic most certainly does not
reflect how people reason with uncertain beliefs, especially in the case of degree
modifiers. Degree modifers themselves represent a potential source of uncertainty, as
do the headers on which they act. For example, take the degree modifier somewhat.
Hat exactly does this word mean? What level of precision can it be assigned, or is this
level something that is perceived subjectively and individually depending on that
person’s own interepretation of the word or the context it which it presents itself? Now
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take the header large. How large is large? Is it a physical or conceptual measurement?
Across how many dimensions does it apply? Both the degree modifier and the header
are potentially uncertain (and possibly highly so), and the perceiver will be aware of
this. This metacognitive awareness of uncertainty is an important aspect of second
order reasoning, particularly when people are required to evaluate what the degree
modifier represents in terms of other people’s beliefs.
Taking a first order approach, a measure of uncertainty could be calculated as 1
minus the amount of certainty. However, to ‘calculate’ uncertainty in this way is to
ignore the effect of metacognition, specifically the degree of uncertainty about
uncertainty. I have already emphasised the role and effect of metacognition on
people’s behaviour and language usage, and this is equally applicable to uncertainty,
and therefore second-order reasoning has to be taken into consideration. Uncertainty
cannot easily be assigned fixed values, and this is especially true when people have
their own perceptions about degrees of uncertainty, and for this reason uncertainty has
to be assigned a subjective value. Therefore a more appropriate proposal is:
“That the uncertainty o f a belief is 1 minus its subjective probability, and 
that the degree o f uncertainty o f a conclusion validly inferred from uncertain 
beliefs should not exceed the value o f their uncertainties” (Evans, Over & 
Manktelow 1993: 182).
Second-order uncertain reasoning (i.e. uncertain reasoning about uncertainty) 
in an environment where various uncertain propositions remain resolved quickly 
increased the cognitive load and makes real-time speech processing difficult. The 
reflexive nature of language adds to this, i.e. an interlocutor who is uncertain about the 
meaning of an utterance is very likely to experience some problems in quickly 
choosing an appropriate response. The amount of certain beliefs being processed by an 
individual is therefore likely to be overshadowed by a relatively small number of
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uncertain propositions. Clearly people need an efficient mechanism with which to 
resolve uncertainty, and it is important therefore that the nature of the uncertainty can 
be identified and addressed appropriately.
Up to this point I have referred variously to ‘knowledge’ and ‘beliefs’, and as 
yet I have not suggested any distinction between the two. The definition of what 
constitutes knowledge or belief is the subject of some debate. One apparent distinction 
between the two is that beliefs are likely to be more subjective then knowledge. Such a 
well-defined distinction is hard to justify without entering into a lengthy philosophical 
debate, which is unlikely to be either conclusive or productive. Furthermore, it would 
not necessarily shed any light on the issue of uncertainty in knowledge or beliefs, 
which is one of my areas of interest.
A more constructive approach to the subject is to treat knowledge and beliefs 
as being very similar mental constructs that have different levels of certainty 
associated with each. The degree of certainty can be represented along a scale, ranging 
from highly uncertain (weak) to highly certain (strong) beliefs. Much of what is 
usually thought of as knowledge can actually be more accurately described as beliefs. 
For example, most people can name the planets within our solar system, and they 
‘know’ that these planets revolve around the sun. However, most people have never 
seen these planets nor have any direct evidence to suggest that they do in fact revolve 
around the sun. For many centuries the earth people (even scientists and the 
established church) held that the earth was at the centre of the universe, and that the 
sun, stars and planets revolved around the earth. This was most definitely treated as 
accepted knowledge, to the extent that anyone who openly contradicted this view was 
considered a heretic. Two entirely different sets of beliefs about the same subject have 
both been treated as knowledge, despite the apparent lack of evidence to support
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either. The essential reason that they qualified as knowledge is that they were very 
strongly commonly held beliefs, and thus treated as factual knowledge. McEnery 
(1996: 30) proposes a hypothetical continuum of weak/strong knowledge as below: 




Book of chess hints 
Weaker rules in harmony 
with stronger rules
Social conventions
Quite weak -  subject to 
change and failure of 
application
Laws of the land
Strong, but can be 





Strong, but may have been 
formulated after a long 
period of uncertainty. Can 
change.
STRONG
This approach, however, does deal explicitly with uncertain knowledge. Uncertain 
knowledge could be represented as an inverse of McEnery’s continuum of 
strong/weak knowledge, i.e. the stronger the belief, the lower the uncertainty 
associated with that belief, and vice versa. This is potentially an interesting hypothesis 
in relation to the study of degree modifiers, i.e. does the certainty associated with the 
perception of degree modifiers grow as their perceived strength increases? For 
example, most people would accept that the degree modifier really communicates a
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stronger modifying effect than fairly. Does this mean then that people’s belief of the 
strength of really exceeds that of fairly ? This interesting question will be examined 
further during the experiment in chapter 4. For the moment however I want to 
concentrate on deepening our understanding of uncertain reasoning, particularly in 
relation to language and linguistic processing.
1.3.2 A Typology of Uncertainty in Language
While I have yet to develop a more complete list of different types of 
uncertainty, there is one area of uncertainty that requires discussion before the pilot 
study can be commenced. I have already outlined in broad terms how language relates 
to thought and the way in which people use categories and other such cognitive 
mechanisms to minimise the amount of cognitive load. However, the disadvantage of 
this system is its lack of precision. Furthermore, uncertainty can be found in the way 
language is used in addition to uncertainty in language itself. To simplify matters I 
have proposed two broad classifications of uncertainty in language, i.e. linguistic 
uncertainty and pragmatic uncertainty. Linguistic uncertainty is especially relevant to 
the way in which degree modifiers are used in that these modifiers can be used to 
reduce, increase or hedge the amount of uncertainty associated with or expressed by an 
utterance. However pragmatic uncertainty is also extremely important in that it can be 
closely related to speaker motivations underlying the choice of language used in a 
given situation. Uncertainty has a number of significant implications for everyday 
language. The term ‘uncertainty’ tends to have negative connotations, and uncertainty 
in language can certainly adversely affect the efficient processing of speech. In 
addition to people’s knowledge o f  language and thought, people also have knowledge 
about language (metalinguistic knowledge) and about thought (metacognitive
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knowledge). An interlocutor, being both speaker and hearer, can be affected by 
uncertainty in many ways. For example, a speaker’s awareness of the grammatical or 
pragmatic ‘rules’1 of language means that they can detect when these ‘rules’ are being 
infringed or broken in some way. This is the basis of one of the leading figures in 
pragmatic theory, H.P. Grice, whose Co-operative Principles were based on people’s 
knowledge about language usage (Grice 1975). Metaknowledge is also one of the 
basic components of any Artificial Intelligence (AI) system, as the ability of a 
computer to reason about the way it thinks is the essence of its own intelligence.
There is unquestionably a direct relationship between metacognition and 
language, particularly cognition involving subjective beliefs. In order to express a 
belief, e.g. “he’s a nice guy”, it is first necessary to hold a metabelief about this belief,
i.e. ‘I believe that he’s a nice guy’. Moreover, according to Langford (1994: 20), this 
relationship is not compromised where the speaker is mistaken or insincere about what 
is said. This is extremely important for the pragmatic use of language. Language can 
be used to disguise intentions and to mislead in the same way that it can be used to 
convey clear and unambiguous meanings. If a speaker mistakenly but sincerely 
expresses a belief, then the fact that the belief is mistaken does not alter the fact that 
the speaker still genuinely holds that belief. Conversely, a speaker who insincerely 
expresses a belief does so knowing that he/she does not actually hold this belief. The 
same principles can be applied to people’s beliefs about other people, and about the 
way that the pragmatic use of language can alter other people’s perception of them. 
While many beliefs are not expressed through language (as they often need to be 
disguised), beliefs or perceptions about other people’s beliefs are significant in
1 I use the term ‘rules’ here simply to refer to people’s general awareness of how language works. I am 
not suggesting that language usage is rule-based.
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shaping the motivation and linguistic choices of interlocutors. As Maslow, A. (in
Lowry (Ed.) 1979) points out:
“Behaviour in the human being is sometimes a defence, a way o f  concealing 
motives and thoughts, as language can be a way o f hiding your thoughts and 
preventing communication”.
Metacognitive and metalinguistic beliefs therefore are by no means purely 
internalised functions, as they both relate to the perception of other people, and in 
particular to people’s conceptions of communicative strategies. A classic example of 
the overlap of metacognitive and metalinguistic knowledge can be seen in the way 
people utilise their beliefs about the recursive nature of language. One of the 
fundamental principles in pragmatic theory is that the communication and 
interpretation of meanings depends on interlocutors’ recognition of each other’s 
intentions, i.e.:
“The speaker’s intention in the making o f an utterance to produce an effect 
in the hearer by means o f the hearer’s recognition o f the intention to produce 
that effect” (Verschueren 1999:47).
This metacognitive belief about language and its effect on people’s perceptions 
and behaviour is used regularly to achieve people’s communicative goals. Similar 
metacognitive knowledge applies to the social context within which speech events 
occur, such as schemata, scripts, and frames. These strongly held beliefs about the way 
people behave in certain types of situations have an important influence both on 
people’s linguistic choices and on the expectations that they have about given contexts 
or situations. These principles are fundamental to what have become known as 
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986), a cognitive-oriented theory that 
emphasises the strong relationship between the language and thoughts of interlocutors:
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“Oral communication, for instance, is a modification by the speaker o f the 
hearer’s acoustic environment, as a result o f which the hearer entertains 
thoughts similar to the speaker’s own” (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 1).
Relevance theory depends on metacognitive and metalinguistic awareness, 
particularly in the interpretation of utterances. Interlocutors’ knowledge about both 
knowledge and language means that they can understand what is being said in its 
given context, and therefore they can resolve and utilise the linguistic and contextual 
elements that are relevant to the speech event.
An interlocutor’s knowledge about the uncertain nature of language can also 
play a significant role in the pragmatic use of language. Ordinarily people may elect to 
make linguistic choices that minimise the amount of uncertainty in their utterances; 
alternatively they may choose to deliberately employ linguistic strategies to increase 
uncertainty. However, in order to appreciate how uncertainty functions in language 
usage it is useful to firstly gain an understanding of what uncertainty actually is, and 
the forms in which it may present itself.
Relevance theory has attracted strong interest among researchers and 
academics because of the way it captures important aspects of cognition and 
communication within its two main principles. The first principle (known as the 
Cognitive Principle of Relevance) proposes that people constantly understand their 
environment by:
“paying attention to the newly accessible information that seems most 
relevant to them, and.... having thoughts inferentially derived by combining 
this information with the most relevant contextual information available”
(Sperber & Wilson 1997: 3).
This concept of the cognitive environment within which social interaction occurs 
forms the basis for Sperber and Wilson’s second principle (Communicative Principle 
of Relevance), which suggests that:
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“Every act o f ostensive communication communicates the presumption o f its 
own optimal relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 158).
However, there are elements in social communication that rely heavily on non- 
ostensive communicative methods. Furthermore, relevance as a notion is somewhat 
intangible, as it combines general notions of what is relevant in given situations (such 
as schematic beliefs) as well as more specific situational-dependant perceptions of 
relevance. It would be very unreasonable to suggest that people work on the basis of 
identical beliefs or perceptions, or that their knowledge about situations or other 
people is complete. Relevance theory provides a convenient explanation of how 
certain communicative goals are achieved but places less (and arguably too little) 
emphasis on communicative failure or the management of difficulties (such as 
uncertainty) in communication. I have explored Relevance Theory in more detail in 
section 2.2.3 below.
1.3.2.1 Linguistic Uncertainty
Several areas of language are uncertain irrespective of their pragmatic 
application in speech or the context in which they occur. Certain syntactic categories, 
such as adjectives, are notorious for the way in which they lack precision (e.g. nice), 
are fuzzy (e.g. long), can be used to convey more that one meaning (e.g. kind). Some 
adjectives have uncertain relationships between them, such as ‘pretty’ and ‘beautiful’; 
these adjectives are arguably part of a continuum of adjectives that describe degrees of 
attractiveness, although they might also be adjectives that are used to classify certain 
types of nouns. For example, ‘pretty’, as an adjective, is more likely to be used to 
describe some person or object that is visually appealing, whereas ‘beautiful’ could be 
used to describe something that appeals to other senses such as hearing (music), smell
44
(aroma of cooking) or taste (good food). In this sense ‘pretty’ can be thought of as 
being part of the possible range of meanings of ‘beautiful’, but not vice versa.
Uncertainty is also an inherent part of nouns. Some nouns are used to label 
categories that are very broad, and the noun therefore can be very imprecise. For 
example, the nouns ‘vehicle’ and ‘precipitation’ can be used to encompass many 
different sub-types of vehicles (cars, buses, motorbikes) and precipitation (rain, sleet, 
drizzle, hail, snow). As with adjectives, some nouns have different potential meanings. 
Although it was many years ago, I distinctly remember my mother telling me to put 
some clothes into the ‘bin’. I was very young at the time and I proceeded to empty the 
clothes into the dustbin instead of the clothes bin. My inability to distinguish between 
the different potential meanings of this noun was not at all appreciated by my mother.
Verbs can also contain uncertainties. For example, what is the exact difference 
between the verbs ‘to agree’ and ‘to concur’? Furthermore, the verb ‘to concur’ can 
also mean to occur simultaneously, to combine, to co-operate or to coincide. Even 
some of these alternative meanings are uncertain in that while they have different 
syntactic forms, they have extremely similar meanings (e.g. to occur simultaneously 
and to coincide). Verbs such as ‘to like’ suffer the same uncertainty as adjectives such 
as ‘nice’ in that they are very vague and imprecise; to like something expresses 
approval but fails to quantify it effectively, hence the potential value of degree 
modifiers such as really.
Other types of words can be used to try to describe or quantify verbs, 
adjectives and nouns in a way that might reduce their inherent uncertainty. Linguistic 
devices such as quantifiers (very, few, several, somewhat) help to address issues such 
as imprecision, but even quantifiers are uncertain in that they are fuzzy (i.e. they do 
not have finite boundaries) are therefore also imprecise. It is rather ironic that a
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linguistic device that can be used to reduce uncertainty is itself uncertain, although this 
adds to the intrigue in exploring the relationship between uncertainty and the use of 
degree modifiers such as quantifiers and intensifies. In this regard it is important to 
have an appreciation of the various classifications of degree modifiers and the way 
they can be used to influence other linguistic forms. This is particularly true as there 
are also issues such as grammatical constraints and collocations that need to be borne 
in mind when evaluating the role of degree modifiers. I have explored these issues in 
greater detail in section 3.2 below.
Other syntactic categories such as pronouns can create uncertainties because 
they rely on clarity of reference to function effectively. Take the following example: 
“John likes Paul because he shares his interests”.
The confusion in this case over who exactly is being referred to in the first pronoun 
(he) and the possessive pronoun (his) is not critical because the meaning of the 
sentence is the same whatever pronoun reference is used. However, the frequent use of 
large numbers of uncertain references such as pronouns and deictics are often more 
problematic that the simple example above. The uncertainty of these and other 
syntactic categories is also moderated by the ways in which they are used in everyday 
language. The way in which language is used can itself create another class of 
uncertainty, i.e. pragmatic uncertainty.
1.3.2.2 Pragmatic Uncertainty
Pragmatic uncertainty occurs as a result of the way in which people use 
language. While people often use their knowledge of linguistic uncertainty to achieve 
this, pragmatic uncertainty is not necessarily the result of linguistic uncertainty. 
Consider the following examples:
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Example 1: This coffee is wonderful.
Example 2: Is the window open?
Example 1 contains linguistic uncertainty because the adjective ‘wonderful’ is 
vague (it lacks clarity of definition and differentiation between other adjectives such as 
‘brilliant’), and it is also fuzzy (it lacks clear boundaries that define its upper and 
lower limits). It is however reasonably precise because its polarity is clear (i.e. it is a 
positive description) and it is towards the upper end of a possible scale of positive 
adjectives (good, great, brilliant, wonderful). Despite these areas of linguistic 
uncertainty, example 1 lacks pragmatic uncertainty in that the language is used in a 
straightforward, unambiguous way and it is obviously a positive comment about the 
coffee (excluding a possible scenario where intonation might indicate sarcasm).
Example 2 does not contain similar linguistic uncertainty. The only possible 
linguistic uncertainty is in the definite article ‘the’ (we assume that there is only one 
window, or that there is more than one but that the interlocutors understand which 
window is being referred to). The adjective ‘open’ has a direct binary opposite, i.e. 
‘closed’ and while there are other possible options (e.g. ajar, half-open), any possible 
uncertainty is minimal. Despite this lack of linguistic uncertainty, example 2 is clearly 
uncertain in that the intended meaning of the speaker is unclear. A hearer might infer a 
number of different intended meanings, such as:
1. Is the window open? (i.e. the question was intended to be literally true).
2. Don’t you think it’s too hot/cold/draughty/noisy in here? (requesting an 
opinion).
3. Can you open/close the window? (requesting or ordering an action).
4. You always leave the bloody window open/closed! (criticism).
From a communicative point of view, the use of degree modifiers should provide
greater specificity in that they qualify or moderate the strength of a concept, e.g. a
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really nice car is a more strongly expressed opinion than a nice car, and this belief is 
apparent to anyone who hears any such utterance. From a more comparative point of 
view, the difference between a fairly nice car and a quite nice car is less clear. For 
someone to describe a car (particularly the other person’s car while in their presence) 
as fairly nice would be unusual in that it flouts the Gricean maxim of manner, which 
suggests that people should avoid obscurity of expression and avoid ambiguity. The 
intention of the speaker in this case is certainty ambiguous and it’s hard to immediately 
tell whether it is in fact intended as a compliment or as damning the vehicle with faint 
praise. Incidentally, if the latter were the case then it would also be in line with 
Dascal’s (1983) suggestion that indirectness is both costly (takes longer for the speaker 
to produce and the hearer to process), and risky (the hearer may not understand what 
the speaker is trying to communicate).
The important point to note at this stage is that language can contain many 
different sources of pragmatic uncertainty such as the use of implicature, indirectness, 
politeness, hesitations, speech dysfluencies, and variations in paralinguistic and 
extralinguistic features. Sources of pragmatic uncertainty often reveal or are related to 
the motivations of the speaker, or alternatively can be used to disguise a speaker’s 
motivations (such as the use of uninformative intonation or ambiguous polarity to 
make the sincerity of a statement unclear). This example arose after a presentation by 
an enthusiastic interviewee, who was under the impression that he had performed 
particularly well:
Interviewer: “Thank you for your presentation, I hope it won’t be necessary
to ask you to do that again.”
It was only afterwards when the interviewee received extremely negative feedback 
that he realised that he had been mistaken about the valency of the statement (i.e. it
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was a negative rather than a positive comment) but that it had been phrased in such a 
way that the insult was not immediately apparent. The realisation that the interviewer 
was actually saying “I hope we won’t need to sit through that rubbish again” added to 
the pain of the rejection, particularly as he had initially believed that he had done well. 
This example illustrates how effective pragmatic uncertainty can be, even when 
linguistic uncertainty is at a minimum. The use of sarcasm is a wonderful example of 
the pragmatic use of degree modifiers to compound the reversal of semantic meaning. 
For example:
Person A: Mary just reversed into your new car.
Person B: That’s brilliant. Absolutely brilliant.
Clearly the word brilliant here is the main vehicle for sarcasm, but the addition of 
absolutely combined with the repetition of brilliant makes the sarcasm utterly 
unqualified and emphatic. It is interesting to see how differing relative strengths of 
degree modifiers and headers combine, e.g.:
“That meal was perfectly adequate”
“That was rather tasty”
In the first sentence, the degree modifier perfectly by itself is very strong and 
potentially very complimentary, yet it is combined with an adjective {adequate) that is 
less than flattering. This combination is likely to make the listener infer that the 
intended meaning of the statement was negative. The second sentence however 
involves a less emphatic degree modifier {rather), but it is combined with a positive 
and approving adjective {tasty). This gives the sense that this is a slightly understated 
but nonetheless enthusiastic compliment about the food. To examine this further 
would require the exploration of the collocational effects of word combinations, and 
this is the subject of chapter 3 in this thesis.
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1.4 Summary
It is clear that language has many types and sources of uncertainty, and that people 
need strategies to help them resolve these potentially problematic issues. The ability to 
reason effectively with uncertain knowledge and beliefs requires an insight into the 
uncertain nature of language, and uncertain concepts therefore need to be represented 
in the perceiver’s mind in a way that permits them to be used effectively during speech 
in real time. So despite their linguistic uncertainty and pragmatic uncertainty 
associated with their usage, it seems that people are able to use verbs, adjectives and 
nouns without substantial communicative failures. If not, speech would fail as an 
effective form of communication.
I now want to bring this introductory chapter towards a more finite focus on 
specific issues relating to degree modifiers are headers. These are important parts of 
language and the way they are used depends on many complex cognitive, linguistic 
and epistemic elements. In chapter 2 I have introduced these key elements with the 




Cognitive Linguistic Representation of Degree Modifiers & Headers
2.1 Introduction
Up to this point I have used terms such as ‘information’, ‘knowledge’, ‘beliefs’ and 
‘facts’ with relative synonymy whereas such definitions, at least past this point in the 
thesis, become more critical. This is particularly true as this research includes the 
study of uncertainty in language, and the representation of uncertain knowledge 
therefore requires clarity of definition. In the next section I will harness this phrase, 
i.e. ‘uncertain knowledge’ as the ongoing issue in this research and will attempt to 
define these and other terms in a meaningful and applicable way within the context of 
this research.
In order to grasp the elements underlying the representation and pragmatic use 
of degree modifiers, it is first essential to understand how people categorise objects, 
events and concepts, and how they are represented in people’s minds; these are after 
all the basic ‘building blocks’ of context. Furthermore, the fact that social interaction 
and speech events take place in real time needs to be acknowledged, and that 
decisions regarding utterance content, degree of indirectness, etc. need to be made 
within the constraints of real-time and in line with the communicative goals of the 
people concerned. This may sound straightforward but it actually represents an 
extremely complex combination of cognitive and linguistic processes working in co­
ordination with people’s existing beliefs (often based on social or cultural norms) 
about the world around the. In this chapter I have endeavoured to choose what I 
believe are the most relevant points from this complex scenario, and to relate them to
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both ‘real life’ communication and to the complex mental processes underlying that 
use of language.
As with many words, the word itself is a symbol that represents a particular 
concept. The word ‘apple’ is not itself an apple; it is a linguistic token that people in a 
culture understand represents that particular type of fruit. I have touched on this 
subject in the first chapter when discussing the work of Sapir and Whorf. The name 
notion applies to degree modifiers and adjectives, as well as many other types of 
lexical units. The notion that something is nice is a way of representing qualities about 
that object, person or experience that are pleasant or agreeable, but the word in itself is 
not more specific than that. Often it required additional information to determine a 
more precise meaning. For example, saying that ‘the meal was nice’ communicates 
the idea that nice means tasty, and that the two concepts are interchangeable in this 
context. Equally, the word very represents the idea that something is somehow 
stronger than some given norm, hence the need to use this word to boost the scalar 
strength of that particular element, whatever it may be. It is all rather conceptual and 
intangible, yet it is such a common, everyday aspect of the way we use language. The 
ability to use language to communicate via concepts such as these is a rich area of 
research, and the fact that communication can be achieved in real time so successfully 
through such an abstract tool as language is genuinely intriguing. I firstly want to 
focus on how this communication is achieved and how uncertainty in its many forms 
can be effectively managed.
2.2 Cognitive Efficiency and Management of Uncertainty
Throughout this thesis a number of basic ideas relating to human cognition and 
perception surface constantly. These are the fundamental mental structures and
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processes that allow human to manage the vast amount of information that bombard 
them daily, not to mention the lifetime of memories and experiences already stored in 
memory. These processes allow people to attend to specific types of stimuli and 
information as required, and to avoid the unmanageable task of dealing with 
unnecessary or peripheral stimuli. They also permit the organisation of an otherwise 
chaotic world into structured units, and the consequent generation of working 
assumptions that form the basis of mutual or common knowledge, such as what 
constitutes ‘normal’ social behaviour.
There is also the question of what people actually do with information having 
acquired it; in order to infer people need some means of reasoning with the 
information available to them. Pragmatic theory, which has a natural focus on 
language issues, tends to avoid this level of cognition, as it appears to be somewhat 
removed from linguistic expression. Furthermore, it largely avoids the more involved 
social aspects of human interaction, which form an important part of the context in 
which speech events occur. This is not a criticism; it is an observation that needs to be 
made to help understand the orientation of this thesis. As my research interest is 
grounded in cognitive aspects of language, I have consequently also spent some time 
exploring social issues, as this is often the environment where dialogue is most 
commonplace. Thomas (1995: 208) points out the need for the balanced consideration 
of these elements:
“it is a mistake to adopt an approach to pragmatics that focuses on social 
factors to the exclusion o f cognitive factors, or on cognitive factors to the 
exclusion o f social factors”.
The way in which degree modifiers are used and the beliefs they represent 
depend on the comparison of observed behaviour against established beliefs or 
assumptions. In this chapter I will deal with both cognitive and pragmatic aspects of
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language and beliefs, with the aim of illuminating the subject of how degree modifiers 
help to represent beliefs about other people.
2.2.1 Semantic Categorisation and Prototype Theory
The role of categorisation, i.e. the classification of objects into groups that are 
considered equal (Rosch 1978: 30), plays a crucial role in this research, particularly in 
the context of social cognition. For this reason it is important to understand how 
prototypes are created and how they influence our perception of the world around us. 
My intention is also to demonstrate that categorisation is more than just a cognitive 
device; it directly affects our interpretation of people and events, and even our own 
self-perception. To label someone as being ‘extremely likeable’ as opposed to 
4somewhat likeable’ requires some fundamental basis on which such an appraisal can 
be made, i.e. there must exist some notion or common understanding of what 
constitutes a scale of Tikeability’. Using such labels and adjusting them through 
degree modifiers relies on a system of categorisation of people, events and behaviour 
such that their interrelationship can be understood by all. I will begin by outlining the 
theoretical basis of semantic categories and prototypes before continuing in 
subsequent sections to apply this theory to the categorisation of people and events.
Categorisation as a cognitive process has been widely explored, particularly in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s when, as discussed in section one, cognitive psychology and 
cognitive science gained immense popularity. Categorisation in general has been the 
subject of renewed interest of late in the light of new connectionist models of 
cognition, which I will discuss separately. The process serves a number of functions in 
the execution of cognitive processes. It helps to preserve cognitive economy in that 
categories “provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort” (Rosch
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1978: 28) and ensure that “the perceived world comes as structured information rather 
than as arbitrary and unpredictable attributes” (ibid.).
Individual categories may be related to each other by means of class inclusion 
where there is a directly proportionate relationship between the degree of inclusion 
and the level of abstraction of the category, i.e. the proportion of distinctive to 
common features within the level. For example, the category ‘animal’ and ‘dog’ is 
related in that a dog is an animal, but the category ‘animal’ is more inclusive (it 
includes all animals) and is more abstract (it is not a particular instance of an animal). 
Continuing this example, we can see that the category ‘dog’ is a subset of ‘animal’, 
and that ‘Labrador’ in turn is a subset of ‘dog’. This exemplifies the top-down 
hierarchical nature of categorisation, which I shall discuss shortly. The proportionate 
relationship between level of abstraction and degree of inclusion can be measured in 
terms of cue validity (Rosch et al. 1976). Cue validity has been described as a 
probabilistic concept (Rosch 1978: 30): the validity of a given cue x as a predictor of a 
given category y  (the conditional probability of y/x) increases as the frequency with 
which cue x is associated with category y  increases, and decreases as the frequency 
with which cue x is associated with categories other than y  increases. This, in addition 
to allowing a harder measure of the level of abstraction of a category, also 
demonstrates that objects can be members of different categories at varying levels of 
cue validity and abstraction. This measure is useful when characterising different 
levels within the hierarchical structure of categories mentioned earlier. Ungerer & 
Schmid (1995: 71-103) provide a detailed account of how categories can be 
conceptualised at three main levels of abstraction:
• Superordinate Level: This is the ‘highest’ level and is characterised by 
having a high ratio of distinctive to common features, therefore being more 
abstract than lower categories. Consider the superordinate level category
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‘animal’, a category whose members include birds, reptiles and mammals. 
These three example members are related to each other by means of class 
inclusion, i.e. they are types of animals, but comparatively they are quite 
distinct and have few features in common, with lower cue validity.
• Basic (or Generic) Level: This is the level at which most everyday objects 
are classified. Category members at this level typically share more 
common features with fewer distinctions between members than at other 
levels of abstraction. Consider the category member ‘bird’ within the 
superordinate category ‘animal’, which is a commonly cited example of 
this category (see Aitchison, J. 1987). At the basic level the category ‘bird’ 
may include hundreds of different classes of bird, but they will share many 
more common features (such as having wings, ability to fly, size, etc.) and 
fewer distinctions than the category members of the superordinate level 
‘animal’, i.e. birds, reptiles and mammals. Cue validity is maximised as 
there is a high degree of class inclusion and a high degree of common 
features between members.
• Subordinate Level: Category members at this level are usually highly 
specialised forms of the higher categories. If the superordinate category is 
‘vehicles’, the basic level might then be ‘cars’, and the superordinate level 
would list particular examples of cars, perhaps by make (Ford, BMW, 
Volvo) or by function (sports car, estate car, etc.). It is similar to the 
superordinate level in that it has lower cue validity than the basic level, but 
for different reasons; there are more category members at subordinate than 
superordinate level, and subordinate category members share most 
attributes with contrasting subordinate categories while maintaining a 
relatively low ratio of distinctive to common features. The subordinate 
level is therefore more abstract than the basic level because category 
members do not contrast well with each other.
The above description of levels of categorisation is somewhat technical and is 
perhaps better expressed in terms of the types of objects one might encounter in 
everyday life, which is in itself an important consideration. Formal classification
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systems such as scientific categories of plant or animal forms are of course valid but 
do not necessarily conform to what Rosch (1978: 29) refers to as perceived world 
structure. A whale for example is a mammal but people are likely to classify it as a 
fish in that it shares a great many physical features with different species of fish, e.g. 
lives in the water, has fins, etc. Categories are also likely to be formed on relatively 
unscientific or formal bases, e.g. books might be classified into ‘books I like to read’, 
or ‘boring books’, or ‘books with an interesting cover’; I often do this with types of 
food, e.g. ‘food to have with a cup of tea’ or ‘food which really tastes horrible without 
salt’. This emphasises the subjective nature of classification; however, despite 
subjectivity and individual differences, categorisation still generally represents shared 
or mutual knowledge within a given culture, i.e. categories create a shared set of 
assumptions about the world which can form the basis for communication and 
meaning.
At the beginning of this section I mentioned Rosch’s definition of categories as 
the classification of objects that are considered equal. What this means is that category 
members share a sufficient number of common features and sufficiently few 
distinctive features to be classified together in a category; it does not necessarily mean 
that within a category all members are equal. We need to consider this point in 
conjunction with issues of subjectivity and perceived world structure. Categories are 
not perceived as finite entities with exact definition and boundaries. For example, 
when thinking of an example of the category ‘bird’ I am more likely to think or a 
robin or a crow than an emu, in fact I would only classify an emu as a bird in that it 
has feathers and lays eggs, but I would not attribute crows and emus equal status as 
emus cannot fly, which is a characteristic I would strongly attribute to members of the 
‘bird’ category (see Aitchison, J. 1987). Other people for this reason might exclude
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emus from the ‘bird’ category or see an emu as being a marginal member of both the 
‘bird’ and ‘two legged-animal’ categories. Where then does one category begin and 
another end? There is no real answer to this because categories, general speaking, 
have fuzzy boundaries that do not have finite cut-off points. Often this is due to 
vagueness of definition, e.g. mountain and hill, or mist and fog, or fuzziness or 
polysemy as to ranges of meaning, e.g. the adjectival label ‘kind’ can mean generous, 
or possibly well-intentioned, but these labels do not convey degrees of kindness or of 
good intention. Their combination therefore with degree modifiers is important in 
expressing beliefs or perceptions more accurately. In addition, the notion mentioned 
earlier that objects can be members of different categories at varying levels of cue 
validity and abstraction emphasises the fluid nature of classification into categories.
At this point we can see that categories are based on real world classifications, 
have fuzzy boundaries and a range of good to bad members. We must also remember 
that while categorisation serves to preserve cognitive economy, this cannot be 
achieved where categories merge into each other at fuzzy boundaries to the extent that 
there is no distinction between them. The need to attain separateness between 
categories, particularly in the case of continuous categories, is achieved through the 
conception of each category in terms of its clear as opposed to marginal cases of 
membership, the clearest cases being those which are defined operationally by 
people’s judgement of ‘goodness of membership’ in that category (Rosch 1978: 36). 
This best example of a category member is known as the prototype, which according 
to Rosch and Mervis (1975) can be measured in terms of attribute-based typicality 
ratings, i.e. a weighted and rank-ordered matrix of attributes. In essence, a prototype 
is the central and most typical member of a given category. A prototype however is 
simply a notion that describes the idea of centrality and as such must arise from
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somewhere, but is not a cognitive process such as cognitive economy (although 
prototypes can help to achieve cognitive economy). Prototypes are formed 
experientially in three main ways:
• Frequency of Occurrence: the attributes and examples of category 
members encountered most frequently in the experiential environment play 
an important role in prototype formation.
• Typicality: In a given environment or culture, some objects are more 
typical than others of a given category are and there is generally a high 
degree of consensus about prototypes. This in part is due to frequency of 
occurrence but also to the fact that some attributes of category members 
are more important than others.
• Psychological Salience: The prototype of a category normally occurs 
where there is a maximal convergence of humanly relevant properties, i.e. 
where those attributes are easily perceivable. It is easier for example to 
visualise ‘car’ than ‘vehicle’ because one can conceptualise ‘car’ in terms 
of particular attributes. This relates strongly to the notion of levels of 
categorisation described above.
Prototypes then have their foundation in the real world classification of everyday
objects. In this sense we can consider the prototype as ‘strong’ knowledge in that
people
“overwhelmingly agree in their judgements o f how good an example or clear
a case members are o f a category, even for categories whose boundaries they
disagree” (Rosch 1978: 36).
This point although important is also quite limited insofar as we have only 
really considered the role of categorisation and prototypicality as it relates to objects. 
A primary aim of this section is to provide a theoretical basis for the analysis of 
relevant instances of categories and prototypes, e.g. relative to scalar representation of 
concepts such as adjectives and degree modifiers.
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2.2.2 Prototypes in Lexical Semantics
One risk of focusing on prototypes and cognitive categories is that we 
potentially give insufficient attention to the lexical and semantic aspects of language. 
For example, the semantics of many nouns are quite straightforward in that they 
correspond to a set of objects in the real world, e.g. car, chair, dog. Equally, adjectives 
represent some specific property, e.g. green, sharp, hot. But most verbs (and also 
many adverbs and adjectives) represent events and relationships that have an internal 
structure, e.g. “Michael left the envelope with Catherine before he left for his 
meeting”. Describing people, events and actions (among many other concepts) must 
be accomplished within sentential and grammatical structures (and related 
constraints), and this can impose selectional restrictions. Croft and Cruse (2004: 3) 
point out that grammatical inflections and constructions play a major role in 
construing the experience to be communicated.
Equally, we need to recognise that people’s choice of words or phrases, 
grammatical constraints aside, is generally intended to reflect the thoughts and 
concepts they are trying to communicate. This can include attempts to be specific 
about the degree of particular lexical items such as adjectives, nouns and verbs, which 
is where degree modifiers serve their purpose. The sentential structure around these 
elements can often serve to specify or disambiguate the intended meaning of specific 
words. However, there also may be a level of ambiguity or potential variety of 
meaning in words that the sentence does not address, and it is important to highlight 
these aspects of lexical semantics. Examples of such instances might include:
Homonyms: Words with the same spelling and pronunciation, but with
different meaning. For example:
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Snowdrops are usually the first sign of spring.
The suspension problem was caused by a defective spring. 
Homographs: Words with the same spelling, but with different meaning and 
possibly different pronunciation. For example:
She had a pretty bow in her hair.
She decided to bow deeply as the Queen passed by.
The bow of the ship was badly damaged.
Homophones: Words that have the same pronunciation but have different 
spellings and meanings. For example:
The knight rode his trusty steed.
The fox only came out to forage at night.
Polysemy: These are often a particular type of homonym, but essentially 
polysemy presents potential multiple meanings from the same word. For 
example:
Michael returned the chair because the leg was broken.
Michael limped badly because his leg was broken.
Synonyms: Generally interpreted as ‘another name for’, synonyms are usually
different words that have the same or similar meanings. For example:
He enjoyed his food.
He enjoyed his grub.
He enjoyed his nosh.
Antonyms: These are generally seen as the opposite of a given concept. For
example:
Big -> Small 
Wide -* Narrow
Dead —» Alive
There are a range of other categories such as hyponyms, meronyms and troponyms, 
but these are less relevant to the core area of research of this thesis.
The notion of antonyms is especially interesting when discussing degree 
modifiers, and is an important aspect of scalar representation. This was the subject of 
Paradis and Willner’s (forthcoming) paper on antonymy and negation, which looks 
specifically at both relative to what she calls the boundedness hypothesis. How scalar 
representation is approached does in part depend on how many dimension of the topic 
you want to explore. To illustrate this I have drawn two scales below; the first deals 
with a single adjectival concept, and how degree modifiers might act on it, and the 
second is of a broader multi-adjectival scale, within which degree modifiers can also 
act.
Single adjectival scale for DIFFICULT
11 11 11 11 [] 11 11 11 11 11 11
Least difficult Difficult Most difficult
The concept of DIFFICULT on this scale can be though of as a prototype, i.e. one of 
its key features is its centrality along the scale. I have discussed prototypes as part of 
categorisational processes at various points in this thesis. It is quite easy to imagine 
where different degree modifiers might fit on this scale; for example, the degree 
modifier VERY would probably be very near the most difficult end of the scale, 
whereas SOMEWHAT might be somewhere in the mid-range between difficult and 
least difficult.
This is certainly one way to approach the exploration of degree modifiers, and 
this is how I have approached this topic as it maintains a strong focus on scalar 
modification via degree modifiers rather than extending and widening the debate to a
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more complex continuum of adjectives. Take for example a more complicated scale as 
below:
Scalar representation from EASY to DIFFICULT
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 [] 11 D
Most Easy Most Difficult
I have presented a similar scale in section 2.3.2 below on person schemata, in which I 
present a scale of intelligence between moron and genius (see next paragraph). It is 
easy to see how this differs from the single adjectival scale; firstly there is a 
continuum of adjectives along the scale that communicate strength of the concept 
along that scale, and then there are degree modifiers that can further refine the 
precision of these concepts.
Another interesting aspect of more complex scales is that it may be more 
difficult to immediately identify the prototypical or central features within the scale. 
Take the example from section 2.3.2 of the moron -> genius scale:
Moron Stupid Average Bright Genius
This is potentially confusing. At either end of the scale there is a noun that described a
particular type of person, whereas within the scale there are adjectives that describe
aspects of people’s intelligence. I am not necessarily holding this up as a correct
example of this scale, but I do want to use it to illustrate how the linguistic
representation of these concepts can become very complicated. The central element of
this scale is average, which in fact is not especially informative of a level of
intelligence, and depends heavily on what you define as an average level of
intelligence. While this is a very realistic approach to the subject and would certainly
be interesting to explore, it is however beyond the scope and reach of this particular
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thesis, and thus I will maintain my focus on the effects of degree modifiers along 
single adjectival scales. Another reason for this is that it allows me to keep the 
exploration of uncertain reasoning reasonably simple, and this aspect of the research 
will become more apparent in chapter 4.
Lexical semantic aspects of language can produce interesting varieties of 
meanings for words. For example, Turewicz’s (2000) study of cognitive grammar 
demonstrated how ten common prepositions realised more than two hundred different 
meanings using the Collins COBUILD series. Research by Peter Turney (2005) of the 
Institute for Information Technology in Ottawa used a process known as Latent 
Relational Analysis (LRA) to measure semantic similarity between two analogous 
pairs of words (e.g. cat: meow and dog: bark), which included some interesting work 
on noun-modifier relations. Relatively little research however has been directed 
specifically towards the lexical semantic study of degree modifiers, hence the 
inclusion in this thesis. There can in fact be many types of semantic similarities 
between words, but Turney’s work focused mainly on relational similarity 
(correspondence between relations) and attributional similarity (correspondence 
between attributes). Words with a high degree of attributional similarity are usually 
classified as synonyms. LRA analysis however does not lend itself especially well to 
measuring either attributional or relational relations between degree modifiers 
themselves.
One issue with degree modifiers is linked to their nature; one role of degree 
modifiers is to moderate or influence the perceived strength of the word or phrase they 
act on; a classic example is a degree modifying adverb acting on an adjective. For 
example, the degree modifying adverb VERY is likely to strengthen the perception of 
any adjective it acts on, e.g. VERY BIG, VERY BAD. Degree modifiers often rely on
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the concept of the mental representation of scale (see above paragraphs and examples 
of scalar representation) where, particularly in the case of this thesis, the relations 
between degree modifier, header and other linguistic elements are left undetermined. 
For example, the study in this thesis looks at the relations between degree modifiers 
such as VERY, REALLY, etc, combined with various headers such as BIG, NICE, 
etc. But these combinations lack any real reference point, e.g. the combination of 
VERY + BIG + CAR or FAIRLY + NICE + WEATHER offers at least some 
additional information whereby prototypical or categorical notions of CAR or 
WEATHER can be activated. As Sloman, Steven A. and Love, Bradley C. and Woo- 
kyoung, Ahn (1997: iv) point out, a robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a 
robin that does not chirp -  i.e. the ability access specific or central features are 
therefore important in generating highly accurate conceptual notions, and this applies 
equally to scalar representation. Without these nouns, the simple degree 
modifier/header combination lacks an item or category that represents information in a 
way that maximizes the cognitive effects that can be derived from it, and minimizes 
the effort needed to derive these effects (Van der Henst, Jean-Baptiste and Politzer, 
Guy and Sperber, Dan (2002: 7). Paradis (2000: 5) suggests that “Adjectives are 
intrinsically prone to ambiguity and vagueness in that they are semantically 
underspecified. They require the presence of a noun for a fully-fledged interpretation”.
The individuals who participated in the thesis study therefore had to rely to an 
extent on their ‘pure’ conceptual notion of what the degree modifier and header within 
the sentential context, and this in fact was part of the rationale in structuring the study 
in this format. Using a measured scale to indicate perceptions of strength (see chapter 
four below) takes this process one step further by asking subjects to decide and 
measure their perception of the strength of each degree modifier.
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The fact that lexical semantics identifies opportunities for words to have 
multiple similar meanings can create an issue as regards disambiguating both degree 
modifiers and headers. Take for example the degree modifiers RATHER and 
SOMEWHAT. Their precision is likely to vary according to the opinion of the 
perceiver, and some people might argue that they could be interchanged. One of the 
reasons for this is that these degree modifies by themselves lack any reference or 
context (such as a header), and therefore lack inferential potency, i.e. features that are 
diagnostic of a category to the extent that they allow us to infer other features of the 
category (Franks 1995). Equally, what exactly is the difference between VERY and 
REALLY? Intuitively one might suggest that REALLY is stronger than VERY 
(although not necessarily), but how much is difficult to measure. This issue also 
applies to the headers chosen of the study in Chapter 4 below. For example, the header 
BIG could have a multitude of meanings depending on the context in which it is used. 
The following thirteen different senses were generated for the adjective BIG using 
WordNet 2.1, an online lexical reference system whose design is inspired by current 
psycholinguistic theories of human lexical memory. English nouns, verbs, adjectives 
and adverbs are organized into synonym sets, each representing one underlying lexical 
concept:
1. (1114) large, big — (above average in size or number or quantity or 
magnitude or extent; "a large city"; "set out for the big city"; "a large sum"; "a 
big (or large) bam"; "a large family"; "big businesses"; "a big expenditure"; "a 
large number of newspapers"; "a big group of scientists"; "large areas of the 
world")
2. (242) big — (significant; "graduation was a big day in his life")
3. (77) big, large, prominent — (conspicuous in position or importance; "a big 
figure in the movement"; "big man on campus"; "he's very large in financial 
circles"; "a prominent citizen")
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4. (24) bad, big — (very intense; "a bad headache"; "in a big rage"; "had a big 
(or bad) shock"; "a bad earthquake"; "a bad storm")
5. (22) big — (loud and firm; "a big voice"; "big bold piano sounds")
6. (21) big, heavy -- (prodigious; "big spender"; "big eater"; "heavy investor")
7. (13) adult, big, full-grown, fully grown, grown, grownup — ((of animals) 
fully developed; "an adult animal"; "a grown woman")
8. (8) big -- (marked by intense physical force; "a big wind")
9. (6) big, swelled, vainglorious — (feeling self-importance; "too big for his 
britches"; "had a swelled head"; "he was swelled with pride")
10. (4) boastful, braggart, bragging, braggy, big, cock-a-hoop, crowing, self- 
aggrandizing, self-aggrandising — (exhibiting self-importance; "big talk")
11. (3) big, large, magnanimous -  (generous and understanding and tolerant; 
"a heart big enough to hold no grudges"; "that's very big of you to be so 
forgiving"; "a large and generous spirit"; "a large heart"; "magnanimous 
toward his enemies")
12. big, bighearted, bounteous, bountiful, freehanded, handsome, giving, 
liberal, openhanded — (given or giving freely; "was a big tipper"; "the 
bounteous goodness of God"; "bountiful compliments"; "a freehanded host"; 
"a handsome allowance"; "Saturday's child is loving and giving"; "a liberal 
backer of the arts"; "a munificent gift"; "her fond and openhanded 
grandfather")
13. big, enceinte, expectant, gravid, great, large, heavy, with child — (in an 
advanced stage of pregnancy; "was big with child"; "was great with child")
It would be impossible to decide which of these senses were applicable without some 
basis for doing so, such as the occurrence of this adjective within a sentence. The first 
issue then from a lexical semantic point of view is that of word sense 
disambiguation. Arguably, the first interpretation above is likely to be the most 
commonly accepted prototype of this particular adjective, particularly given the 
frequency of occurrence (and therefore salience) of this definition. However, this
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would entail synonymous meanings between BIG and LARGE, in which case one 
could ask the question as to why two words need to exist if they in fact represent the 
same concept. WordNet 2.1 defined LARGE as follows:
1. (152) large, big — (above average in size or number or quantity or 
magnitude or extent; "a large city"; "set out for the big city"; "a large sum"; "a 
big (or large) bam"; "a large family"; "big businesses"; "a big expenditure"; "a 
large number of newspapers"; "a big group of scientists"; "large areas of the 
world")
2. (2) large — (fairly large or important in effect; influential; "played a large 
role in the negotiations")
3. bombastic, declamatory, large, orotund, tumid, turgid — (ostentatiously lofty 
in style; "a man given to large talk"; "tumid political prose")
4. big, large, magnanimous — (generous and understanding and tolerant; "a 
heart big enough to hold no grudges"; "that's very big of you to be so 
forgiving"; "a large and generous spirit"; "a large heart"; "magnanimous 
toward his enemies")
5. big, large, prominent — (conspicuous in position or importance; "a big figure 
in the movement"; "big man on campus"; "he's very large in financial circles"; 
"a prominent citizen")
6. large -- (having broad power and range and scope; "taking the large view"; 
"a large effect"; "a large sympathy")
7. big, enceinte, expectant, gravid, great, large, heavy, with child — (in an 
advanced stage of pregnancy; "was big with child"; "was great with child")
This indicates some degree of synonymy between BIG and LARGE, but they do differ
in the number of word senses generated, and in the prevalence of each word sense.
However, if we apply the adjective BIG to a particular noun such as MAN, then the
potential meanings of BIG are potentially extended due to the specificity of the
features that are now accessible. BIG could now mean TALL, FAT, HEAVY-SET,
etc. and therefore we are moving from synonymy to polysemy. This is demonstrated
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by the fact that TALL and FAT are entirely different characteristics, yet both may 
potentially be represented by the adjective BIG. These are important points when 
considering the issue of what constitutes a prototypical notion of either a degree 
modifier or adjective, which as we can see are largely conceptual in nature unless 
specified by proximity or reference to a particular noun or other similar reference. To 
explore this further we need to understand how prototypes are mentally represented, 
and in particular whether these representations are conceptually driven or data driven, 
as explained in section 2.3.1 below.
The study of collocations have also been used to explore word sense 
disambiguation, usually by searching for words that co-occur with senses of the target 
word more often than could be expected by chance (Wiebe, McKeever, & Bruce 
1998). Natural language applications often use knowledge about groups of related 
words. A variety of distributional methods exist for measuring word similarity in 
order to obtain groups of similar words (e.g. (e.g., Bensch & Savitch, 1992; Brill, 
1991; Brown et al., 1992; Grefenstette, 1992, 1994; McKeown & Hatzivassiloglou, 
1993; Pereira, Tishby, & Lee, 1993; Schutze, 1993). However, it is critically 
important to distinguish between word senses within groupings. For example, Brown 
et al. (1992) illustrate the notion of a distributionally derived, “semantically sticky" 
cluster using an automatically derived word group containing attorney, counsel, trial, 
court, and judge. Although human cognition can use epistemic knowledge to 
comprehend the relationships between these words as a cluster, a computational 
system query expansion might generate words like advice (derived from counsel) or 
royalty (derived from court). A solution to this is to use taxonomically-defined 
semantic similarities to distinguish grouping between word senses as opposed to word 
meanings. However, there must be some basis for determining or informing what
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taxonomy is appropriate in the context. One view of the role of context in meaning 
and inference was proposed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, who developed what 
ultimately became known as Relevance Theory.
2.2.3 Cognitive Economy and Relevance Theory
The above section indicates the need for degree modifiers and headers to refer 
to a specific noun or to occur within a given context (such as sentential) in order to 
communicate a specific meaning. This is in fact important for two reasons. The first 
has to do with the issue of cognitive economy, i.e. the propensity of the human mind 
“to provide maximum information for least cognitive effort” (Rosch 1978: 28). This is 
one simple definition of what is a considerable ability, particularly given the degree to 
which language can contain ambiguities and other classes of uncertainty (see 
Smithson’s Taxonomy of Ignorance in section 1.3.1 and the discussion of word sense 
disambiguation in section 2.2.2 above).
Different definitions of cognitive economy have also been proposed. Collins 
and Quillian (1969) used the term cognitive economy to describe a principal for 
eliminating the redundant storage of information by presenting a semantic network of 
human memory in which facts about different knowledge are stored in a hierarchical 
network. This approach naturally organises the world into meaningful associations 
between complex items and simplifies the world by using cognitive devices such as 
categorical perception (see section 2.2.1 above) and prototypical representations such 
as stereotypes (people) and schemata (actions and events). The notion of perception is 
interesting in that it suggests that the human cognitive system filters incoming 
information in order to reduce the cognitive load; as Rosch (1978: 29) points out “it is 
to the organism’s advantage not to differentiate one stimulus from another when that
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differentiation is irrelevant to the purposes at hand”. Perceived relevance therefore is 
an important aspect of cognitive economy, and I will discuss this in a few moments. 
One significant point needs to be made first, particularly in the context of the structure 
of the thesis study; the linkage between lexical semantic aspects of language and the 
determination of relevance in itself. What I refer specifically to is the process of 
feature extraction, i.e. the process by which an individual modifies their 
representations to detect features that are relevant to the task. This is further 
determined by the nature of the task itself; cognitive processes can for example 
include goal-oriented categorisation or can be concerned with failure avoidance. 
These motivations make it easier for the individual to make finer discriminations as to 
the information attended to or deemed to be most relevant (Finton 2002: 21). 
However, as indicated in section 2.2.2 above on lexical semantics, the lack of specific 
features associated with the degree modifier/header combination as a result of the lack 
of related noun or sentential context reinforces the notion that participants in the study 
were forces to rely purely on their conceptual scalar representation of both degree 
modifiers and headers. Furthermore, the lack of a specific goal or task (other than 
participating in the study) mitigates again this element being activated and therefore 
contributing to finer discriminations being made by participants as to the information 
most relevant.
I now want to focus on the notion of relevance as an element in cognitive
economy. A good definition of this relationship can be found in Van der Henst, Jean-
Baptiste and Politzer, Guy and Sperber, Dan (2002: 5), which suggests that:
“In relevance theory, relevance is seen as a property of inputs to 
cognitive processes (e.g. stimuli, utterances, mental representations).
An input is relevant to an individual at a certain time if processing this 
input yields cognitive effects. Examples of cognitive effects are the
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revision of previous beliefs, or the derivation of contextual 
conclusions, that is, conclusions that follow from the input taken 
together with previously available information. Everything else being 
equal, the greater the cognitive effects achieved by processing an 
input, the greater its relevance. On the other hand, the greater the 
effort involved in processing an input, the lower its relevance. 
Everything else being equal, it is clearly conducive to greater 
cognitive efficiency to aim at greater relevance in the inputs one 
processes”.
This known as the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, i.e. that human cognition is 
geared towards maximising relevance (defined further below). The idea that relevance 
increases in line with cognitive effects achieved is interesting in how it relates to the 
degree of uncertainty that a given concept entails. It also raises a possible contradictory 
element in this aspect of Relevance Theory, which is described below.
We have seen from the arguments in this section that context can contribute 
considerably to the specificity and perceived accuracy of concepts such as those 
represented by degree modifying adverbs. The study of contextual factors (specifically 
in verbal communication) was a core research area of two researchers, Deirdre Wilson 
and Dan Sperber, who were interested in two specific aspects of human 
communication: firstly, what is communicated, and secondly how communication is 
achieved. They examined how coding and inference co-occur in communication, and 
the critical differences between sentences and utterances. They brought their different 
approaches to this subject together in what ultimately became known as Relevance 
Theory; I have captured some of the fundamental elements of it below but it is difficult 
to describe all aspects of Relevance Theory in detail without a very lengthy 
description, hence I have limited my discussion to identifying some of the more 
pertinent aspects.
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Sperber and Wilson pointed out that the semantic representation of a sentence 
takes no account of non-linguistic properties such as the time and location of the 
utterance, the identity of the speaker and their intentions, etc. Sentences therefore are 
confined to semantic representation and are bound by rules of grammar. Utterances, 
however, convey a number of elements, such as the thoughts of the speaker and their 
attitude to those thoughts, and their comprehension requires at least an element of 
inference on behalf of the perceiver. Comprehension in its most inclusive sense 
typically requires the integration of the semantic aspects of the sentence plus the 
relevant aspects of the context in which the utterance occurs. The relevance of a 
stimulus is determined by two factors: the need to process it optimally, and the 
cognitive effects this optimal processing achieves (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 156 — 
157). Other important issues are also in play such as the assumption that the 
communicator intends the meaning of their utterance and their communicative or 
pragmatic intention to be apparent to the hearer, and that this further assumes that the 
utterance is relevant to the hearer in some way. This is an important part of what 
Sperber and Wilson refer to as ostensive-inferential communication. As Sperber and 
Wilson point out, ostensive-inferential communication requires the construction of 
conceptual representations and the mobilisation of central thought processes (ibid 
1995: 153).
This has interesting implications for the representation of degree modifiers. It 
has already been established that the greater the effort involved in processing an input, 
the lower its relevance (see Cognitive Principle of Relevance above). Furthermore, the 
greater the reliance on existing presuppositions (such as prototypical notions or 
schematic beliefs), the lower the processing effort required, and therefore relevance is 
increased. However, this assumes that these conceptual representations themselves can
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be described as reasonably strongly held beliefs, as otherwise the belief is unlikely to 
hold any predictive value or to activate clear expectations of what is about to occur 
(such as in the remainder of a sentence). This aspect of language and cognition has 
already been described in section 1.2.4 above, particularly in relation to the process of 
feedforward. Some beliefs can be described as being weak in two ways:
• Beliefs that are vague or non-specific (or engender other forms of 
uncertainty, see Smithson’s Taxonomy of Ignorance in section 1.3.1)
• Beliefs that are more specific but which are not strongly held, i.e. they 
engender high levels of uncertainty
This does raise a question as to whether vague beliefs are more likely to entail higher
levels of uncertainty. This issue is one reason why the study in this thesis was
structured to take account of both of these elements. It also raises the question as to
whether vague beliefs are more or less commonly held between individuals than
strongly held beliefs, and whether they require more evidence (such as in the content
of a sentence or contextual clues) to validate or specify their meaning. There is
therefore a ratio between the initial strength of a belief and the amount of information
(sentential or contextual) required to confirm or to revise that initial belief. This
confirms Sperber and Wilson’s assertions about the need to combine coding/decoding
(sentential) and inference (contextual), but it is on this very point that Relevance
Theory comes in for some criticism. While the original 1986 version of Relevance
Theory was subsequently updated in 1995, it has still attracted criticism (such as
Frederking 1996) for its dependence on a relatively unspecified cognitive theory; it
would be difficult to actually test the validity of Relevance Theory without combining
it experimentally with an appropriate computational cognitive model. Equally, while
their notion of relevance is interesting, I am not fully convinced that it sufficiently
takes into account the highly complex area of human reasoning, and of uncertain
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reasoning in particular. Given this, I can accept the principle that relevance can be used 
(at least in part) to explain how people attend to aspects of communication that they 
perceive to be relevant to the goals or intentions of the speaker, but I think it is 
important to examine further the underlying cognitive structures and reasoning 
processes that both inform the inferential process and contribute to the ongoing goal of 
ensuring cognitive economy. In particular, the idea that the greater the cognitive 
effects (such as the revision of existing beliefs) achieved by processing an input, the 
greater its relevance, requires a fundamental understanding of and a more critical 
approach to the whole area of human reasoning.
2.3 Degree Modifiers and Headers as part of the Mental Lexicon
As with prototypes of objects and people, events and social behaviours share many of 
the characteristics of prototypes, particularly in that they form sets of assumptions 
about the social world that are sufficiently consistent between individuals as constitute 
social and behavioural norms. The origin of schema theory is generally attributed to 
Frederick Bartlett, although the growth in popularity of cognitive psychology in the 
1970’s and the subsequent emergence of cognitive science has refocused attention on 
this important subject. Schema theory features strongly in research on social 
cognition; in fact it was originally research on person perception, non-social memory 
and categorisation that gave rise to schema theory as we know it today (Fiske & 
Taylor 1982: 139). In addition to a plethora of research, there also emerged an array of 
different terminologies, most of which convey essentially the same idea. For the sake 
of simplicity I will continue with the term ‘schemata’ (Rumelhart 1976, Rumelhart & 
Ortony 1977) although one could also use terms such as ‘frames’ (Minsky 1975) or 
‘scripts’ (Schank & Abelson 1977). Rumelhart defined a schema as “a data structure
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for representing the generic concepts stored in memory those underlying objects,
social situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions” 
(Rumelhart 1984: 163), whereas Schank (Schank & Abelson 1977: 41) defines a script 
as “a structure that describes appropriate sequences of events in a particular
context  a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well-
known situation”. We can see here that these definitions while worded differently are 
nonetheless representing the same idea.
Schemata are similar to prototypes in that they create approximations about 
events and actions that minimise cognitive processing requirements and allow these 
limited cognitive resources to be focused elsewhere. Furthermore, schemata contain 
causal structures that can link individual events into chains of events, further 
decreasing processing load. This is relevant when considering the relationship 
between degree modifiers and uncertainty, particularly as degree modifiers can serve 
to either express an element of uncertainty {FAIRLY NICE) or to reduce uncertainty 
(FELRTNICE). The effect of this can also be seen in combination with verbs which 
normally are associated with uncertainty such as seem. Consider the difference 
between ‘she seems fairly nice’ and ‘she seems very nice’ -  the degree modifiers in 
these examples significantly alter the degree of uncertainty associated with the verb 
seem. In each case the schematic associations with each belief expressed might well 
be significantly different. Anything that reduces uncertainty also reduces the cognitive 
load and allows limited processing resources to be directed to other tasks when 
communicating in real time. Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) described the main 
characteristics of schemata:
• Schemata have variables.
• Schemata can embed, one within another.
• Schemata represent knowledge at all levels of abstraction.
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• Schemata represent knowledge rather than definitions.
Rumelhart (1984: 169 -  170) suggests two additional characteristics:
• Schemata are active processes.
• Schemata are recognition devices whose processing is aimed at the 
evaluation of their goodness of fit to the data being processed.
A classic example of a schema that is widely used is Schank’s restaurant 
schema. Entering a restaurant activates a whole sequence of beliefs about what to do, 
where to go, how to behave, i.e. you enter the restaurant, are shown to your table, are 
provided with a menu and given some time to choose your dishes, the waiter then 
takes you order, and so on. People in such scenarios do not need to expend much 
cognitive effort on deciding what to do because they can rely instead on their 
knowledge and experience of the world. Schank and Abelson (1977) even developed a 
computer programme called SAM to measure the consistencies and variances between 
people’s self-reported behaviour in restaurants.
Schemata can tell us a lot about the way humans integrate existing and new 
information. The activation of schemata is particularly informative in this context. 
Because of the variety of levels of abstraction within schemata, and the existence of 
sub-schemata within schemata, there must be some form of control process to 
determine how and when different schemata are activated and processed. I have 
already noted that people typically require some evidence to guide which degree 
modifiers they use (if any) and the strength of beliefs they express, and it is important 
to understand the potential sources of this evidence. Bobrow and Norman (1975) 
suggest that schemata can be conceptually driven or data driven.
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2.3.1 Conceptually Driven and Data Driven Schemata
As I have already mentioned, schemata often contain a range of sub-schemata. 
The activation of a higher schema may also activate one of these sub-schemata, which 
is a conceptually driven process in that the broader concept activates subsets of itself. 
For this reason conceptual processing is often referred to as top-down activation. This 
conceptually driven processing is also significant in that the activation of specific sub­
schemata is generally derived by the expectations created by the initial schemata. This 
is consistent with the notion that people tend to generate schema-based hypotheses 
about the world and that there are causal relations between schemata and probabilistic 
expectations generated by these schemata. For example, schematic notions relating to 
clothing and dress generate strong schema-based expectations. Observation of how 
someone is dressed can generate other sub-schemata and also activate other related 
schemata. For example, the idea of a man wearing a smart suit generates schemata 
relating to how individual items of clothing constitute this general appearance; 
individual aspects such as items of clothing (jacket, trousers, tie, shirt, etc.) are 
activated as are style (formal or conservative) and colour (usually dark). This is also 
consistent with the notion of feedforward described in section 1.3.3 above which 
illustrates how language can drive expectations or beliefs.
Observing items such as clothing and dress however may in turn activate data- 
driven processing, which is a bottom-up form of processing. The activation of lower 
level schemata (known as feature detectors for their attention to finer detail) can in 
turn activate higher level schemata associated therewith. From the above example, the 
observation of formal dress might result in the activation of a ‘businessman’ schema, 
which involves schematic knowledge relating to profession, salary and social status 
and lifestyle. Each of these processes involves the evaluation of ‘goodness of fit’
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against schematic beliefs. Given the constraints of cognitive economy, Rumelhart
(1984: 171) suggests that:
“when sufficient evidence is accumulated against a schema, processing o f  
that schema is suspended and processing resources are allocated to other 
currently more promising schemata. Whenever enough evidence is gained in 
favour o f a schema that schema is taken as an adequate account for the 
relevant aspect o f the input and the interpretation offered by that schema is 
taken as the ‘correct’ interpretation o f the relevant event”.
Schemata are highly integrated conceptual structures in that they can 
encompass a vast range of relations. For example, a person telephoning to offer 
double-glazing at an amazing discount immediately activates a ‘seller’ schema, but 
also activates a ‘buyer’ self-schema. The self-schema is a form of self-categorisation 
and is significant in that it generates beliefs about what other people expect of us, 
which can potentially influence our behaviour. I often balk at mentioning that I am a 
student because I dislike the idea of being categorised as such, given some of the 
negative stereotypical features associated with the label. It is often also more difficult 
to ‘compete’ with people within the domain of other schemata such as the example of 
businessman mentioned above.
Given that the activation of schemata can be conceptually driven or data- 
driven, there remains the issue of why one might occur and not the other. I am not 
suggesting that they are mutually exclusive or cannot co-occur, in fact their co­
occurrence can be a useful ‘check’ as to the validity of the perceiver’s beliefs, and can 
result in back-propagation or belief revision described in section 1.3.3 above. 
Assuming that information is available that might initiate either, what factors 
determine which is activated? This relates strongly to the particular instance and 
context of occurrence and the attentional and motivational biases that apply in that 
case.
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Schemata are also significant in that they create strong expectations about 
future events. In this sense schemata can be thought of having predictive properties 
which, based on previous repeated experience (one of the main components in schema 
formation), is thought by the individual to be the most likely outcome. Probabilistic 
expectations arising from schemata are in part defined by the degree of belief 
associated therewith; schemata can be highly prototypical or more marginal and can 
be thought of therefore as ranging in their ‘strength’ of knowledge. Strong or definite 
expressions (e.g. she’s really nice), such as those expressed through the use of 
intensifiers, are more likely to be associated with strong beliefs than with marginal or 
weak beliefs. Highly prototypical schemata such as Schank’s much-cited restaurant 
schema creates strong beliefs concerning the probability of likely sequence of events 
and actions of individuals in that case, whereas a less typical schema is likely to 
generate weaker beliefs concerning such probabilities. Schema theory has however 
attracted a certain amount of criticism relating to the supposed predictive powers 
(Culpeper 1994: 48) because of the all-encompassing nature of schemata; schemata 
can relate to almost any class of event or action at any level of abstraction and 
therefore hardly constitutes a scientifically testable hypothesis about predictive 
powers. Whatever the strength of these expectations, the ‘hypothesis’ created by 
schema-based beliefs can be tested against available evidence that presents itself 
during the duration of the event. This evidence may serve to confirm or disconfirm 
this hypothesis, or may range in its degree of informativeness regarding the validity of 
the hypothesis. The need or desire to test the hypothesis is itself moderated by a 
number of factors. Given that perception is a goal-directed activity (Rumelhart 1984: 
179), the motivation of the individual is likely to play an important role in defining
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attentional biases, which could influence the way in which perceptions are represented 
and the strength of beliefs associated with them.
2.3.2 Schematic Beliefs and the Cognitive Context
Beliefs can be classified in a number of ways, in this case I have chosen to 
present them as schema subtypes which I think is the most concise and practical 
method of summarising schemata as they relate to the representation of degree 
modifying adverbs. The role of individual features in the generation of highly defined 
and specific beliefs can be of particular importance in that some features are more 
psychologically salient than other in a given context; as Culpeper (1994: 50) usefully 
points out when discussing Asch’s (1946) experiments: “a cold, intelligent person was 
seen as calculating, whereas a warm, intelligent person was seen as wise”. It is not 
necessarily easy then to predict impression from individual traits, nor can we consider 
impressions as being an average of the traits involved; the above example illustrates 
this clearly. Culpeper continues his exploration of social schemata to suggest the three 
following subtypes.
1. Person Schemata
This form of schema relates to knowledge concerning either a particular 
person or people in general. A person schema generally consists of trait schemata 
and/or goal schemata. While we mentioned earlier that schemata in themselves lack 
predictive powers, this criticism does not hold true for goal schemata; goal schemata 
have strong predictive powers regarding an individual’s likely behaviour in a given 
situation (Fiske & Taylor 1984: 150). This in part is due to fact that goals tend to be 
highly contextually or circumstantially dependent and depend largely on the
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individual concerned. Trait schemata are typically conceptualised as adjectival labels 
(kind, generous, friendly, unsociable) which approximate the strength of that label; 
what this means is that often adjectival trait labels can be thought of as existing on a 
scale relating to that general class of labels, although this does not apply to all classes 
of adjectives (see section 3.2.2 below). Degree modifiers can be used to ‘shift’ the 
adjective along a scale and can possibly extend the strength of the expression or belief 
beyond the natural parameters of the scale itself. For example, consider the following 
instance:
Figure 2.1; Scalar Properties of Adjectival Trait Labels
Example: Scalar representation of adjectives associated with intelligence:
Moron Stupid Average Bright Genius
This very simple example might include a range of further adjectival labels 
such as smart, clever, dim, brain-dead, dunce, etc. This is useful when considering one 
adjective at a time but, as I have already mentioned information earlier in this section, 
adjectives need to be considered in relation to each other in terms of the schematic 
beliefs and associations they might generate. Furthermore, some domains of adjectives 
do not have defined cut-off points or adjectival trait labels associated with them; 
‘generous’ for example might be extended by adding ‘extremely’ to it but I cannot 
think of a label which extends the meaning to its ultimate extremity. This scale also 
fails to communicate the notion that individual traits tend to generate associations with 
other classes or instances of traits, such as ‘introvert’ invoking an association with 
‘unsociable’ or ‘shy’. Schema theory does however generate associations in that a trait 
schema for a confident person will include how confident people behave, what they
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say, examples of confident people, and other characteristics typically associated with 
confident people such as extroversion and social skills.
2. Social Role Schemata
One’s social role can be described in a number of ways. Taylor & Fiske 
suggested that these could be expressed as either achieved roles, which have to be 
acquired through effort (e.g. professional roles such as accountants or solicitors), or as 
ascribed roles, which are automatically acquired by individuals (such as kinship roles, 
e.g. father, son, uncle). Individuals can move quickly from one role to another as 
required. As schema theory suggests, these role labels each generate further schematic 
associations. An ascribed role such as ‘mother’ might generate schematic expectations 
of a caring, devoted and protective person who has specific responsibilities related to 
the upbringing of her offspring (incidentally, this is also an example of entailment, i.e. 
mothers are necessarily female). Such associations, particularly those relating to 
achieved roles, are likely to generate the final category of social schemata, i.e. 
stereotype schemata.
3. Stereotype Schemata
Stereotypes are notoriously inaccurate in that they emphasise particular 
attributes depending on the individual’s point of view; a stereotypical member of the 
one’s social group (the in-group) is likely to be conceptualised in terms of its more 
favourable characteristics whereas a stereotypical member of a different social group 
(the out-group) is conversely more likely to be conceptualised in terms of its negative 
characteristics. Furthermore, stereotypical notions tend to exaggerate highly 
distinguishing characteristics, such as a stereotype schema of an English person 
including the wearing of a bowler hat, which very few people in fact wear (example
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from Culpeper 1994: 52). Stereotypes are strongly held beliefs that are highly resistant 
to change, and the activation of schematic beliefs and expectations can influence 
attention to and interpretation of new information, and the encoding and retrieval of 
information in memory (Rothbart, Evans & Fulero 1979). The stereotype is a good 
example of a conceptually driven process whereby category-based beliefs are typified 
by the prototype of that social category. This is distinct from a more person-based 
data-driven approach. As mentioned in section 2.3.1, both conceptually-driven and 
data-driven processing can combine, which in the context of social cognition means 
that impressions are created through the combination of category-based and person- 
based processes.
There is one form of schema (below) that I would add to Culpeper’s. While 
this type is somehow implicit in the notion of schemata anyway, I think it is worth 
identifying separately when discussing the cognitive context.
4. Event Schemata
Event schemata consist of information relating to how typical events occur and 
the sequence in which particular sub-events usually happen. Fiske and Taylor (1984: 
149) suggest that
“People’s prior knowledge o f the typical sequence o f events on standard 
social occasions helps them to understand ambiguous information, to 
remember relevant information and to infer consistent information where it 
is missing”.
This definition actually contains a number of important points. The role of 
schemata and other such conceptual structures in the interpretation of ambiguous and 
other forms of uncertain knowledge is important and for this reason I have dedicated a 
specific subsection to the exploration of this subject. The notion of standard social
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occasions is actually quite robust in that general conceptually-driven or data-driven 
schemata in this regard can contain sufficient information to guide processing even 
when highly specialised social situations occur. In this context I think Fiske & Taylor 
might have reconsidered the use of the term ‘standard’ as this suggests a bias in favour 
of conceptually driven processes.
Fiske & Taylor (1984: 149) also suggest two further types of schemata in 
social cognition. Firstly, they propose self-schemata, which aid information 
processing concerning oneself. I find this suggestion lacking in a number of respects. 
It fails to deliver a robust account of how self-categorisational processes influence 
other aspects of social perception in the way that Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT) 
does. Furthermore, Fiske & Taylor’s definition of self-schema relates to “information 
about one’s own psychology” (1984: 149), which they suggest guides information 
processing about oneself. The term ‘psychology’ here is somewhat vague, or rather it 
is to broad a term to be usefully applied in such a definition. They also propose 
content-free or procedural social schemata differs from other forms of schemata in 
that they govern how schematic information is applied; they in fact consist entirely of 
rules for managing information within schemata. An important example of such a 
non-domain specific schema is the causal schema, which contains information 
regarding how causal relationships are inferred and processed. This type of schema 
then can be thought of as a form of meta-knowledge in that it contains information 
about information. This form of knowledge is significant in that it in part constitutes 
how human reasoning operates, which I will be applying later in relation to 
uncertainty resolution in particular.
Schema theory as we can see is useful in terms of describing how knowledge 
in represented in the mind and how it combines in a structured and efficient manner.
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What schema theory lacks is the ability to explain how people process and manipulate 
information beyond the scope of conceptual structures. More specifically, the role of 
schemata and categorisation in linguistic behaviour such as the use of degree 
modifiers needs to be considered, particularly with reference to the extent to which 
people share an understanding of their meaning and strength.
2.3.3 Mutual and Proprietary Knowledge
In the above subsections I have introduced conceptual structures that allow 
people to view the world in a consistent and organised way. Consistency is an 
important aspect of these structures; if each person had highly individualised 
conceptual structures then communication would be extremely difficult, as people 
would base their linguistic decisions on different sets of assumptions. In this regard 
schemata and stereotypes work well as they are largely consistent within a given 
culture, for the reasons explained in the above sections. In cognitive terms this idea is 
known as the co-presence heuristic (Clark & Marshall 1981), which can be segregated 
into three different levels of awareness: physical co-presence, linguistic co-presence 
and community membership. Essentially this is the same concept as mutual 
knowledge (and not dissimilar in nature to Sperber and Wilson’s mutual manifestness 
in relation to spoken communication); people share similar assumptions about their 
physical environment and linguistic meanings, both of which are moderated by the 
culture or community in which they exist. A simple example that is cited increasingly 
often is the use of the ‘cc’ function when sending an email to a number of recipients; 
the fact that other recipients are visible to all readers (as opposed to ‘bcc’) makes the 
content of the email common knowledge. None of these things are said because they 
are what Lewis (1969) call common knowledge, i.e.:
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The members of a group G commonly believe that p = def.
1. The members of G believe that p.
2. The members of G believe that the members of G believe that p.
3. The members of G believe that the members of G believe that the members
of G believe that p.
And so on, although the constraints of cognitive economy intervene to limit an 
otherwise infinite reflexivity. This idea has been proposed under different labels, but 
they all convey the same basic definition. One question that these different definitions 
cover to varying extents is the degree to which mutual knowledge represents a set of 
common assumptions about the world as opposed to knowledge available to both 
interlocutors that is not strictly mutual. Consider the following definitions, in this case 
(using the example of perceptions about a person):
Proprietary Knowledge: Factual knowledge that is not usually 
available to all upon first meeting, e.g. religious persuasion, dietary 
preferences, temperament, personality traits, etc.
Non-Proprietary Knowledge: Factual knowledge that is available to 
all upon first meeting, e.g. skin colour, general appearance, dress, 
facial expression, etc.
Unless these individuals had met each other before, then both categories could 
be considered as new information, beginning with non-proprietary knowledge 
(available immediately) and moving towards non-proprietary knowledge as more 
information becomes available. Yet neither could be accurately classified as mutual 
knowledge, even though non-proprietary knowledge is available to all. This is because 
prior to their meeting this information was not mutually available and therefore was 
not common to both interlocutors. Furthermore, mutual knowledge is best presented 
as a set of working assumptions about the world (and a given culture in particular) as
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this is more consistent with the maintenance of cognitive economy. New information 
is therefore compared with and assimilated into existing knowledge as it becomes 
available.
While mutual knowledge, which is comprised of conceptual structures such as 
prototypes and schemata (and therefore experientially driven), is common to both 
interlocutors, the same cannot be said of specific events and memories in their own 
lives. Mutual knowledge therefore is an ‘approximation’ about the world and how it 
functions, and not a limitless resource of information about every event, situation or 
person. This initial generalised set of assumptions about the world is supplemented by 
individual experiences (stored in and retrieved from memory), and then by non­
proprietary and proprietary knowledge acquired in specific situations. In considering 
how this process works in real time, one needs to look more closely at how these 
elements combine and how they relate to inferences, particularly from a cognitive 
linguistic perspective. Memory can be thought of as the ‘middle ground’ between 
mutual knowledge and non-proprietary/proprietary knowledge, as well as offering 
some answers about how inferences are processed in real time. What is important is 
that people operate at both levels, and that the combination of assumptions about our 
environment (mutual knowledge) and information that is particular to that individual, 
such as from personal experience. These are some of the specific influences that will 
contribute to informing cognitive structures such as categories, prototypes and 
schemata, all of which play an important part in both minimising uncertainty and 




In this chapter I have introduced some of the key elements in the scalar representation, 
and particularly those relating to the combination of degree modifiers and headers 
(such as adjectives) within the sentential context. I have also discussed some of the 
cognitive and informational processes that either function generally or those that are 
activated specifically by particular types of stimulus. One of the reasons for keeping 
the discussion reasonably broad at this stage is that I want to emphasise the social and 
experiential context within which everyday speech occurs, and to remind the reader of 
how the diversity of the social environment influences the use and interpretation of 
what I have defined in section 1.2.4 as the cognitive context. Beliefs and stimuli 
relating to people can activate a social mental lexicon and features such as central 
stereotypical notions that can be quite different to those activated by an event (such as 
entering a restaurant), where the logistical aspects of the experience may play a more 
central role than stereotypical notions about the people themselves.
To proceed straight to a technical discussion of degree modifiers without at 
least attending to such important issues would be to treat the use of degree modifiers 
in language as existing in a vacuum, in some way removed from or separate from the 
context in which they are used. Having completed this task, I can now move on 
towards a more detailed discussion of degree modifiers themselves, how they interact 
with other lexical units and how the tendency of words to co-occur in collocational 
form can contribute to our understanding of degree modifiers/header combination in 
general, but also relative to the specific combination of both chosen for the 
experimental study in chapter 4 below.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Degree Modifiers and Headers
3.1 Introduction
In developing an appropriate study for this research, several critical factors needed to 
be considered. Linguistic uncertainty markers such as quantifiers and intensifiers are 
typically part of a grammatical structure comprising many linguistic forms such as 
nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc. I have already emphasised the need to consider 
uncertainty markers not only in isolation, but also in the way in which they relate to 
different classes of linguistic forms. There are few methodologies that encompass all 
of these elements while allowing an adaptation appropriate to this particular research 
topic. For example, Semin and Fielder’s (1988) Linguistic Category Model (LCM) 
would offer a number of features, although in this thesis I will use Paradis’ (1997) 
Scaling Test (described in section 4.1.2 below).
The original LCM proposed a framework that examines how language and 
specific linguistic forms mediate between social cognition and social reality. Their 
1988 model focused on the use of adjectives and three classes of verb forms in 
representing social beliefs, and even this initial work demonstrated the flexibility and 
adaptability of the LCM. Another benefit of the LCM is that it established the 
relationship between social beliefs and the degree of abstraction of the linguistic forms 
used to represent them. This is especially relevant to the subject degrees of 
uncertainty, which can also be represented along a concrete->abstract scale. Finally, 
the LCM can be used in a wide variety of experiments, and in this regard it is 
relatively straightforward to use it to explore hypotheses or research questions from 
different perspectives.
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The LCM however does not deal with degree modifiers per se and for this 
reason I have not used it as the basis of an experiment or study. Instead, I have 
employed the methodology used by Paradis (1997) in her Scaling Test, which deals 
specifically with combinations of degree modifiers and adjectives. It is easy to 
speculate or use common sense to understand everyday linguistic choices, but this is 
not adequate when critically examining the role of degree modifiers in representing 
beliefs. Any model used would need to address the role of language at differing levels 
of abstraction, and be inclusive of linguistic categories other than degree modifiers. It 
is also important to understand the broader social context in which language is used, 
and the ways in which pragmatic language use moderates the beliefs we hold about 
people. For this reason it is important consider the role of various linguistic 
classifications such as nouns, verbs and adjectives. This can be used as a foundation 
for the more specific study of degree modifiers and their relationship to other 
linguistic categories, and to the wider social and pragmatic context in which language 
and communication occurs.
3.2 What are Degree Modifiers?
So far I have given a considerable amount of attention to the cognitive processes and 
social factors that feed into the way we perceive situations and people. Language 
offers people a rich and varied means of expressing their beliefs, and it is important to 
at least briefly look at the main lexical units that are part of everyday language. Rather 
than attempt to cover every aspect of this lexicon, I have used the main linguistic 
components in line with the Semin and Fielder Linguistic Category Model, i.e. verbs 
and adjectives. I have also added nouns as they are an important category in terms of 
the cognitive representation of beliefs.
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Nouns have an obvious significance in describing objects, people and events 
in that they can activate schematic and category-based beliefs, and can create a set of 
expectations. For example, the noun ‘accountant’ can generate quite a detailed yet 
stereotypical image of that individual that extends well beyond the scope of 
professional occupation. It is also more likely to create an impression of a male person 
compared to the noun ‘nurse’ which stereotypically is more likely to be represented by 
a female. This too can have implications for the selection of adjectives; using the 
above examples, it is far more likely that the adjective ‘pretty’ would be associated 
with the noun ‘nurse’ rather than ‘accountant’, although interestingly neither noun in 
itself conveys gender identity. Conversely, the inability to find a noun that neatly and 
conveniently categorises an individual, object or event is likely to make it more 
difficult to establish strong beliefs about and expectations of that target.
Verbs seem to attract a great deal of attention from Semin and Fielder, to the 
extent that they propose that verbs be classified into four main categories. I have 
examined these classifications in detail below and therefore will not attempt to 
describe them at this stage. In some ways verbs are actually less directly descriptive 
than nouns or adjectives, and Semin and Fielder’s typology of verbs has more to do 
with the identification of verb categories at cognitive and functional levels. The real 
significance of verbs in scalar modification is more indirect than nouns or adjectives,
i.e. verbs describe what people do, think and feel, and describe how they behave. 
Furthermore, the use of verbs to can be quite significant to the expression not only of 
a belief, but also to the tacit expression of uncertainty in a belief; consider the 
difference between these two sentences:
‘He’s a nice guy’
‘He seems like a nice guy’
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Comparing the two, we can see that the first conveys a greater degree of certainty 
about the belief that the target is a nice guy. Injecting a degree modifier such as ‘very’ 
(i.e. he seems like a very nice guy) does substantially increase the intensity of the 
adjective ‘nice’ and the certainty of the belief expressed through the sentence by 
hedging the uncertainty implicit in ‘seems’, and I will explore this aspect later in this 
chapter. Sentences such as the above examples also reflect something of the character 
of the perceiver as well as their beliefs about the target. Take the following examples:
‘He knows what he’s talking about’
‘He seems to know what he’s talking about’
The first sentence communicates a sense of authority and level of knowledge on the 
part of the perceiver, and as such tells us something more about the relative 
knowledge of the perceiver than a more abstract and subjective observation such as 
‘he’s a nice guy’.
The final category is adjectives, which can be used very effectively to 
accurately describe beliefs or to specify the strength of a belief. As with verbs and 
nouns, the choice of adjective reflects something of the position of the perceiver 
relative to their target. Adjectives can be versatile at describing people in any number 
of ways, e.g. physical (tall, fat), personality (kind, generous), abilities (intelligent, 
incisive), attitudes (easy-going, liberal), etc. In the context of this thesis they are also 
important in that they are readily influenced by the use of degree modifiers subject to 
grammatical limitations and collocations discussed in section 3.3.2 below.
Individually, nouns, verbs and adjectives can be used to describe beliefs or to
represent a concept. However, their collective use has a compound effect that can be
quite informative about the degree of belief held by the perceiver about their target.
This is one of the strengths of Semin and Fielder’s model, albeit with some criticism
for their lack of inclusion of nouns and their possible over-emphasis of verbs. The
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LCM does however provide a framework within which the use of degree modifiers 
might be evaluated, and in this regard it is a very useful and proven tool. However, it 
is important to move towards a methodology that focuses specifically on degree 
modifiers, hence the move away from the LCM and the move towards Paradis’ 
Scaling Test in Chapter 4. Before this I want to examine degree modifiers in more 
detail, and to specifically focus on collocational aspects of degree modifier/adjective 
combinations.
3.2.1 Exploring Degree Modifiers
There is no single definition of what constitutes a degree modifier. Very 
simply, a degree modifier is a linguistic form that alters in some way an adjacent or 
related form. The influence can be positive or negative, i.e. it can intensify or weaken 
the original effect, or can possibly change the character of the effect in a way that 
cannot be best described as an intensifying or weakening effect. Degree modifiers can 
take a wide number of forms - nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, prosodic features, 
repetition, etc. can all have a modifying effect. Previous research on degree words in 
English (such as Bolinger 1972) has demonstrated the syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic constraints on degree modifiers. It is important to note such constraints as 
they have a material effect on the way the study in this thesis is constructed and 
analysed, in the same way that any legitimate study in linguistics must take linguistic 
principles and rules into account. For this reason topics such as lexical semantics and 
collocations have been included.
I have made various references so far to the forms that degree modifiers 
influence. For the sake of convenience I will refer to the base form (upon which the 
degree modifier acts) as the ‘head’. Jacobson (1964:14) points out the syntactic
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dependency between modifiers and a head, to the extent that the head can select and 
determine the modifiers in the first place. For example, the adjective ‘cold’ (the head) 
selects degree modifiers such as very, fairly, bitterly, etc, but cannot select much. The 
nature of the head therefore is important in determining what degree modifiers are 
available for use. Using the above example, the head ‘cold’ can be placed along a 
scale, such as hot —> cold, with varying degrees of heat and coldness along that scale. 
However this scalability is not necessarily true of all potential heads: (Vermeire 1979: 
26) describes three main types of head, which he characterises as follows:




Inherently Gradable: Relative, implies a scale
E.g., good/bad
These classifications are useful in that they express the extent to which each are 
restricted by the degree modifiers that can be applied to them. Inherently non-gradable 
heads are relatively restricted compared to non-inherently gradable heads, with 
inherently gradable heads being the least restricted.
The accuracy of these classifications is open to debate. The integrity of 
absolute classifications such as male/female is questionable given that there are a 
variety of stages of transexuality between the two, albeit that as a mainstream 
classification it is acceptable if not entirely inclusive. Similarly, heads such as 
dead/alive can also be modified (e.g. half-dead, barely alive), although these cannot be 
literally true -  one is either alive or dead. Non-inherently gradable heads, while 
relative, can also be expressed in less than absolute terms, although again their literal 
validity is questionable. A vessel can be full, empty, or somewhere in between, but
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cannot be extended beyond the full or empty absolute limits. Yet it is possible to say 
for example that a bus or a cup is very full, but this refers more to the normal or 
recommended rather than the absolute physical capacity. Inherently gradable heads 
are least restricted in that their abstraction and the fuzziness of the upper and lower 
parameters make them easily modifiable.
To progress this exploration further requires a shift in focus towards the 
degree modifiers themselves, and to break them down into their own set of 
classifications. As I mentioned previously on as number of occasions, degree 
modifiers can take many forms. Prosodic or paralinguistic features of language can 
easily be used as a form of degree modifier by moderating the effect of an utterance, 
such as the use of loudness, emphasis/stress, repetition, and even silence. Vermeire 
(1979:42) points out that a unit in a clause that is given extra prominence by means of 
loudness or pitch variation is also in a sense intensified. Speakers can use both 
conventional and conversational implicatures to alter the tone, style or meaning of an 
utterance (Grice 1975). For example:
Conventional implicature:
He was old yet very agile.
The implication of the content of this sentence is that old people are generally not very 
agile, and it is the use of the word ‘yet’ which conventionally implies this. Such use of 
language can be employed to create or increase effects such as emphasis or contrast. 
Conversational implicature:
John: I think she’s really pretty.
Alice: Of course, my dear husband, she’s a real stunner.
Assuming that Alice does not normally refer to John as ‘my dear husband’, it becomes 
clear that what she is saying is not literally true, and that she patently disbelieves 
John’s assertions. By using the phrase ‘my dear husband’ she is obviously being
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sarcastic (by flouting the Gricean maxim of quality) because she does not believe 
what she is saying. This not only modifiers the adjective ‘stunner’, it undermines the 
integrity of the description in itself. Even devices such as tag questions can be used as 
degree modifiers:
Jane: He’s a liar, isn’t he?
Harris (1984) argues that people’s use of tag questions does not express uncertainty or 
a request for confirmation, but that it actually reflects a very powerful act in that 
questions demand answers.
These examples demonstrate how the pragmatic use of language can be used 
to moderate how language is used and inferred, and such types of linguistic behaviour 
are prevalent and important in linguistic research, although they might qualify as 
‘language modifiers’ rather than strictly degree modifiers. However for the purposes 
of this thesis I will focus on a narrow category of linguistic phenomena (i.e. degree 
modifying adverbs) and my discussion will define what I ultimately mean by the 
terms ‘degree modifiers’ for the purposes of the subsequent experiment. This is the 
form most familiar to people as degree modifiers, e.g. very tall, rather strange, bitterly 
cold, clearly successful. These fall into different sub-classifications of adverbs.
3.2.2 A Typology of Adverbs and Degree Modifiers
In this section I will focus on describing, with examples (in italics), the most 
common adverb groups by semantic domain. By doing this I aim to illustrate what 
degree modifying adverbs are, as opposed to what they do (see the next section on the 
effects of degree modifying adverbs). Not all adverbs act as degree modifiers, but for 
the sake of inclusiveness I have discussed as many adverb categories as possible as 
most classifications include some examples of adverbs that have a modifying effect.
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Here, there, away, far, toward
Place adverbs show position {here), direction (forward) or 
distance (far).
Always, never, now, then, usually, often
Time adverbs describe time position (now), frequency (often),
duration (always, continuously) and relationship (recently,
already).
Quietly, well, quickly, together, well, significantly 
Manner adverbs describe how actions are performed. These 
adverbs are often (although not always) typified by —ly 
suffixes, derived morphologically and semantically from the 
adjective from which they originate.
Really, very, quite, fairly, more, too
Degree adverbs are the most obviously significant category in 
the context of this research’s focus on degree modifiers. They 
describe the extent to which a characteristic (typically 
characterised in the head) is either less or greater than usual or 
than another element in the neighbouring discourse.
Also, too
Additive adverbs, as their name suggests, demonstrate that one 
item is being added to another either at a clausal or phrasal 
level.
Restrictive Adverbs: Just, particularly, only, else
Restrictive adverbs are similar in nature to additive adverbs 
insofar as they create a focus on a certain element of a clause, 
often having an emphasising or narrowing effect, e.g. All the 
boys, especially Gavin, hated the new teacher.
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Stance Adverbs: Probably, actually, like, maybe, indeed, perhaps
Stance adverbs are interesting in that they have a range of 
applications and can on occasions illustrate a level of 
uncertainty or doubt.
Linking Adverbs: Then, so, therefore, anyway
Linking adverbs are used to create or moderate relationships 
between clauses for purposes such as continuity, contrast, 
relativity, etc.
Other Adverbs: While avoiding extending the list to every conceivable class of
adverb, there are other adverbs that can be important and 
therefore merit a mention. Arguably some could possibly be 
included under some of the above categories, although there is 
not a universally accepted standard list of adverb classes.
Adverbs that might be considered are manner of speaking 
adverbs (bluntly, frankly), factive adverbs (fortunately, 
naturally), instrumental adverbs (manually), and viewpoint
adverbs (statistically, economically).
These categories are useful in that they break adverbs into identifiable groups based 
on definitions of what constitutes each group. However it is also important to 
appreciate the effect that degree modifiers have, i.e. what they do versus what they 
are. This is the focus on the next section.
3.2.3 Degree Modifiers and their Effects
There are many ways of approaching the task of classifying and describing 
degree modifiers. The previous section provided a structured approach to their 
classification based on definitions of what they are. Another approach, which I have 
adopted in this section, is to look at how degree modifiers are used and the effect they 
have. The value of taking a different approach to degree modifiers can be seen when
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examining the various ways in which the same adverb can be used, which technically 
would mean that the same adverb would have to be simultaneously classified in 
several of the categories in the above section. For example, consider the adverb just:
1) I had just finished my coffee (denoting closeness in time).
2) We’re just two goals down on the other team (downplays the size and 
significance of the two goals).
3) That skirt is just awful (intensifying effect of the adjective awful).
4) It’s just too difficult for me (denotes an absolute statement, i.e. just 
could be easily be replaced by another adverb such as simply).
5) He’s just here beside me (denotes physical closeness).
In this case we can see that the same adverb is used in many different ways to create
varying effects. Equally, it is important to note the semantic, syntactic and
grammatical constraints that adverbs operate under, and analysing how adverbs are
used contributes to this. Essentially there are three primary effects that degree
modifiers have on their related head, and the following classifications are based on
these effects (from Quirk et al 1985 and Paradis 1997):
Amplifiers (+): Amplifiers have the effect of increasing the intensity of the 
form they act on, hence the plus sign attached to the title. They can be broken 
down into two sub-categories:
Maximisers -  completely, totally, absolutely 
Boosters -  very, really
Downtoners (-): These have the effect of reducing the intensity of the form 
they act on:
Approximators -  almost 
Compromisers -  more or less 
Moderators -  quite, rather, pretty, fairly 
Diminishers -  partly 
Minimisers -  hardly, barely
Emphasizers: Emphasizers, although similar in nature to amplifiers and 
downtoners, do not necessarily have either a positive or negative effect.
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While this approach is useful, there are elements that are not particularly 
satisfactory. Not least of these is the final category, i.e. emphasizers, which could 
potentially include most of the other two categories. Allerton (1987) proposed a 
different type of classification based on their gradable features, as described below 
(from Paradis 1997):
1. Scalar Modifiers indicate different parts of a mental scale of degree, 
which ranges from immeasurably high to zero, e.g. extremely, very, pretty, 
rather, fairly, somewhat, slightly, not at all.
2. Telic Modifiers relate the actual degree of the modified item to the degree 
required for some purpose and place it above or below that mark, e.g. 
easily, barely, only, just, hardly, virtually, nearly.
3. Absolutive Modifiers indicate that the degree of the modified item is 
‘superlative’, e.g. absolutely, utterly, totally, entirely, and these combine 
with ‘superlative’ types of adjectives.
4. Differential Modifiers indicate the difference of degree between the item 
being described and some reference point. They include far, much, a lot, 
marginally, slightly, a bit in combination with comparatives.
Whichever model one chooses to identify with, they all use broadly the same sub­
classifications such as maximisers, diminishers, etc., which are useful in 
characterising the effects of various degree modifiers. However, there are constraints 
that apply to any classification system. Specifically, one must consider the effect of 
collocations, i.e. the way that lexical items combine according to semantic and 
grammatical rules or principles. An exploration of this area of linguistics would take a 
considerable effort and I do not propose completing such a study within the confines 
of this thesis, although I will refer when appropriate to specific instances or rules 
regarding:
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• Collocational preferences between degree modifiers and 
adjectives, i.e. the propensity for specific degree modifiers 
and adjectives to co-occur;
• Selectional and attitudinal restrictions that apply to the 
combination of degree modifiers and adjectives.
The effects of degree modifiers can be influenced by collocations. For example, the
combination of ‘rather’ and ‘nice’ can be used to express a level of appreciation that
exceeds the strict literal meaning of the phrase, e.g. “My, that car is rather nice”. The
phrase ‘rather nice’ here is an understated way of expressing strong admiration for the
car in question, particularly with supporting use of stress and intonation. Collocations,
in addition to indicating words that tend to be used together, also can create
restrictions on which particular words can be combined. The co-occurrence of words
can also activate the priming and down the garden path processes described in section
1.3.3 above. For example, the use of the degree modifier bitterly creates a strong
expectation that the adjective cold or disappointed will follow, due to their
collocational associational with each other. The same would not apply to a degree
modifier such as very.
Gnutzmann (1975) also points out that the nature of the utterance itself can 
create or moderate collocational associations. For example, exclamatory utterances 
can only use intensifying degree modifiers to reinforce the related head. For example:
1) How beautiful!
2) How very beautiful!
3) How fairly beautiful!
The use of the intensifier very in example 2 above works well with the
adjective beautiful in the context of the exclamatory utterance. The use of fairly in
example 3 however makes no sense as it undermines the use of the adjective in the
exclamatory utterance. Collocational associations are also subject to the intended
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meaning of the degree modifier, as many have a number of potential meanings (such 
as quite) or have a different potential meaning from the adjective from which they are 
derived. Classic examples of this are awfully and terribly, which can be used 
interchangeably with very or extremely. The relevance of collocations depends on the 
actual degree modifiers and heads chosen for the experiment in this thesis, and for this 
reason I have not expanded the discussion of collocations any further at this stage.
One point that emerges from the above discussion is that the effect (and 
possibly even the meaning) of the degree modifier can depend on the head that it 
relates to, or on the broader sentence or utterance in which it occurs. The latter will be 
the subject of my analysis of the results of the experiment later in this chapter, which I 
believe is an important and valuable aspect of this research, particularly in looking at 
degree modifiers as markers of certainty or uncertainty. With regards to the 
relationship between the degree modifier and the head, one might argue that the effect 
of one depends on the intensity of the other. For example, descriptions such as fairly 
nice or fairly disgusting beg the question as to whether the term fairly has the same 
‘strength’ in each case, or whether it is influenced by the extremity of disgusting 
versus the more neutral adjective nice. This does not necessarily undermine the notion 
of gradability of degree modifiers or adjectives such as suggested in this chapter and 
in section 2.3.2.1 above, but it does mean that some consideration needs to be given to 
the combinations used to represent beliefs about people. This is part of the rationale 
behind my choice of experimental methodology and the design of the actual 
experiment.
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3.3 Collocational Aspects of Degree Modifiers
A collocation is an expression consisting of two or more words that correspond to 
some conventional way of saying things. Firth (1957: 181) describes collocations of a 
given word as “statements of the habitual or customary places of that word.” 
Collocation is the relationship among any group of words that tend to co-occur in a 
predictable configuration. Khellmer (1991) suggests that our mental lexicon is made 
up not only of single words, but also of larger phraseological units, both fixed and 
more variable. Although collocations seem to have a semantic basis, many 
collocations are best recognized by their syntactic form. (McRoy 1992). Collocations 
are characterized by limited compositionality. We call a natural language expression 
compositional if the meaning of the expression can be predicted from the meaning of 
the parts. Collocations are not fully compositional in that there is usually an element 
of meaning added to the combination. A commonly cited example of this is the phrase 
strong tea. In this case the word strong is likely to be defined as rich in some active 
agent as opposed to having physical strength. Nouns such as cats and dogs are more 
likely to be associated with each other than cats and giraffes. Equally, word sense can 
be influenced by collocations. For example, the sense of the word mouse is likely to 
vary when collocated with these two groups of words:
(a) Computer, keyboard, click
(b) Cheese, trap, rodent
I have already mentioned the association between collocations and word sense 
disambiguation in section 1.3 above, in particular the famous quote from Firth about 
how words are characterised by the company they keep. Various suggestions have 
been made about how collocations can be defined and classified, which is the subject 
of the next section.
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3.3.1 Defining and Classifying Collocations
I have already provided a preliminary definition of collocations (above) that 
are generally accepted as describing the broad nature of collocations. However, 
different definitions of collocations have been suggested:
5. We may use the term node to refer to an item whose 
collocations we are studying, and we may define a span as the 
number of lexical items on each side of a node that we consider 
relevant to that node. Items in the environment set by the span 
we will call collocates (Sinclair 1966:415)
6. the study of lexical patterns (Brown 1974:1)
7. a sequence of words that occurs more than once in identical 
form and which is grammatically well structured (Kjellmer 
1987:133)
8. the meaning of a word has a great deal to do with the words with 
which it commonly associates (Nattinger (1988:68)
9. a recurrent co-occurrence of words (Clear 1993:277)
10. the way individual words co-occur with others (Lewis 1993:93)
11. the way in which words occur together in predictable ways (Hill 
& Lewis 1997:1)
Definitions aside, several approaches to the subject of collocations have also been 
proposed. Gitsaki (1996) identifies three different schools of thought:
The lexical composition approach: Methodologically, this approach ‘is based 
on the assumption that words receive their meaning from the words they co-occur 
with’ (Gitsaki 1996:10). It thus sees lexis as independent of grammar and the Neo- 
Firthians, as they were called (represented by Halliday and Sinclair), also kept 
grammar and lexis separate, though they did not try to devalue grammar in any way. 
Firth provided a more detailed explanation:
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Meaning by collocation is an abstraction at the syntagmatic level and 
is not directly concerned with the conceptual or idea approach to the 
meaning of words. One of the meanings of night is its collocability 
with dark, and of dark, of course, collocation with night (Firth 
1951/1957:196)
Thus part of the meaning of a word is the fact that it collocates with another word. The
other words with which it collocates, however, are often strictly limited.
The semantic approach: This is an approach where ‘linguists attempted to
investigate collocations on the basis of a semantic framework, also separate from
grammar’ (Gitsaki 1996:13). The crux of this approach was to try and find out not just
that certain words collocate with each other, but why they collocate: why we can say
blonde hair but not blonde car. The semantic approach attempted to address what was
perceived as a failing of the lexical compositional approach, which was its perceived
inability to explain why words collocate.
The structural approach: The third approach to collocation says that
“collocation is influenced by structure, and collocations occur in patterns; therefore
the study of collocations should include grammar” (Gitsaki 1996:17). Thus, in
contrast to the two previous approaches, grammar is seen as a central factor that
cannot be separated from lexis. Lexical and grammatical collocations thus represent
two different but related aspects of the same phenomenon, and Bahns (1993: 57)
defines the difference between them as follows:
Examples of grammatical collocations include: account for, advantage 
over, adjacent to, by accident, to be afraid that... They consist of a 
noun, an adjective, or a verb, plus a preposition or grammatical 
structure such as an infinitive or clause. Lexical collocations on the 
other hand, do not contain prepositions, infinitives or clauses, but 
consist of various combinations of nouns, adjectives, verbs and 
adverbs.
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A more consolidated approach involves lexical and grammatical integration, such as 
that advocated by Sinclair (1987, 1991). Hudson et al (1997:209) suggest that “there 
are two main points about patterns to be made: firstly, that all words can be described 
in terms of patterns; secondly, that words which share patterns also share meanings”. 
Collocations can be found in idioms (such as level playing field, new kid on the block, 
raining cats and dogs) and in phrasal verbs (see through, write down, throw up). 
Interestingly, Hill (1999) suggests a class of collocations that he refers to as unique 
collocations, such as foot the bill or shrug your shoulders, and it does seem that this is 
simply another way of classifying idiomatic phrases as collocations. Collocation does 
occur in these cases, as phrasal verbs and idiomatic phrases entail the collocation of 
given words to create a specific meaning, although in idiomatic phrases this meaning 
often differs from the literal meaning of the constituent words. This is different 
however from a more random collocation of words, or the propensity for some words 
to collocate more than other outside of lexical units such as idioms. Collocations are 
usually placed somewhere in the grey area between fixed idioms and free 
combinations, often in a phraseological framework (e.g. Burger et al. 1982). In a 
narrower sense, they are understood as semi-compositional word pairs, with one 
“free” element (the base) and the other element lexically determined (the collocate). 
From this point of view it is useful to classify types (or scale) of collocations, such as 
those suggested by Lewis (1998):
Strong collocations: These are collocations that tend to co-occur only in 
specific combinations and are strongly associated with each other. Examples would 
include bitterly cold and avid reader.
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Medium strength collocations: These are words that co-occur more 
frequently than weak collocations. Examples include hold a meeting and carry out a 
study.
Weak collocations: These are defined as words that co-occur with greater than 
random frequency. For example, colour labels can be used liberally with most objects, 
but with a noun such as wine, the collocates are likely to be red, white or rose.
Hill (2000) proposes seven different categories of collocations based on their 
grammatical structure:
1. adjective + noun, e.g. a huge profit
2. noun + noun, e.g. a pocket calculator
3. verb + adjective + noun, e.g. learn a foreign language
4. verb + adverb, e.g. live dangerously
5. adverb + verb, e.g. half understand
6. adverb + adjective, e.g. completely soaked
7. verb + preposition + noun, e.g. speak through an interpreter
This research focus in this thesis in obviously most interested in the sixth category 
above, i.e. adverb + adjective. Also, this largely eliminates the need for any substantial 
exploration of the topic of collocational span, i.e. the idea that words can collocate 
even if they occur two, four or even more words away from each other in a sentence. 
However, I will explore the subject of reciprocity in collocations, i.e. that the strength 
of the collocation is not equal between the words concerned. For example, the word 
blonde collocates only with a relatively small number of words (normally associated 
with hair), but the word hair can co-occur far more widely. Given that the degree 
modifier and adjective combination group in the study of this thesis is so finite, it is 
relatively easy to examine reciprocity within that group. This is part of an examination
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of the wider characteristic of the adverb + adjective collocation, particularly in 
relation to scale and boundedness (explained in detail in section 3.2.3 above). I will 
now focus on the specific characteristics of collocations associated with degree 
modifiers before exploring evidence in various corpora.
3.3.2 Collocations and Degree Modifiers
My specific interest at this stage is to look at the combination of six degree 
modifiers and the various headers used in the study in this thesis, and to examine 
whether there are any observable patterns in terms of how they collocate. I should 
mention first that the exact meaning of a degree modifier/adjective combination 
depends on the context, a point made several times during the course of this thesis. 
For example, saying “that’s absolutely wonderful” in a sarcastic tone when you 
discover that the dog has relieved itself in your slippers is unlikely to be literally true. 
Equally, describing an expensive sports car as “rather nice” is a particularly 
understated style of expression that communicates the notion that the person considers 
that car to be very much more than “rather nice”. The study of collocations here is not 
directly related to the context in which they occur and is limited to their co-occurrence 
in given corpora irrespective of how they can be used pragmatically or in various 
contexts.
Firstly, a reminder of the degree modifiers and headers used in the study:











When using corpora to explore the above items, it is important to bear a few 
things in mind. The collocations I am interested in here are instances where the above 
combinations of degree modifiers and adjectives co-occur. Calculating the 
significance of the scores for the results is quite straightforward. In this case I am 
using the t score to measure the statistical significance of the results. It would be easy 
to calculate the frequency that a given combination (e.g. QUITE + NICE), but this 
ignores the underlying frequency of the query word QUITE. In general, a t score is a 
statistic which assumes that the values being analyzed are distributed in the standard 
bell-shaped curve (what is called the normal distribution). The t score allows 
measurements which conform to some normal distribution to be reduced to the 
standard unit normal distribution which has a mean of zero and a known average 
squared deviation. Once this is done, then the significance of a measurement can be 
assessed.
The advantage of using t scores as a measure of significance is that it assesses 
whether the association between collocates is true and not due to the vagaries of 
chance; raw frequency in itself does not achieve this. The t score test looks at the 
mean and variance of a sample of measurements, where the null hypothesis is that the 
sample is drawn from a distribution with mean p. The test looks at the difference 
between the observed and expected means, scaled by the variance of the data, and tells 
us how likely one is to get a sample of that mean and variance (or a more extreme 
mean and variance) assuming that the sample is drawn from a normal distribution with 
mean fx.
The calculation of the t score first requires the determination of the z score. 
The z score reports the relative position of a score in the test distribution, and is the 
number of standard deviations a score is from the test mean. The mean will have a z-
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score of zero. Scores above the mean have a positive z score and scores below the 
mean have a negative z score. Z scores and t scores are called standard scores. These 
scores are usually interpreted in conjunction with the normal curve where 68% of the 
scores fall within one standard deviation of the mean; 96% of the scores fall within 
two standard deviations of the mean; and 99% of the scores fall within three standard 
deviations of the mean. T scores are obtained by multiplying the z score by 10 and 
adding 50. This gives t scores a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. A t score 
of 65 is 1.5 standard deviations above the mean. Z score is a statistic for hypothesis 
testing, i.e. for assessing whether a certain event is due to chance or not. When used 
for collocation selection, z score tests whether the co-occurrence of two words is due 
to other factors than chance. It is very similar to a t score, the difference lying in the 
fact that z is used with the data distributed normally. Both z score and t score are one­
sided measures. Large positive values indicate significant evidence for positive 
association, while large negative values indicate evidence for negative association.
Other methods of measuring the significance of word collocations are mutual 
information, likelihood ratios and Pearson’s Chi square test. Relative frequency ratios 
can also be used to assess the significance between collocations in different corpora. 
Pearson's chi-squared test is the standard test for statistical independence in a 2 x 2  
contingency table, and is much more appropriate as a measure of the significance o f 
association than t.score. Despite its central role in mathematical statistics, it has not 
been very widely used on co-occurrence data. In particular, t score was found to be 
much more useful for the extraction of collocations from text corpora (cf. Evert & 
Krenn, 2001). The SARA software used to make enquiries about collocations in the 
British National Corpus (or BNC, a 100 million word collection of samples of written 
and spoken language from a wide range of sources, designed to represent a wide
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cross-section of current British English, both spoken and written) allows both mutual 
information and z scores to be selected as scoring algorithms, although it does not 
provide a facility for calculating t scores. The Collins Wordbanks Online English 
collocation sampler does allow the user to select either t scores or mutual information, 
but offers limited flexibility in defining tagsets or word combinations.
Extracting collocations relating to degree modifier/adjective collocations 
requires a careful approach to setting up the query. It is important where possible to 
limit the collocational span to the word to the immediate right of the degree modifier 
(also referred to as the focal word or base), and to specify that the collocate should be 
an adjective. This is especially important with adjectival headers such as kind, whose 
polysemous characteristics mean that it could be either an adjective (e.g. a kind 
person) or a noun (e.g. a kind of dog). Also, only the adverbial form of the degree 
modifier itself was selected in each query. These were considerations that were factors 
into the query process when using the largest corpus in the world, the British National 
Corpus.
3.3.3 Degree Modifier Collocations in the British National Corpus
The British National Corpus (BNC) is a very large body of written and spoken 
data, consisting of more than 100 million words. The BNC is primarily a corpus of 
written text (90%), with the remaining 10% being spoken language. It is an excellent 
resource for exploring instances and patterns of collocations and is used widely by 
researchers for this and for many other research purposes.
The query for the study of our combination of degree modifiers and adjectives 
firstly involved a singly word query to determine the frequency of occurrence of each 
of the six degree modifiers, which is indicated in the table below:
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Straight away we can see that the degree modifier VERY is by far the most prevalent 
within the group with 113,282 instances found in the adverbial form. REALLY and 
QUITE are roughly similar in their frequency, and thereafter the other remaining 
degree modifiers occur increasingly infrequently. Without trying to jump to 
conclusions too quickly, the prevalence of each degree modifier is potentially 
interesting in that frequency of occurrence is one of the elements that indices 
psychological salience in the mental categorisational processes (Rosch and Mervis 
1975). However, raw frequencies of the degree modifying adverbs alone are not an 
especially valid method of analysing the data or deriving conclusions. For this I am 
going to use two measures:
• The frequency of collocations of each degree modifier and adjective (with the 
adjective specified as falling immediately to the right of the degree modifying 
adverb
• The z scores generated by the SARA software based on the frequency of the 
collocation relative to the frequencies of both the degree modifier and 
adjective
The data collected from the BNC enquiry is displayed in the table below. Two figures 
are included in each cell; the frequency of the collocation of that specific combination 
of degree modifier and adjective, and the z score generated (in brackets). For example,
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the collocation of VERY + BIG is 472 (89.2), which means that the collocation of 
VERY + BIG occurred 472 times, and generated a z score of 89.2. The table below is 
structured to easily illustrate the variances between the scores for each combination.
Figure 3.2: Degree modifies/adjective combination matrix
wm
V E R Y 4 7 2  (8 9 .2 ) 2 0 5 2  (4 3 4 .4 ) 365  (6 9 .9 ) 465  (1 1 5 .8 ) 147 (7 6 .5 ) 7 3 0 (2 1 2 .3 ) 1 2 8 (4 6 .4 ) 3 1 7 (6 1 ) 1 4 1 9 (3 9 1 .8 )
R E A L L Y 149 (4 3 .2 ) 58 (16 .4 ) 11 (0 .4 ) 2 0 7  (80 .7 ) 4 . 2  h 6 9  (29 .7 ) 3 4 (1 8 .7 ) 1 4 (1 .4 ) 3 8 4 (1 6 4 .7 )
F A IR L Y 2 0 (1 5 .4 ) ......... 5 (4 .4 ) 13 (28 .3 ) 13 (15 .1 ) 4 , 2 . 7 . i M .  L 1 (0 .3 )
R A T H E R . .  1 112 (54 .3 ) 15 (17 .4 ) 33 (40 .6 ) 3 (0 .6 ) 5 ( 3  1, j * 91 (5 8 )
Q U IT E 93 (28 .3 ) 2 0 9  (7 2 .6 ) 8 (-0 .1 ) 3 2 (1 1 .6 ) 9 ( 7 ) 563 (2 7 7 .8 ) 33 (19 .8 ) 190 (6 3 .6 ) 32 8  (1 5 1 .9 )
S O M E W H A T 1 4 (1 4 .1 ) .............................:...... _______ .. . . 1 <J ■" . - ....... 0 ( 0 )
The results here are extremely interesting. There are clear asymmetries between the 
combinations and there are obvious propensities for some combinations to either 
occur very frequently or to occur very rarely. A more detailed discussion of the results 
is presented in section 3.3.4 below.
Before this, I want to briefly look at another intriguing aspect of collocations 
within the degree modifier group. The inclusion of the degree modifier REALLY in 
this group adds a dimension in that it can be used in combination with other degree 
modifiers to form a more emphatic form of compound degree modifier (e.g. that 
woman is really very nice). This quality does not work with the other five degree 
modifiers, i.e. combinations such as very really or somewhat quite do not work. I 
could have extended this query to consider how the degree modifier combinations 
below also collocate with the nine adjectives in this study, but this would have taken 
the analysis to a depth that would not have directly addressed the research questions of 
this thesis, although it would be an interesting area for further exploration.
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The word REALLY has a number of interesting qualities and is quite versatile 
in terms of how it can be used. Stenstrom (1986: 151) suggests that the position and 
syntactic function of really give rise to its varying meaning:
• this question is really surprising
• this is a really surprising question
• this is really a surprising question
• this really is a surprising question
• really this is a surprising question
The first two examples above involve REALLY acting as a degree modifier to the 
adjective SURPRISING. It also has the ability to combine with other degree modifiers 
as indicated below, although this could also be VERY VERY (e.g. I ’m very very busy 
at the moment) and possibly QUITE QUITE (e.g. it’s quite quite impossible, I ’m 
afraid), although the latter would be seen as very idiosyncratic use of language. The 
combination of VERY VERY yields a collocational frequency of 913 and a z score of 
72.1, and the combination of QUITE QUITE yields a collocational frequency of 30 
and a z score of 4.2. Paradis (2003) explores the nature and the semantic/pragmatic 
characteristics of REALLY in more detail, and she asserts that “really differs from 
very in that it is not a fully-fledged degree modifier, since it takes propositional truth 
attesting scope in questions” (ibid: 8); truth attesting really takes scope over a 
proposition whose function is to assert something that may be true or false, e.g. ‘she 
loves me really\
With the exceptions of FAIRLY and SOMEWHAT, the degree modifiers 
seem to combine quite frequently with REALLY. The clear exceptions of FAIRLY 
and SOMEWHAT plus the z scores of the remaining degree modifier combinations 
indicate the strong likelihood that these collocations (REALLY + VERY, RATHER, 
QUITE, REALLY) occur more than might be expected on a random basis. The scores
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for REALLY + QUITE is interesting, as intuitively I would have expected REALLY 
+ VERY to return a higher frequency and collocational effect.
Figure 3.3: Frequency of REALLY + degree modifier collocations
REALLY VERY 204 22
REALLY RATHER 111 22.5
REALLY FAIRLY 2 -0.4
REALLY SOMEWHAT 0 0
REALLY QUITE 235 53.7
REALLY REALLY 117 22.3
It might be worthwhile exploring these aspects of collocations further, particularly 
with regard to how their combined use might affect judgements of strength and 
uncertainty. Logically a combination of REALLY + VERY + ADJECTIVE should 
have the effect of further reinforcing the scalar component of the property denoted in 
the adjective. Inevitably the compound degree modifier will always serve to 
strengthen or emphasise the adjective’s scalar property, but also should (at least 
logically) reduce uncertainty associated with that belief. The effect of the additional 
degree modifier could be measured, but in order to maintain a focus on the specific 
research goals of this thesis, I will now look at the results of the corpus data from the 
original degree modifier/adjective combinations and consider what it tells us about 
collocational effects.
3.3.4 Analysing and Interpreting the Corpus Data
The table of both collocational frequency and z scores for each of the 54 
degree modifier/adjective combination actually represents a lot of information to 
analyse. For convenience I have presented the table in figure 3.2 once again below:
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V E R Y 4 72  (89 .2 ) 2 0 5 2  (4 3 4 .4 ) 365  (6 9 .9 ) 46 5  (1 1 5 .8 ) 147 (7 6 .5 ) 7 3 0 (2 1 2 .3 ) 1 2 8 (4 6 .4 ) 3 1 7 (6 1 ) 1 4 1 9 (3 9 1 .8 )
R E A L L Y 1 4 9 (4 3 .2 ) 5 8 (1 6 .4 ) 11 (0 .4 ) 2 0 7  (80 .7 ) - M2  11 6 9  (2 9 .7 ) 3 4 (1 8 .7 ) 1 4 (1 .4 ) 3 8 4 (1 6 4 .7 )
F A IR L Y 2 0 (1 5 .4 ) 8 ( 6 ) 5 (4 4 , 13 (2 8 .3 ) 1 3 .  -  I* 4 ( 5 .7 ) 1 (40 4 , 1 (0 .3 )
R A T H E R 9 ( 2 .1 ) 1 1 2 (5 4 .3 ) o c : 1 5 (1 7 .4 ) 33 (4 0 .6 ) 4 ( 0 . ' , ) 5 ( 3  4 . i (-1 6 , 91 (5 8 )
Q U IT E 93 (28 .3 ) 2 09  (72 .6 ) 8 1-0 1) 3 2 (1 1 .6 ) 9 ( 7 ) 563 (2 7 7 .8 ) 33 (19 .8 ) 190 (6 3 .6 ) 328  (1 5 1 .9 )
S O M E W H A T 0 f.°2 1 4 (1 4 .1 ) - ' - ' i l l '__________ 0 ( 0 ) 2 ( 5 ) I (1 .4 ) ....... 0 ( 0 )
I will first make some general observations before looking more at some of the 
specific instances. The first comment to make is that the degree modifier VERY 
obviously generates the highest number of collocations across the nine adjectives, and 
that the degree modifier SOMEWHAT generates the least. Looking at the pattern of 
collocations across the tables, the degree modifiers can be ranked as follows from 
most to least collocations generated:
(1) VERY (4) RATHER
(2) REALLY (5) FAIRLY
(3) QUITE (6) SOMEWHAT
The disparity of the results does illustrate how dependant the scores are on the 
particular combinations involved. The example of QUITE demonstrates this clearly, 
especially given the variance of results across the nine adjectives. I have flagged the 
combinations below that I feel are most interesting:
Figure 3.4: Key adjective/degree modifier combinations
V E R Y 4 7 2  (8 9 .2 ) 2 0 5 2  (4 3 4 .4 ) 365  (69 .9 ) 4 6 5 (1 1 5 .8 ) 147 (7 6 .5 ) 7 3 0 (2 1 2 .3 ) 128 (4 6 .4 ) 3 1 7 (6 1 ) 1 4 1 9 (3 9 1 .8 )
R E A L L Y 149 (4 3 .2 ) 5 8 (1 6 .4 ) 11 (0 .4 ) 2 0 7  (8 0 .7 ) 4 ( 2 .1 ) 6 9  (29 .7 ) 3 4 (1 8 .7 ) 1 4 (1 .4 ) 3 8 4 (1 6 4 .7 )
F A IR L Y 2 0 (1 5 .4 ) s u o .. ( 0 0 . ____ 5 (4 .4 ) 13 (28 .3 ) 1 3 (1 5 .1 ) 7 j. 1 (-0 .3 ) 1 (0 .3 )
R A T H E R 9 (2 .1 ) 1 1 2 (5 4 .3 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 5 (1 7 .4 ) 33 (40 .6 ) 3 (0 .6 ) .... 1 (-1 .6 ) 91 (5 8 )
Q U IT E 93 (28 .3 ) 20 9  (72 .6 ) . s  ; ’ ...... .  . '*<"! 563 (2 7 7 .8 ) 33 (19 .8 ) 1 9 0 (6 3 .6 ) 3 2 8 (1 5 1 .9 )
S O M E W H A T 0 ( 0 ) 1 4 (1 4 .1 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 2 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 (1 .4 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 )
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I firstly want to use this table to analyse each column of adjectives; for each adjective 
above I have indicated (via colour code) the degree modifiers that appear to be most 
significant, at least relative to the scores within that group. For those combinations 
that co-occur frequently, it will be interesting to compare these results against 
perceived measures of strength and uncertainty in the study of this thesis in Chapter 4.
BIG: The adjective BIG seems to combine strongly with VERY, and to a 
lesser extent with REALLY and QUITE. The combination of RATHER + BIG seems 
to co-occur quite rarely, and the BNC query returned no collocations for 
SOMEWHAT + BIG.
DIFFICULT: This adjective co-occurs most frequently with VERY, then with 
QUITE and RATHER to a decreasing extent. As with BIG, the remaining degree 
modifiers co-occur with DIFFICULT much less frequently.
KIND: This is an especially interesting adjective. With the obvious exception 
of VERY, there are very few collocations with other degree modifiers. It is not 
immediately obvious why KIND would co-occur with VERY so often but not with 
REALLY, which is not a particularly dissimilar degree modifier. As mentioned above, 
Paradis (2003) does make an important distinction between REALLY and VERY, and 
this may be a factor. I will return to this point in Chapter 4 when analysing the results 
of the study and comparing them with those of the BNC query.
BAD: This adjective only combines strongly with REALLY and VERY, and 
less so with the less extreme degree modifiers, although this is a hypothesis based 
purely on the observation of the results. It is also possible that the negative nature of 
BAD may be a factor, and again this is an idea that I will return to in Chapter 4.
WEAK: The co-occurrence with VERY is considerably higher than for all the 
other degree modifiers. With the possible exception of RATHER, there are no other
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instances where degree modifiers co-occur with this adjective to the same extent as 
with VERY.
HAPPY: There are two pronounced cases of collocation, i.e. with VERY and 
QUITE. My first thought was that this may be related to the word senses involved; for 
example, HAPPY can communicate different senses such as jovial, pleased, content 
and satisfied. This does require further exploration to understand why these particular 
combinations co-occur more than others.
WARM: This is similar to BIG in that the degree modifier VERY co-occurs 
most often, followed by REALLY and QUITE. I am a little surprised that RATHER + 
WARM does not co-occur more often, as I had imagined that this phrase might have 
been used reasonably frequently in spoken language. Then again, given the weather of 
the British Isles, perhaps there are reasons why this is not the case.
LIKELY: This adjective co-occurs most frequently with VERY and QUITE. 
The adjective LIKELY communicates a sense of probability about a given outcome, 
and this word sense may influence the degree modifier it co-occurs with most 
frequently. The relative absence of the degree modifier REALLY is also interesting.
NICE: Once again the degree modifier VERY far outweighs the others. 
REALLY and QUITE are roughly similar, although I suspect that the combination of 
QUITE + NICE normally communicates a somewhat understated expression of 
admiration (similar to RATHER + NICE, which interestingly co-occurs much less). 
The adjective NICE is notoriously vague in that it communicates a sense of niceness, 
but does not specify what quality of the target is appealing.
Looking across the table by row, it is clear that FAIRLY and SOMEWHAT 
represent the least number of co-occurrences within the wider degree 
modifier/adjective group. Part of the explanation for this is likely to be found in the
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frequency of occurrence of these degree modifiers themselves in the BNC, illustrated 







And now let us re-introduce the ranking table of degree modifiers from a few 
paragraphs above, with the frequencies now included:
(1) VERY (113,282) (4) RATHER (20,531)
(2) REALLY (46,467) (5) FAIRLY (6,584)
(3) QUITE (39,895) (6) SOMEWHAT (4,495)
The ranking of the degree modifiers based on the frequency of collocations across the 
nine adjectives matches exactly with the ranking of raw frequency of the occurrences 
of the degree modifiers themselves, e.g. VERY occurs most times in the BNC and it 
also generates the most collocations across the nine adjectives. The frequency of 
occurrence of FAIRLY and SOMEWHAT is the lowest within the group, and 
inevitably as the occurrences of degree modifiers diminish, the number of co­
occurrences with adjectives is also likely to fall, particularly relative to other more 
prevalent degree modifiers. I have qualified this aspect of the analysis in a few 
paragraphs below. However, this needs to be looked at in combination with the 
frequencies of occurrence of the adjectives themselves. In the case of the adjectives I 
have also examined the part of speech (POS) tags associated with each adjective. For 
the purposes of the original BNC query above the A JO (adjective, general or positive) 
POS code only was used for the adjectives, and the AVO (adverb) code only used for 
the degree modifiers. These figures are included in the table below:
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Figure 3.5: Breakdown of adjectives by POS codes
AJO 24,433 21,621 1,041 14,493 3,477 11,340 6,060 21,177 11,703
NN1 0 0 21,181 77 0 0 35 0 0
NPO 0 0 1 18 0 0 0 0 113
W B 0 0 0 0 0 0 251 0 0
W I 0 0 0 0 0 0 375 0 0
UNC 4 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0
AVO 0 0 544 16 0 0 0 251 18
AJO-AVO 391 0 0 262 0 0 0 1,280 808
AVO-AJO 25 0 0 46 0 0 0 288 114
AJO-NN1 0 0 241 21 0 0 22 0 0
NN1-AJO 0 0 591 1 0 0 1 0 0
F req u en cy 24,853 21,621 23,602 14,935 3,479 11,340 6,744 22,996 12,756
Key:
AJO adjective (general or positive) e.g. good, old
NN1 singular common noun, e.g. pencil, goose, time, revelation
NPO proper noun, e.g. London, Michael, Mars, IBM
W B  the finite base form of lexical verbs, e.g. forget, send, live, return
W I  the infinitive form of lexical verbs , e.g. forget, send, live, return
UNC unclassified items which are not appropriately classified as items of the English lexicon
AVO adverb, e.g. often, well, longer, furthest
AJO-AVO adjective or adverb
A VO-A JO  adverb or adjective
AJO-NN1 adjective or singular common noun
NN1-AJO singular common noun or adjective
The above definitions and examples were extracted from the BNC user manual.
The frequencies of both degree modifiers (AVO) and adjectives (AJO) therefore are:


















And one again, the matrix of degree modifiers and adjectives (figure 3.4):
V E R Y 4 7 2  (8 9 .2 ) 2 0 5 2  (4 3 4 .4 ) 365  (6 9 .9 ) 4 6 5 (1 1 5 .8 ) 147 (7 6 .5 ) 7 30  (2 1 2 .3 ) 128 (4 6 .4 ) 3 1 7 (6 1 ) 1 4 1 9 (3 9 1 .8 )
R E A L L Y 149 (43 .2 ) 5 8 (1 6 .4 ) 11 (0 .4) 2 0 7 (8 0 .7 ) 4 ( :  -1 > 69  (29 .7 ) 3 4 (1 8 .7 ) 1 4 (1 .4 ) 3 8 4 (1 6 4 .7 )
F A IR L Y 2 0 (1 5 .4 ) 8 ( 6 ) 0 ( 0 ) 5 ( 4  4) 13 (28 .3 ) 1 3 (1 5 .1 ) 4 ( 5 .7 ) 1 (-<>3, 1 (0 .3 )
R A T H E R 9 ( 2 .1 ) 1 1 2 (5 4 .3 ) 15 (17 .4 ) 33 (4 0 .6 ) 3 (0 .6 ) 5 (3 .4 ) 91 (58 )
Q U IT E 93 (2 8 .3 ) 2 0 9  (72 .6 ) 8 . - U U 3 2 (1 1 .6 ) 563 (2 7 7 .8 ) 33 (1 9 .8 ) 1 9 0 (6 3 .6 ) 3 2 8 (1 5 1 .9 )
S O M E W H A T 0 ( 0 ) 1 4 (1 4 .1 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 2 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 (1 .4 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 )
Although it takes a few minutes to mentally take in all of this data, a few points can be 
made immediately. The frequencies for each individual combination of degree 
modifier and adjective seem not to be the most influential factor. For example, the 
degree modifier SOMEWHAT returns almost identical results across all adjectives 
despite their varying frequencies. The degree modifier VERY returned much higher 
collocations with NICE than with LIKELY, despite the frequency of the latter being 
almost twice as high.
The example of KIND is very interesting indeed. Although a raw frequency of 
23,602 occurrences were reported by the BNC query, 21,181 of these were NN1 
single common nouns (e.g. a kind of dog) with only 1,041 being AJO adjectives. This 
is a clear indication of the need to disambiguate word sense, and also flags the danger 
of word sense ambiguity in the experiment if an appropriate sentence is not provided. 
In this case the fact that we were presenting adjectives was obvious because of the
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way in which they were combined with degree modifiers, but even then the exact 
concept that the adjective KIND represents is still value. This lexical semantic aspect 
of adjectives was discussed in some detail in section 2.2.2 above. For example, 
WordNet 2.1 reports the following potential meanings for KIND:
1. having or showing a tender and considerate and helpful nature; used 
especially of persons and their behaviour; "kind to sick patients"; "a kind 
master"; "kind words showing understanding and sympathy"; "thanked her for 
her kind letter"
2. kind, genial, agreeable, conducive to comfort; "a dry climate kind to 
asthmatics"; "the genial sunshine”;” hot summer pavements are anything but 
kind to the feet"
3. kind, tolerant and forgiving under provocation; "our neighbour was very 
kind about the window our son broke"
While the sentence and context in which this adjective occurs is obviously going to be
important, it would be interesting to explore which word sense is most central to the
concept of KIND, and the extent to which the others are marginal. This would help us
to understand the nature of the prototypical notion of KIND and other adjectives, and
consequently of the scalar representation of such concepts.
Without going through each combination in detail, it is clear that some of
these combinations have a predisposition to co-occur (for different reasons) beyond
what one might expect to occur at random, and certainly more than the combined
frequencies themselves would suggest. Equally, some combinations are highly
unlikely to co-occur (such as SOMEWHAT + HAPPY), simply because the degree
modifier is incongruous with the adjective involved. While the exploration of
collocational effects is interesting, there remain unanswered questions that the next
chapter should contribute to, which I have specified in section 3.3.5 below.
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3.3.5 Integrating Corpus Data with the Thesis Study
A few important points have emerged from the analysis of collocational 
frequencies above:
• Some collocations occur frequently and are used often in spoken and written 
language (such as VERY + BIG, REALLY + NICE)
• Other collocations are very incongruous and simply do not either occur 
frequently or feel ‘right’ to a speaker, even if they are not necessarily 
grammatically incorrect (e.g. SOMEWHAT + BAD).
• The fact that individual degree modifiers and adjective might have high 
frequencies of individual occurrence does not mean that they will have a high 
frequency of co-occurrence
The effects of frequency of occurrence are open to debate. For example, collocations
that are used often and conventionally in language can be said to be socially salient,
i.e. they represent instances of central and typical patterns of language use
(Tomaszczyk & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk in Hanks 1990). However, collocations
that are somehow unusual or more noticeable should in theory generate psychological
salience. Psychologically, people tend to register the unfamiliar rather than the
familiar, the unusual rather than the usual (Tomaszczyk & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk
in Hanks 1990). A lot of research in this area has been conducted by lexicographers
such as Hanks (1990: 9), who also strongly concurred with this view when he wrote:
“Everyday familiarities of language use - common words, ordinary 
meanings - tend not be registered by the conscious mind. For that reason 
the everyday, familiar words of our language are often not well described 
in dictionaries; without a great mass of evidence of unremarkable, 
everyday usage, it is almost impossible to achieve appropriate levels of 
generalization. Rare words and unusual uses, on the other hand, seem to 
be consciously registered and stored in the mind in such a way that they 
can be readily recalled for mention (discussion of their meaning and use), 
as well as being used in making new utterances”.
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This is an interesting point because it has direct implications for how frequency of 
occurrence can be interpreted, and gives rise to some intriguing possibilities for how 
either social or psychological salience influences our perception of the strength of 
belief associated with a degree modifier/adjective combination, and the strength of 
certainty with which that belief is held.
This is exactly what the experimental study in chapter 4 looks at, so 
combining the analysis of how the chosen degree modifiers and adjectives collocate is 
a sensible approach. This suggested analysis however was not part of the original 
thesis when submitted for examination; instead it was a recommendation to strengthen 
the existing thesis. For this reason a joint methodology was developed from the outset, 
which makes it difficult to develop a model that truly integrates both analyses to any 
substantial degree. For this reason I have focused on examining both the collocational 
analysis and the experimental study ‘side by side’, and drawing whatever conclusions 
can reasonably be deduced. As I have noted in section 4.3 below, this is one potential 
area in which the study of degree modifying adverbs can be developed.
I can however begin the process of articulating the issues and questions that 
arise when the subject of integrating both analyses is approached:
• What forms of salience pertain to degree modifier/adjective collocations, 
and what evidence from either lexicographers (social salience) or cognitive 
linguists (psychological salience) can be gathered to address this debate?
• Does frequency of collocation in a given degree modifier/adjective 
combination have any direct correlation with the perceived modifying 
strength of that degree modifier relative to that adjective?
• Does collocational frequency also have any influence on the degree of 
certainty with which the above perceptions are held?
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As with most analyses of this nature, one would not expect a yes/no answer to any of 
the above, and particularly the last two. This is partly because any experiment of 
methodology is unlikely to be entirely conclusive and uncontended, but also because 
this is an area of immense complexity and there are dimensions of linguistics, social 
and cognitive psychology and statistics that should always be reviewed and refined. In 
essence, it would represent a challenging but intriguing work in progress, as do many 
areas of academic research.
It is difficult to begin to discuss the proposed more straightforward 
comparison of the results of collocational analysis with the results of the experimental 
study in chapter 4, and for this reason I will revisit this topic in section 4.2.2 below 
once the main experiment has been completed.
3.4 Summary
This chapter contains some critical elements in the overall findings of this thesis. 
Apart from defining and exploring degree modifiers in more detail ahead of chapter 4, 
it has addressed the issue of how degree modifiers and adjectives tend to co-occur in 
various ways, some of which co-occur at a level higher than would be expected at 
random. This has been an especially interesting aspect of this research and will 
ultimately play a role in defining the findings of the research in chapter 5.
The fact that this research has demonstrated how the specific combinations of 
degree modifiers and adjectives collocate has a number of implications. It does 
confirm that collocational effects do apply to these specific lexical units, and therefore 
the study of collocations should be an intrinsic part of further research into scalar 
representation. Secondly, it does suggest that collocations might have an influence on 
prototypical notions of scale or centrality along a scalar continuum, and I would be
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especially interested in seeing how this works on a more multi-adjectival scale (see 
discussion in section 2.2.2 above). Finally, the study of collocations does demonstrate 
how idiomatic (or at least idiosyncratic) phrases might play a role in accounting for 
why some specific combinations co-occur.
It is now time to bring this research to an experimental level by studying the 
perceptions of strength and uncertainty of an identified group of six degree modifying 
adverbs and nine adjectives. The study of degree modifiers uses an adaptation of an 
existing methodology (Paradis’ 1997 Scaling Test), although my study does not 
include intonational and prosodic aspects of language included in the original study. I 
have also included a study of uncertainty in this experiment, which was one of the 
stated aims of this research thesis. The rationale, methodology and findings are now 
presented in chapter 4 below.
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Chapter 4
An Experimental Study of the Scalar Representation of Degree 
Modifiers under Uncertain Reasoning
Research into degree modifiers is by no means a new area of exploration. People such 
as Bolinger (1972, 1981), Sapir (1956), Halliday (1973, 1985) and many others have 
investigated degree modifiers from varying perspectives. Indeed, the research in this 
thesis has drawn on much of this previous work, particularly Vermeire (1979) and 
Paradis (1997). The work of Paradis is especially interesting in that she has devoted 
much of her academic career to the exploration of the lexical semantics of adjectives 
in general and to degree modifiers in particular. I have already referred to her work on 
antonyms and negation, which would be important directionally in terms of taking this 
research further. Her paper on epistemic modality and degree (specifically to the use 
of REALLY) has been useful (see section 3.3.3 above) in accounting for the use and 
collocations of ‘compound’ degree modifiers (such as REALLY VERY). It is this 
focus of research and related methodologies that determined my decision to use and 
adapt the research and experimental methodologies of Paradis to support my own 
research study in this thesis.
4.1 The Research Experiment: Measuring the Influence of Degree Modifiers
Several factors needed to be taken into consideration when designing an experimental 
study for this area of research. The core requirement was the use of an established 
methodology for evaluating the perceived strength of degree modifiers, as without this 
the integrity of the study would have been questionable. However, it ultimately 
became necessary to adapt an experimental methodology to suit my particular needs,
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and in this regard any changes needed to be thought through properly. In section 4.1.2 
below I have outlined Paradis 1997 Scaling Test, upon which my adaptation is based.
A key theme in this research is the scalar representation of concepts such as 
degree modifiers and adjectives, hence the cognitive linguistic orientation of the 
thesis. Any person’s perception of the strength of a degree modifier is unlikely to be 
something that they actively think about at a very conscious level in real time, 
particularly given the constraints of cognitive economy (section 1.2.4) and other 
issues such as people’s tendency to attend to contextually relevant elements (section 
2.2.3). Consequently, when asked to consciously score their perception of the strength 
of a degree modifier, and then to further judge the certainty with which they hold that 
belief, a question inevitably arises about the risk of subjectivity of the measurements 
concerned. The fact that in many cases we are dealing with concepts that contain 
many forms of uncertainty (see Smithson’s Taxonomy of Ignorance in section 1.3.1 
above) also needs to be borne in mind. I do not propose to construct a formalism for 
dealing with subjective decision making under uncertainty, but I would like to at least 
discuss some of the relevant aspect of this area of cognitive science before moving on 
to the experiment itself.
4.1.1 Representing Subjective Beliefs under Uncertainty
At various stages during this thesis I have described how people acquire, 
process and measure their existing beliefs against new information. There are distinct 
cognitive structures and processes (such as prototypes and schemata) that contribute to 
the efficient acquisition and assimilation of information, and other elements such as 
context and goal-driven behaviour that informs how information is perceived and 
interpreted. Some forms of information in the environment are more psychologically
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salient than others, i.e. where attributes of the information are easily perceivable. This 
is an essential factor in the generation of categorisational prototypes.
One of the most important elements to consider is context; context can have a 
considerable impact on what is communicated and how it is interpreted, both 
semantically (e.g. word sense) and pragmatically (e.g. speaker intention). Context can 
also be important in determining the nature and level of uncertainty of an utterance in 
a given situation (either linguistic or pragmatic uncertainty) as discussed in section
1.3.2.1 and 1.3.2.2 above, but also of what mental processes are activated or utilised in 
order to manage that uncertainty. To process everything at a conscious level would 
cause a mental meltdown very quickly, hence the need for underlying reasoning 
processes, particularly those relating to uncertainty. A great deal of information 
therefore will be processed at a subconscious level, such as information processed at a 
metacognitive or second order level (see section 1.2.1 above). The reason I mention 
this now is that in the experimental study below I am asking people to make an overt 
judgement of something (i.e. level of uncertainty) that would normally be processed at 
second order level. In this regard it is important to explain why I have taken this 
approach and how it fits with current thinking on uncertain reasoning.
To begin the discussion, I have copied below the combination of questions 
used to test each degree modifier/adjective combination:
The wall is very bis
[] [] [] [1 [1 [1 11 [1 [1 D □
Least big Big Most big
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [i 11 [i [] [] [] u n
Most uncertain Most Certain
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The instructions for the first scale above are contained in the text accompanying the 
test, and instruct the participant to score their perception of the strength of that degree 
modifier/adjective combination. I am not concerned about this first stage question as it 
is a straightforward elicitation of a reasonably tangible belief. However, the second 
question above (i.e. how certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have 
just made?) is an elicitation of a belief about a belief \ and therefore is likely to be 
more subjective. Furthermore, this second stage was not a part of Paradis’ original 
1997 Scaling Test, and I cannot therefore rely on this as a precedent. As a 
consequence, it is important that the reason for using this format is explained, and that 
its integrity is established.
The first aspect of this test that is important to understand is that this test is not 
based on a belief revision model, i.e. one where an existing belief is established and 
measured (i.e. the prior belief), and any changes to that belief measured after new 
information has been introduced (i.e. the posterior belief). The use therefore of this 
particular aspect of Bayes’ Theory is of limited use in that the Bayesian conception of 
probabilistic reasoning, which provides a normative rule for updating the belief in a 
hypothesis, will not be relevant to this particular study, although the subjective 
probabilistic approach of Bayes Theory is certainly relevant.
When considering a given belief in a proposition, we need to remember that 
this belief represents the perception of likelihood or probability that that proposition is 
true. Toulmin (1958: 14) suggests that “when I say ‘S is probably P’, I commit myself 
guardedly, tentatively or with reservations to the view that S is P, and (likewise 
guardedly) lend my authority to that view”. Of all the methods for handling 
uncertainty, probability theory has by far the longest tradition and is the best 
understood (Krause and Clarke 1993: 16). They also point out that “modem Bayesian
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approaches also provide a way of formalising the notions of relevance and 
independence which people do use in their everyday reasoning” (ibid: 17), and that it 
provides a framework for answering the query ‘given that I know E, what is my belief 
in H?’ (ibid: 21). While I have not used Bayes’ Theorem computationally in the 
experiment, I have adopted a subjective probabilistic approach to judgements about a 
given belief, in this case the strength of a degree modifier/adjective combination. If I 
was looking for a more concrete formalism based on belief revision, then I would also 
have considered other more objective probabilistic approaches such as those suggested 
by Tversky and Kahneman, who proposed that people employ certain heuristic rules 
to process information rather than Bayes’ rule, in particular by using a 
representativeness heuristic (underweighting prior beliefs) or a conservative heuristic 
(overweighting prior beliefs). Further doctoral research might explore this further, in 
particular when using an experiment to establish an initial strength value of the 
adjective itself, and then measuring how this value changes when a degree modifier is 
added. Apart from being very interesting, this area of research would bring an 
additional level of knowledge and integrity to the exploration of the effects of degree 
modifiers.
In this case, the participants in the study are asked to make a subjective 
judgement of how certain or uncertain they are about the given score for the strength 
of the degree modifier/adjective combination (i.e. ‘given that I know E, what is my 
belief in H’ from the above paragraph). Moreover, the elicitation of subjective 
judgements does have the advantage of providing a realistic view of the genuine 
beliefs of each participant rather than trying to infer these beliefs from more objective 
data (Manski 2004). Furthermore, a very recent study (September 2005) used a very 
similar process to elicit the strength of belief of the effectiveness of various birth
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control methods before then continuing to measure how these beliefs were updated by 
new information (Delavande 2005). So while I am satisfied that the second question 
relating to the belief about certainty/uncertainty is the right approach for this particular 
thesis, I am equally confident that a more sophisticated study involving updating of 
beliefs would benefit from a more detailed (and inevitably complex) formalism for 
measuring these changes in beliefs.
I have already mentioned that it is essential that the study in this thesis is based 
on a methodology that is applicable to the exploration of the scalar representation of 
degree modifiers. I will now continue by briefly describing the approach I have used 
for this, which is an adaptation of Paradis’ 1997 Scaling Test.
4.1.2 Paradis’ Original Scaling Test (1997)
In section 3.2.4 above I mentioned the significance of the combination of 
degree modifiers and their related head. Judging the strength of a degree modifier 
based on a single combination therefore is likely to create a biased or less rounded 
view of the strength of that degree modifier, and any experimental methodology needs 
to address this from the outset. It would be unrealistic of course to suggest that every 
possible combination could be taken into account, and therefore a sensible cross-check 
using the same degree modifiers with a variety of heads would be sufficient. This 
issue was addressed effectively by Carida Paradis in her Scaling Test (Paradis 1997). 
Her research work was undertaken at both the University of Lund in Sweden and the 
University of Manchester, UK, and focused on the role of degree modifiers in spoken 
English. The orientation of her research had an emphasis on spoken as opposed to 
written English, and she used the London Lund Corpus as a primary source of 
common adverbs and adjectives for her work.
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The Scaling Test consisted of 40 test sentences, each containing a degree 
modifier and a related adjective. The issue of the strength of the degree modifier 
relative to the adjective was addressed by varying the adjective used with a particular 
degree modifier in a number of test sentences. The degree modifiers used for the 
scaling test were quite, fairly, somewhat, pretty, and rather. These were combined 
with the following ten adjectives: long, good, beautiful, drunk, happy, sober, different, 
disgusting, hot, bad. Participants were presented with 40 test sentences using the 
above combinations and asked to score the strength of the degree modifier on a nine-
point scale ranging as in the example below:
The book was somewhat dull
[] [] [] G [1 [1 [1 11 11
Least dull Dull Most dull
Participants were also asked to indicate their gender and age group, although this 
information was not used in the analysis of the results. Paradis used a recording of 
each sentence being spoken, and repeated once, after which the participants had 
around ten seconds to indicate their score. The test was conducted twice using 
different participants, and using different prosodic features for each test. In the first 
test the nucleus went on the adjective (falling tone), and in the second test the nucleus 
was on the modifier (fall-rise). In each case the mid-point of the scale was treated as 
an average score, i.e. in the above example the mid-point on the scale represents an 
imaginary point of average dullness. Both tests were given to 25 native English- 
speaking participants at the Universities of Manchester, Nottingham and Lund.
For each test, the mean score and standard deviation for each degree modifier 
were calculated. Paradis used the results to comment on the differences generated 
through the use of different intonational features, although this is the point of
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departure as regards relevance to my research. The methodology employed however 
remains valid and useful for my purposes, albeit with some adaptation to suit my 
specific research goals.
4.1.3 Proposed Experimental Methodology and Theoretical Justification
For this research I propose adopting Paradis’ experimental framework and 
methodology. There is no immediate relevance in using recorded sentences with 
various intonational features, as the focus of this thesis lies more in how degree 
modifiers are used at a cognitive level and how their perceived strength relate to 
judgements of uncertainty, as opposed to how they are produced in speech. I have 
made several changes to the original questionnaire used by Paradis. I have enlarged 
the scale from 9 to 11 points to allow a greater degree of sensitivity to be built into the 
test, and have used 60 native English speakers compared to 25 in Paradis’ experiment.
The starting point in terms of the rationale behind these choices is the 
emphasis of this research on the subject of uncertainty and uncertain reasoning. There 
is little value is asking participants to score the strength of maximisers (e.g. absolutely, 
completely) as these scores are inevitably going to be at the upper end of the scale, and 
their emphatic nature is likely to reveal little about degree modifiers as uncertainty 
markers. There is however an implicit assumption here that such maximisers 
communicate a strong element of certainty about the belief they express, and in that 
regard they are ultimately relevant. The same argument could apply to the heads 
themselves. In section 3.2.2 above I described how heads could be broken down into 
three main categories:
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Inherently Gradable: Relative, implies a scale
E.g., good/bad
Arguably, the first two categories are less useful in terms of test material in that their 
nature makes uncertainty or fuzziness less likely. It is necessary to choose 
combinations of degree modifiers and heads that are likely to be most informative in 
terms of my research goals. For these reasons I have limited the heads used in the 
study to those that can be categorised as inherently gradable, and have also excluded 
both maximisers and minimisers when choosing degree modifiers for the study. There 
are also grammatical, semantic and collocational considerations, such as those 
described in chapter 3 above, which need to be bome in mind. The study aims to 
measure the influence of degree modifiers on a range of heads using Paradis’ 
methodology, albeit on a larger scale.
4.1.4 Research Study: Methodology
For the study in this thesis, a group of 60 native English-speaking 
undergraduate and postgraduate students were selected from Trinity College Dublin, 
University College Dublin and Dublin City University in Ireland. All were aged 
between 18 and 29 years. Twenty four of the participants were female, and the 
remaining thirty six were male. For this experiment, six degree modifiers and nine 
adjectives (heads) were chosen as follows:
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Participants were presented with the Scaling Test paper, which consisted of a cover 
sheet that contained instructions and two example sentences and scoring scales. The 
instructions were as follows:
Here are the instructions for the Scaling Test. The test contains 2 example 
sentences and 54 test sentences. In this scaling test you are asked to give your 
judgements on the degree expressed in each o f the 54 sentences. Degree o f a quality 
can he expressed by different words and by different strengths. For example, 
somewhat dull, rather dull, very dull, terribly dull.
Please look at example 1 on page 1. It contains an eleven-point scale, which 
extends from an imaginary point o f least dull to another imaginary point, most dull. 
Least dull is the left-most box, and most dull is the right-most box. The point in the 
middle, where it just says dull, represents an imaginary point o f average dullness. I f  
you feel that very indicates a degree somewhere betM’een dull and most dull, put a tick 
in what you think is the box that indicates most accurately your judgement o f the 
degree expressed.
Immediately below this you will see another eleven-point scale, which extends 
from an imaginary point o f most uncertain to another imaginary point, most certain. 
Most uncertain is the left-most box, and most certain is the right-most box. You 
should tick the box that indicates most accurately how certain or uncertain you feel 
your judgement o f the degree expressed for that test sentence.
Please complete the example questions 1 and 2 on the cover sheet. The 
researcher will examine these to ensure that you understand and have carried out the 
instructions correctly. You may then open the test booklet and proceed to the Scaling 
Test itself. There are 54 test sentences, each with an accompanying scale on which you 
are requested to put your tick. Please try to make your judgement as spontaneous as
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possible based on your natural intuition without thinking about each sentence at 
length. I f  you have any questions about these instructions you may ask them now or at 
any stage during the test.
You may now open the booklet and begin the Scaling Test.
In addition to the above instructional text, the cover sheet also contained the two 
example questions and gender/age fields as follows:
Please complete the fields below for gender and age 
Gender: Male [] Female []
Age: ________
Example sentences
l. The book was very dull
[] 11 0 1] 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Least dull Dull Most dull
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Most uncertain Most Certain
2. The book was somewhat dull
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Least dull Dull Most dull
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Most uncertain Most Certain
Test participants were given five minutes to read the instructions and to
complete the example sentences. Before examining the completed example sentences,
participants were asked if they fully understood the instructions, and were given the
opportunity to ask any questions they wished. The example sentences were then
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examined to ensure that they had been properly completed in line with the instructions. 
Following this, the participants were instructed to open the test booklet and to 
commence the test. No time limit was imposed on participants, and the test was 
normally completed within 15-20 minutes.
When the 60 participants had completed the task, the resulting data was 
collected and analysed as described below.
4.1.5 Research Study: Test Results and Data Format
The obvious question is how the raw data should be analysed and what 
statistical processes should be applied such that the data could yield meaningful and 
relevant results in line with the objectives of this thesis. In selecting the most 
appropriate approach to analysing the data, a number of elements needed to be 
considered. The study and the questionnaire is structured to yield as much possible 
information about each individual degree/modifier combination, but also allows for 
the comparison of the strength of scores for each combination against each other, 
which means that the relativity between them can be easily analysed.
In addition to the relative scores for the strength of each combination, there is 
also the added element of the scores against the uncertainty scale for each 
combination. The nature of the relationship between the strength score and uncertainty 
score for each combination differs somewhat from the comparisons indicated above in 
that the strength and uncertainty scores for each combination (i.e. within-combination) 
are dependant variables, whereas the between-combination scores are independent 
variables. Accordingly, the correct statistical methods need to be chosen to take into 
consideration the nature of these relationships. Equally, the methodology chosen has 
to be robust enough to identify specific instances of interest within the data while
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simultaneously revealing wider patterns across the entire data set. The exact 
methodology and the reasons for choosing this statistical model is discussed further in 
section 4.2 below.
The study generated a large body of data -  60 participants were involved in the 
study, each of whom provided scores for their perceptions of both strength and 
uncertainty for a matrix of 6 degree modifiers and 9 adjectives. In total, this generated 
a data set of 6,480 individual scores (60 x 6 x 9 x 2). The data is presented below in a 
series of nine tables, each reflecting the scores for the six adjectives versus the range 
of degree modifiers. Each of the 60 participants was allocated an alphanumeric code 
(V01, V02, etc.) such that the results across the different tables reflect the scores given 
by the same individual in each case. This is of particular importance when using a 
statistical process known as a repeated measures procedure, which was employed to 
help analyse the data. The data is arranged within each table under each of the six 
degree modifiers {very, really, quite, rather, somewhat, fairly), with the strength score 
appearing first followed by the uncertainty score (the ‘U5 column) immediately to its 
right. For the sake of clarity, I have colour coded the columns for strength and 
uncertainty scores for each degree modifier so that they cannot be confused with each 
other. These tables can be found in Appendix 3 at the back of this thesis; below is a 
sample of the layout for illustrative purposes.
Figure 4.1: Modified example o f degree modifier/adjective data table
BIG Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 9 10 9 9 7 5 7 7 5 7 3 4
V02 8 9 9 8 6 4 8 5 6 6 4 5
V03 8 9 8 9 8 6 8 5 5 8 3 5
This table shows the scores of the first three participants (V01, V02, V03) for the 
adjective BIG (the adjective involved is indicated in the top left-hand cell). For
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participant V01, the combination VERY + BIG yielded a strength score of 9 on the 11- 
point scale, indicating that participant’s belief that the degree modifier VERY adds 
considerably to the strength of the adjective, i.e. that VERY BIG is considerably 
stronger than BIG. This interpretation is based on the assumption that the midpoint on 
the 11-point strength scale is the point at which the relevant adjective is neutral such 
that the effect of the degree modifier can then be measured. The column immediately 
to the right (using the same colour coding) shows the uncertainty score (indicated by 
the column header U) derived from the strength score, i.e. the participant’s view of 
how certain or uncertain they felt about the strength score they had just recorded. This 
is an important qualifying element in that it gives a more accurate representation of 
how that degree modifier/adjective combination is perceived; otherwise the study 
would be limited to the comparatively one-dimensional 11 point scale, which offers no 
real insight of the role of metacognitive awareness and second order reasoning 
discussed in section 1.3.1 above.
Given the size and complexity of the data set with regard to the research 
questions that gave rise to the study, it was extremely important to choose a method of 
analysing the data that could effectively reveal relationships between the linguistic 
variables that could be identified as being statistically significant, and which would 
support a clear interpretation of the results. The details of this methodology and the 
outcome of the study are presented in section 4.2 below.
4.2 Statistical Analysis Methodology and Findings of the Study
Selecting the best statistical methodology and tools to analyse this complex data set 
was difficult. In considering this question, a conflict between the methodologies 
available and the structure of the data became apparent very quickly. At one level, the
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data demanded analysis at a very micro level, such as the significance of the scores in 
what I will call a ‘ within combination ’ set of data, i.e. the scores for all 60 participants 
for any one combination of degree modifier and adjective. For example, it is important 
to understand the variances in scores between all 60 participants for the single 
combination of VERY + BIG. Equally we need to understand these variances within 
all other combinations of degree modifiers and adjectives.
It is then important to understand the relationships in the test results for what I 
will call ‘between combinations’ scores, i.e. the analysis of the test scores for different 
combinations of degree modifiers + adjective. For example, it is important to 
understand the variances in test scores between VERY + BIG, REALLY + BIG, 
QUITE + BIG, etc. This type of analysis should give us an understanding of the extent 
to which each degree modifier alters the perception of the strength of the adjoining 
header.
The third dimension of this is not dissimilar, and is no less important in 
presenting an inclusive view of the test results. It can also be described as a ‘between 
combinations' form of analysis, but in this case it focuses on the variances in scores 
caused by using different adjectives with the same degree modifier, e.g. VERY + BIG, 
VERY + DIFFICULT, VERY + NICE, etc. This goes towards our understanding of 
whether, or to what extent, the effect of a degree modifier is moderated by the header 
it is acting upon.
Finally, the overall data set needs to be analysed at a more global level to 
identify wider patterns and to understand what the totality of the data set means 
relative to the research questions. Finding a single statistical methodology, plus the 
right software and analysis tools to support the various needs above, proved very 
difficult. A quick and convenient way of summarising the data to combine these macro
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and micro approaches would have been to calculate the averages of the test scores for 
each of the 60 participants, and present them in a simple summary table. However, this 
approach alone sacrifices the higher resolution that the extensive data set offers, and 
would have gone against the rationale for undertaking such a detailed and 
comprehensive study in the first place. The ‘within combination’ level of analysis 
would have been almost entirely removed from the analysis, and this in my view 
would have taken away from the overall integrity of the study.
The challenge then was to identify a statistical analysis methodology that was 
sufficiently robust to achieve all the above goals, and which could be processed such 
that the outputs could be easily presented and readily interpreted. Before delving into 
the technical detail of the statistical analysis methodology, I think it is important to 
refresh our minds about the research questions that this analysis seeks to address. The 
results can then be more clearly measured against these questions and the 
interpretation of the results can revolve around these specific questions:
1. What are the key cognitive linguistic elements that contribute to the 
communication of the meaning of degree modifiers, and what role does 
uncertain reasoning play in the conceptualisation and processing of these 
meanings?
2. What effect do different degree modifiers have on the perceptions of the 
strength of the header on which they act, and on the certainty of the belief that 
the degree modifier/header combination represent?
3. Can different headers actually influence the way degree modifiers themselves 
are perceived and if so how does this manifest itself?
4. What role do collocational or other lexical semantic aspects of language play 
in moderating the way in which the analysis of degree modifier/adjective 
combinations should be approached or interpreted?
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Realistically, the results of the study alone cannot answer all of these questions, nor 
were they intended to. The overall answer will be derived from the totality of the 
content of this thesis, in which I have discussed how people represent beliefs about 
concepts such as measures of degree, and how these are embodies in degree modifiers. 
What the study can provide is measurable and statistically tested evidence of the 
effect of degree modifiers in representing degrees of belief, and of the extent to which 
these beliefs themselves are strongly or weakly held as indicated by the certainty 
scores associated with each strength score.
Within these research questions in mind, and with a good sense of what the 
study by itself can contribute, the next stage is to describe the technical detail of the 
chosen statistical analysis methodology. I have also chosen to discuss the results as 
they present themselves and to build up a cumulative picture, as I found this more 
helpful and illustrative than keeping them separate.
4.2.1 Statistical Analysis Methodology and Interpretation of Results
One key characteristic of the study is the way it was structured, i.e. such that 
each of the 60 participants would complete the questionnaire in a completely 
consistent and uniform way. In each case they completed an identical questionnaire 
under the exact same test conditions, and consequently the data in its present format 
represents a direct Tike for like’ comparison between each participant across the entire 
data set.
This is critically important for a number of reasons. If the study were such that 
different individuals were used to rate only one (instead of all) degree 
modifier/adjective combinations (as described above), then a simple linear regression 
alone would be appropriate. In this case, the design of the study was such that each 
individual was measured at multiple times under a number of different factors for the
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entire degree modifier/adjective combination set. The ‘strength’ and ‘uncertainty’ 
associated with each combination varied for each individual and this was recorded 
each time. Thus, an appropriate analysis should take into account the repeated 
measures structure and the variation in strength and uncertainty scores. This is why 
PROC MIXED in SAS (a popular statistical analysis software suite) was used, i.e. a 
linear mixed model. PROC MIXED is a variation of a standard general linear 
model (GLM) that allows for both fixed and random effects. The MIXED procedure 
fits a variety of mixed linear models to data and enables you to use these fitted models 
to make statistical inferences about the data. A mixed linear model is a generalization 
of the standard linear model used in the GLM procedure, the generalization being that 
the data are permitted to exhibit correlation and non-constant variability. The mixed 
linear model, therefore, provides you with the flexibility of modeling not only the 
means of your data (as in the standard linear model) but their variances and 
covariances as well. The primary assumptions underlying the analyses performed by 
PROC MIXED are as follows:
1. The data are normally distributed (Gaussian).
2. The means (expected values) of the data are linear in terms of a certain set of 
parameters.
3. The variances and covariances of the data are in terms of a different set of 
parameters, and they exhibit a structure matching one of those available in 
PROC MIXED.
Since direct interest centred on the values of each of the variables, they were 
considered as fixed effects for the fitted model. The model was also fitted considering 
strength as a random effect, to measure its impact on the other coefficients.
Considering the size and complexity of the data set, I felt it important to 
include as many visualisations of the data and outputs as possible. This is one area in
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which both SPSS and SAS are lacking, and for this reason I also chose a statistical 
analysis software package called Data Desk (version 6.2), which is very effective in 
presenting data in graphical form. Using this package, I first plotted the entire set of 
strength and uncertainty scores for all 60 participants on a scatterplot, using the x and 
y axes to map strength and uncertainty scores respectively, as seen in the figure below. 






This scatterplot is the most rudimentary form of visual presentation of the full 
data set in that it does not illustrate which scores relate to the various combinations of 
degree modifiers and adjectives. However, it is interesting to observe the way the 
scores are distributed; in particular the diagonal cluster that is apparent in the
scatterplot, which immediately suggests that the distribution is not entirely random. 
The question then is what combinations of degree modifiers and adjectives give rise to 
this pattern, which is the next stage of analysis.
For the scatterplot below, the variables ‘Strength’ and ‘Uncertainty’ were 
jittered. That is, a small amount of random noise was added to each of the recorded 
values. This was done to ensure that the scatterplot allowed each of the observations to 
be visible (since otherwise, individuals with equal observations would be plotted on 
top of each other). The scale of the axes below was also adjusted slightly to ‘magnify’ 
the scatterplot as much as possible. The colour coding is used to identify the scores per 
degree modifier without explicit reference to the adjectives used; this level of analysis 
will evolve later.
Figure 4.3: Jittered degree modifier scatterplot with colour coding
y/.rm sst mm m  m
‘vTivs* ' . *
---------------1-------------------------------------------------1-------------------------------------------------1-------------------------------------------------h -
2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
StrengthJ
Blue = REALLY Red = VERY Green = QUITE
Orange = RATHER Cyan = SOMEWHAT Pink = FAIRLY
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It is clear from this plot that the data for the degree modifier FAIRLY (plotted in pink 
above) lies far from, and has a different type of relationship with the other variables. 
This simple visual representation of the distribution of the scores from the study is 
very useful and gives us some immediate clues above what the data might ultimately 
tell us. Thus, the relationship between strength and uncertainty is similar between the 
different degree modifiers, apart from the sixth one (FAIRLY). The actual values of 
each measure are different for each degree modifier, but this will be examined later.
To progress the analysis further I calculated and plotted the mean scores for 
the strength and uncertainty scores for all participants. The shift from raw data (as in 
the scatterplot above) to mean scores is because the raw scores are more useful when 
considering correlations, whereas the mean scores are more useful when trying to 
understand the differences in scores between the variables, whether they are degree 
modifiers or adjectives. For the sake of clarity I have avoided trying to amalgamate the 
54 combinations of degree modifiers and words (6 x 9) into a single scatterplot with an 
inevitably confusing array of colours. Instead, I have plotted the mean scores firstly 
for the six degree modifiers, then separately later for the nine adjectives. The 
combination of both was of course completed, which is discussed later in this section.
As I have already pointed out, it is clear from the scatterplot above that the 
degree modifier FAIRLY is atypical compared to the other five degree modifiers. 
Given this, I chose to exclude FAIRLY from the scatterplot below, as its inclusion 
would have skewed the analysis, although it will of course ultimately be included in 
the analysis. Specifically, it would have caused the slope of the regression line for the 
entire data set to be skewed considerably, which would not be representative of the 
general distribution of scores. In shifting from raw to mean scores, I also chose to 
change the colour key to maximise the clarity of the subsequent scatterplots. In each
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individual scatterplot the colour key is provided although it remains unchanged 
between them.
Figure 4.4: Scatterplot o f mean scores o f degree modifiers excluding FAIRLY
H-----------------1---------------- 1----------------H
4 6  8  10
S tren g th  JS
Green = VERY = REALLY Blue = QUITE
Purple = RATHER Red = SOMEWHAT
As expected, plotting the mean scores by degree modifier creates identifiable and 
distinct clusters with varying degrees of overlap. Both VERY and REALLY are 
almost identically distributed, RATHER and QUITE have similar distributions, and 
SOMEWHAT is reasonably distinct from the other degree modifiers. The most 
effective use of this output is achieved by adding coloured-coded (using the above 
colour key) regression lines to illustrate how the intercepts and slopes differ for each 
of the degree modifiers. Linear regression is a technique in which a straight line is 
fitted to a set of data points to measure the effect of a single independent variable. The
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slope of the line is the measured impact of that variable. The slope of the line is its 
angular degree, and the intercept is where a regression line cuts the origin.
Figure 4.5: Scatterplot o f mean scores o f degree modifiers with regression lines
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From the above scatterplot, the following features can be observed:
• All the coloured slopes are less than that of the overall regression (denoted by 
the black line)
• The intercepts for groups to the right are greater than those to the left.
• The coloured lines agree with the black line in the area supported by data, i.e. 
the data for each colour can only be related to the area of the black line for that 
degree modifier, and not beyond.
The next question is how the distribution of the regression lines relative to each other 
combined with the above observations can be interpreted. In preparing this 
interpretation, a few points need to be borne in mind. If the line around which the
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points tend to cluster runs from lower left to upper right, the relationship between the 
two variables is positive (direct), but if the line around which the points tend to cluster 
runs from upper left to lower right, the relationship between the two variables is 
negative (inverse). Furthermore, the more the points tend to cluster around a straight 
line, the stronger the linear relationship between the two variables (the higher the 
correlation).
From the above scatterplot we can clearly see that all regression lines indicate 
direct relationships (to varying degrees) between the strength and uncertainty scores 
for each of the degree modifiers. VERY, REALLY, QUITE and RATHER have 
almost identical slopes, and very similar intercepts are shared by VERY and 
REALLY, and by QUITE and RATHER. The distribution of plots shows that the 
‘weaker’ degree modifiers (i.e. those with lower strength scores) are more scattered, 
which may suggest that as perceived strength decreases, the certainty of the perception 
becomes more variable. One might hypothesise from this that lower strength degree 
modifiers are inherently less certain than stronger degree modifiers, but as yet the 
evidence is not sufficiently conclusive to make such an assertion.
To develop the analysis further, I decided to repeat the above process, this 
time using colour coding to illustrate how the scores were distributed among the nine 
adjectives. This is useful because it provides information as to whether the adjectives 
themselves moderate the strength of the degree modifier, e.g. does the strength of 
VERY differ when combined with the adjectives BIG or WARM. A consideration 
here from a purely linguistic point of view is that for each test sentence the degree 
modifier naturally preceded the adjective, and this naturally shifts the emphasis 
towards the degree modifier, thereby potentially reducing the effect of the adjective 
itself. Also, in spoken language, people are more likely to vary their intonation around
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the degree modifier than the adjective if they want to achieve an emphasis effect, and 
one might ask whether this plays some part, however indirect, in the perceptions of the 
sixty participants, even though the test sentences were never actually spoken aloud.
The scatterplot below uses the same approach as before, i.e. it plots mean 
scores for strength and uncertainty, this time illustrating the distribution by adjective 
rather than degree modifier.
Figure 4.6: Jittered adjective scatterplot with colour coding
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The overall pattern here is very distinct. There is a clear diagonal cluster with 
a good degree of overlap between the plots for the nine adjectives, to the extent that 
the plots for the individual adjectives are difficult to see because of the level of 
overlap. Upon close examination, we can see that the plots for each adjective are
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typically scattered along the full length of the diagonal, which contrasts with the 
scatterplot for the degree modifiers where each was confined to one particular area 
along the diagonal length. Adding regression lines (below) serves to further confirm 
the consistency between the different adjectives.
Figure 4.7: Scatterplot o f mean scores o f adjectives with regression lines
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Red = LIKELY Pink = DIFFICULT Purple = WEAK
Navy = WARM Blue = KIND
This shows the relationship is approximately constant across different adjectives. The 
overall regression line is black and is buried in the centre of the plot. It might be noted 
that there is some evidence that BIG ( ) and KIND (blue) have different slopes and
intercepts to the rest of the group. BIG has higher scores along the diagonal than all 
other adjectives, whereas KIND has lower scores. From a linguistic point of view,
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there are a number of reasons why BIG and KIND might be exceptional. There are 
two key observations that can be made about this:
• BIG refers to an attribute that is often physical and observable, e.g. a BIG dog. 
While this is not always the case, e.g. a BIG problem, this adjective does have 
an association with size or scale, either absolute or relative. In this regard the 
concept of BIG could be described as reasonably finite and solid, especially 
compared with other adjectives. While BIG does have some fuzziness 
associated with it (i.e. how big is BIG?), it could not be described as an 
intrinsically uncertain adjective, and the data certainly supports this assertion. 
Also, BIG does not offer a wide or diverse range of potential meanings or 
interpretations, a point that becomes clearer when contrasted with KIND 
below.
• KIND, on the other hand, refers to a personality trait that is neither visible nor 
physical. It is difficult to measure or compare, possibly because its definition is 
more open to interpretation or may be more contextually bound. So what 
exactly does KIND mean? Arguably, it could be replaced by a number of other 
adjectives (such as generous, warm, gentle, nice) depending on what exactly 
was intended. In this regard it is clear that, at least compared to BIG, the 
adjective KIND is relatively uncertain, and again the data supports this. Using 
the terms from section 1.4.3 above, KIND appears to contain three different 
types of uncertainty: ambiguity (what the word actually means), vagueness 
(lack of definition around each individual interpretation of the word) and 
fuzziness (lack of parameter definitions that distinguishes or differentiates it
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from other similar adjectives). Furthermore, as identified in section 3.3.4 
above, KIND relative to the other adjectives exhibits low raw frequency of 
occurrence within the BNC and is also exceptional in that a different part of 
speech (NN1) substantially outnumbered the occurrence of the adjectival form 
(A JO).
The other adjectives have very similar regression lines and as such there are no major 
differences between them from which any important conclusions can be drawn.
At this stage I have analysed the distribution of strength and uncertainty scores 
using both degree modifiers and adjectives to plot the scores. While there is some 
evidence that the adjectives themselves do moderate the effect of the degree modifier, 
this effect is not major. There are far more notable differences in the scores for degree 
modifiers, and FAIRLY in particular seems to have some interesting characteristics 
compared to the other degree modifiers. In order to more fully understand the very 
complex relationship between the degree modifier/adjective and strength/uncertainty 
relationships, a more quantitative analysis of the data is required using the 
combination of simple and mixed linear models described earlier in this section. To 
achieve this I have used residual analysis - residuals are differences between the 
observed values and the values predicted by the model. Analysis of residuals allows 
the estimation of the adequacy of a model for particular data, in this case the data set 
generated by the study.
The analysis of residuals plays an important role in validating the regression 
model. If the error term in the model satisfies the model assumptions, then the model 
is considered valid, and if the model fits well then it can also have a useful predictive 
value. The primary reason why a simple linear regression would be inappropriate in 
this circumstance is that the correlation in the subject specific residuals could breach
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the model assumptions. In order to examine this, a linear model was fitted to the 
(original, unjittered) data, and residual analyses carried out. The output of the 
regression model (using SPSS 11.5) that included just ‘Strength’ is as follows:
Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .814 .662 .662 1.047
a Predictors: (Constant), Strength
ANOVA





1 Regression 5784.924 1 5784.924 5279.516 .000
Residual 2956.280 2698 1.096
Total 8741.204 2699
a Predictors: (Constant), Strength










1 (Constant) 7.635E-03 .093 .082 .934
Strength .910 .013 .814 72.660 .000
a Dependent Variable: Uncertainty
The residuals were examined, and are consistent with the requirements for the model 
fitted. In addition, the residuals for each individual were examined in turn. There did 
not appear to be evidence of a correlation in these for each individual.
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The above graph shows nscores versus studentized residuals for participant 60. The 
stepped nature of curve is a feature of the discrete data. The studentized residual, also 
known at the standardized residual, is simply the raw residual divided by this standard 
error. An error is the amount by which an observation differs from its expected value. 
Residuals, as mentioned earlier, are differences between the observed values and the 
values predicted by the model, i.e. an observable estimate of the unobservable error.
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For example, take a random sample of n women whose ages are measured. The 
sample average is used as an estimate of the population average.
• The difference between the age of each woman in the sample and the 
unobservable population average is an error, and
• The difference between the age of each woman in the sample and the 
observable sample average is a residual.
It is very important to understand the difference between errors and residuals in 
statistics. Consider the simple linear regression mode
Y i  =  <*0 +  AT X i  +  S i ,
where the errors e„ i = 1,..., n, are independent and all have the same variance 
a2. The residuals are not the true, and unobservable, errors, but rather are estimates, 
based on the observable data, of the errors. When the method of least squares is used 
to estimate ao and ai, then the residuals, unlike the errors, cannot be independent since 
they satisfy the two constraints
n




J2 iiXi =  0 .
*=l (Here £ i is the fth error, and £ i is the /th residual)
Moreover, the residuals, unlike the errors, do not all have the same variance: 
the variance increases as the corresponding x-value gets farther from the average jc- 
value. The fact that the variances of the residuals differ, even though the variances of 
the true errors are all equal to each other, is the principal reason for the need for 
Studentization.
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The studentized residual = residual / sresiduai, where sresiduai is the estimated 
standard error of the residual when the line is fit using all data values except the one 
for which the residual is being computed. These studentized deleted residuals 
therefore measure how many standard deviations each point is away from the line 
when the line is fit without that point. In moderately sized data sets (such as the one 
generated by this study), studentized residuals of 3.0 (+ or -) or greater in absolute 
value may well indicate outliers, which should be treated separately. We can see from 
the graph above that the scores fall within these parameters, and consequently a 
separate analysis of outliers is not necessary.
The pattern of residuals for models including adjectives and degree modifiers 
were similarly examined. The fitting of the model incorporating repeated measures for 
each subject for adjective and degree modifier was carried out using MIXED in SPSS 
version 11.5. The syntax and the output for the fitted model are presented separately 
below. However, the fitted values are worthy of note, and those values are included 
here for comment.
The two elements that need to be examined when considering the broader 
analysis of the results of the study are the main effects and the interactions (also 
known as interaction effects). It is important to understand what these mean and how 
they can be used to enhance our understanding of what the data is telling us. The main 
effect is how one variable affects the outcome. For example, the main effect of BIG is 
the ‘average’ extent to which using BIG will affect uncertainty. It may be thought of 
as how uncertainty will change, holding all else constant. Note, however, that 
interactions can be critical to how main effects are interpreted. The interaction is how 
the combination of two factors or covariates influences the outcome. For example, the 
main effect of the adjective could be high, but interaction with strength, say, could be
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negative. Thus, to find out how a particular adjective influences uncertainty, holding 
all else constant, one has to add the main effect plus the interaction at whatever level 
of strength is being held constant. Note that, for example, the adjective/strength 
interaction is large whereas strength/degree modifier interaction is small. This means 
that if you change degree modifier you only need to consider the main effect of the 
degree modifier, not the interaction.
The intercept for BIG (ADJ 1) is high, which is consistent with the plot, and 
the intercept for NICE (ADJ 2) is low, again consistent with the plot. ADJ 9 (KIND) 
was taken as the reference. There is not much difference between the other adjectives. 
The degree modifier 6 (FAIRLY) was excluded for the reasons discussed earlier. The 
other degree modifier intercepts relate to the position of the degree modifier in 
relation to ‘strength’. The early degree modifiers (e.g. VERY, REALLY) have high 
values of strength, and it is clear that there is a scalar relationship between degree 
modifiers based on their perceived strength. The interaction of slope with degree 
modifier and the high intercepts are compatible with the lines fitted. The main effect 
of strength is reduced, since the intercepts for adjective and degree modifier factors 
account for some of the scores on the uncertainty measure. It is worth noting in 
particular that the adjective/strength interactions tend to compensate for the non-zero 
intercepts -  that is where the intercept is high, the slope is low. This is characteristic 
of the highly mixed scores (in terms of their distribution) and the consistencies in 
regression (in terms of their values) for the adjectives, which indicates the lesser effect 
they have relative to the effect of the degree modifiers. As has been observed, the 
relationship between measurements for each individual is not strong. That is, the use 
of a repeated measures design is not critical, and similar conclusions would be reached
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by fitting a simpler (if less correct) model. Thus, the findings are not sensitive to 
modelling assumptions.
At this stage three different statistical processes have been employed in the 
analysis of the data. A mixed linear model was used which took account of the 
repeated measures aspect of the data. A regression model was then used which 
allowed some useful comparisons and visualisations to be drawn from the complex 
data set. Finally, a residual analysis was used to test the validity of the model and its 
fit with the data set. All contain a fair element of technical complexity, and there is 
always a danger that the desired understanding of the data will be lost in these 
complexities and details. Consequently, the next section will focus on summarising 
the findings of the various analyses and drawing more qualitative conclusions in light 
of the broader content of this thesis.
4.2.2 Comparing the Collocational and Experimental Analyses 
From the above sections we can see that a reasonably rigorous methodology, both in 
terms of analysis and statistical integrity, was applied to the evaluation of the 
experimental data. In Chapter 4 this analysis so far has focused exclusively on the 
results of the experimental study and has not taken into consideration the issue of 
whether collocations between the chosen degree modifiers and adjectives have any 
influence or relevance on this data. This, as indicated in section 3.3.5, is an element 
that has been introduced as an additional part of the thesis, so does not represent a 
consideration that was entertained from the outset. As a consequence, there is not an 
integrated methodology to truly bring both elements together; this I would see as an 
important part of future research as such possible relationships would be an interesting 
area of exploration. I have focused therefore on a more descriptive than
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methodological approach and have looked below at whether there appears to be any 
observable relationships between the collocations from Chapter 3 and the 
strength/uncertainty relationships identified in the above sections of Chapter 4. One of 
the issues in this analysis is how to look at the relationship between collocations 
instead of just the relationship between the individual frequencies of degree modifiers 
and adjectives relative to their perceived strength and certainty. This presents a 
difficulty because the analytical methodology and consequent visual presentations 
were not structured from the outset to achieve this.
I will firstly re-introduce figure 3.4 which illustrates in tabular form the
collocations frequencies between the selected degree modifiers and adjectives:
V E R Y 4 7 2  (8 9 .2 ) 2 0 5 2  (4 3 4 .4 ) 3 6 5  (6 9 .9 ) 4 6 5 (1 1 5 .8 ) 147 (7 6 .5 ) 7 3 0 (2 1 2 .3 ) 128 (4 6 .4 ) 3 1 7 ( 6 1 ) 1 4 1 9 (3 9 1 .8 )
R E A L L Y 1 4 9 (4 3 .2 ) 5 8 (1 6 .4 ) 11 (0 .4 ) 2 0 7  (8 0 .7 ) 4 ( 2 .1 ) 6 9  (2 9 .7 ) 3 4 ( 1 8 .7 ) 1 4 (1 .4 ) 3 8 4 (1 6 4 .7 )
F A IR L Y 2 0 ( 1 5 .4 ) 8 ( 6 ) 5 (4 .4 ) 13 (2 8 .3 ) 1 3 (1 5 .1 ) ; 1 (0 .3 )
R A T H E R ' 1 1 2 (5 4 .3 ) 1 5 (1 7 .4 ) 33  (4 0 .6 ) 3 (0 .6 ) 5 (3 .4 ) ! ,- U M 91 (5 8 )
Q U IT E 93  (2 8 .3 ) 2 0 9  (7 2 .6 ) 8 (-0 .1 ) 3 2 ( 1 1 .6 ) 563  (2 7 7 .8 ) 33 (1 9 .8 ) 1 9 0 (6 3 .6 ) 3 2 8 (1 5 1 .9 )
S O M E W H A T 0 ( 0 ) 1 4 (1 4 .1 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 ) 2 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0 ) 1 (1 .4 ) 0 ( 0 ) 0 ( 0 )



















It is important to focus on the collocational table above from figure 3.4 and to 
understand the key messages from this before using these to compare against the 
findings of the experimental study data. For this reason I have used the data from table 
3.4 to rank the top twelve collocations by frequency. I have chosen twelve instances 
simply because using the full set of combinations (54 in total) would be onerous. I 
have chosen the top twelve (as opposed to the lowest twelve) because, as I have 
mentioned in the section 4.3 below, the study would might have been improved by 
including degree modifiers at the lower end of the strength scale, such as BARELY. 
Also, the lowest twelve scores would mainly be zeros, which would not be useful.
Figure 4.10: Top 12 degree modifier/adjective collocations by frequency
1 VERY DIFFICULT 2,052
2 VERY NICE 1,419
3 VERY HAPPY 730
4 QUITE HAPPY 563
5 VERY BIG 472
6 REALLY NICE 384
7 VERY KIND 365
8 QUITE NICE 328
9 VERY LIKELY 317
10 QUITE DIFFICULT 209
11 REALLY BAD 207
12 QUITE LIKELY 190
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The results here are quite surprising in some ways. The top twelve collocations 
involve only three degree modifiers (VERY, QUITE, REALLY) -  this is not that
surprising in itself (given that they represent 50% of the total number of degree
modifiers), but what is interesting is that they do not follow the pattern identified by 
the strength/uncertainty analysis in the experimental study. I will first present the rank 
ordering of the three degree modifiers identified above:
Figure 4.11: Top 3 degree modifiers by ranking and occurrence
We can now compare these collocational patterns with those of the degree modifiers 
from the experimental study as illustrated in figure 4.12 below:
Figure 4.12: Top 3 degree modifiers by collocation mapped to scatterplot
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Blue = REALLY Green = QUITE
Orange = RATHER Cyan = SOMEWHAT Pink = FAIRLY
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The above figure 4.12 is an adaptation of the original 4.3 figure, which illustrates the 
jittered distribution of scores for the six degree modifiers against both strength and 
uncertainty scales. In this case I have added circles to emphasise the clusters 
(excluding a few outliers) that characterise the distributions of VERY (red circle), 
REALLY (blue circle) and QUITE (green circle) on the scatterplot. VERY has 
relatively high strength and uncertainty scores, and also ranks highest of the degree 
modifiers as illustrated in figure 4.11 above. REALLY however, despite having a high 
individual frequency of occurrence in the BNC, scored considerably below QUITE in 
figure 4.11, which had a lower individual frequency of occurrence in the BNC.
We can immediately see that there is a considerable difference between the 
rankings of the top three degree modifiers and their behaviour on the strength and 
uncertainty scales. There does not initially therefore appear to be an argument that 
there is a direct correlation between collocational frequency (based on the rankings in 
table 4.11) and perceptions of the strength/uncertainty of these three modifiers; if 
there were, we would expect to see REALLY ahead of QUITE in the ranking, but 
below VERY. However, we have not looked at the behaviour of the adjectives in 
terms of their ranking based on the top twelve instances of collocational frequency 
(illustrated in figure 4.10 above), so I will perform this analysis now before 
commenting further. For ease of reference I have copied figure 4.10 below:
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1 VERY DIFFICULT 2,052
2 VERY NICE 1,419
3 VERY HAPPY 730
4 QUITE HAPPY 563
5 VERY BIG 472
6 REALLY NICE 384
7 VERY KIND 365
8 QUITE NICE 328
9 VERY LIKELY 317
10 QUITE DIFFICULT 209
11 REALLY BAD 207
12 QUITE LIKELY 190
Figure 4.13: Listing o f adjectives from collocational frequency table
NICE 2, 6, 8 3 (25%)
DIFFICULT 1, 10 2 (17%)
HAPPY 3,4 2(17%)
LIKELY 9, 12 2 (17%)
BIG 5 1 (8%)
KIND 7 1 (8%)
BAD 11 1 (8%)
In this case I have described figure 4.13 above as a ‘listing’ of the adjectives, as they 
do not form a clear ranking either in terms of rank order or number of occurrences in 
the same way that the degree modifies did. This is partly due to the number of 
adjectives in the top twelve (7 in total from a possible 9), plus the fact that their 
rankings were far more scattered and appeared to occur in a more arbitrary manner. 
For example, it is debatable where DIFFICULT and HAPPY could be placed in rank 
as they all occur twice but have different rankings. LIKELY is however likely to 
feature both as its rankings are relatively low (9 and 12), despite having the same 
number of occurrences.
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If we were looking at a larger or more complex data set then I would use one 
of many standard methodologies to present weighted rankings, or alternatively 
develop a more customised algorithm to process the data in more specific and optimal 
ways. However, the data from the collocational frequency table and from other areas 
of analysis such as those in chapter 3 is quite straightforward and does not really merit 
such endeavours, at least given the present structure of the experimental study. There 
are other reasons why I feel that an exclusively quantitative approach might be flawed, 
and I have identified these reasons in section 4.2.3 below.
I will now repeat the same process for top three adjectives as I conducted for 
the three degree modifiers (using the top seven would make the scatterplot completely 
unintelligible), i.e. to examine the ranking (or listing) of adjectives compared to their 
distribution on the strength/uncertainty scatterplot:
Figure 4.14: Top 3 adjectives by collocation mapped to scatterplot
10.0  - -
7 .5  - -
5 .0  - -
2 .5  - -
10864
S tren g th  JS
Cyan = BIG Green = NICE = HAPPY Orange = BAD
Red = LIKELY Pink = DIFFICULT Purple = WEAK
Navy = WARM Blue = KIND
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The distribution of adjectives is clearly very different that those of the degree 
modifiers. As we had seen from the original scatterplot of adjectives on the 
strength/uncertainty scales (figure 4.6), each adjective shows high levels of variability 
of scores and are highly scattered. There is also no discemable relationship between 
the distributions of adjectives in the collocational frequency table (figure 4.10) and the 
patterns observed in the scatterplot in figure 4.14. Although I have only mapped 
NICE, DIFFICULT and HAPPY, it is clear that the other four adjectives would be 
similarly distributed on the scatterplot.
There are a number of inherent difficulties in using collocational frequency to 
investigate any relationship or correlation between degree modifier/adjective 
collocation and their behaviour along the strength and uncertainty scales. Firstly, we 
are approaching this analysis with no clear hypothesis in mind, which means that there 
is no specific focus for the investigation and nothing in particular to validate or 
disprove. To do this would have required an extensive literature review beforehand 
and a more considered approach to which degree modifiers and adjectives to combine 
for the purposes of this thesis -  this is a self-criticism that I have mentioned in other 
sections of the thesis. Furthermore, there is a danger that using a rather simple 
collocational frequency measure which gives a single result (e.g. the frequency of 
VERY + HAPPY is 730) is not highly informative in itself, and is unlikely to explain 
or contribute significantly to how we interpret the highly scattered distribution of 
HAPPY on both strength and uncertainty scales. I suspect that it would be necessary 
to conduct a broader study of collocations with each degree modifier and adjective 
first before being able to make meaningful comments on their likely influence on 
issues such as perceptions of strength and the certainty of these beliefs. This again is a
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possible area of future research, and I believe is a necessary aspect of research on 
degree modifier/adjective combinations.
In the same way that FAIRLY generated some interesting results during the 
original experimental study in this chapter, QUITE is the only degree modifier that 
produced a really interesting result in this smaller area of analysis. It is important to 
bear in mind however that any influence would have been derived from the 
participants’ prior knowledge or beliefs about each degree modifier and adjective, as 
there were no variations in the frequency of occurrence of either during the 
experimental study itself; each participant was asked a total of 54 questions 
representing 6 degree modifiers and 9 adjectives, so no individual combination 
occurred more frequently during the experiment than another. The question then is 
whether the collocations with particular adjectives caused or contributed to the 
behaviour of FAIRLY and QUITE, and at this stage there is no conclusive evidence 
that this is the case. There are other likely factors that should also be borne in mind, 
and I have included these in my conclusions in section 4.2.3 below.
4.2.3 Conclusions and Comments
This study generated quite an extensive and complex data set, not least from 
the point of view of statistical analysis. As mentioned earlier, there was no single 
approach or methodology that could analyse the data such that conclusive and 
complete outputs could be generated, and this was both the challenge and rationale in 
employing a combination of different methodologies. It is important then to bring all 
three chosen methods together at some level, even if it cannot be done 
computationally. Also, the degree modifier FAIRLY needs to be considered more 
fully, as it was excluded (for good reasons) from several of the analyses above. In
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pursuing this discussion I have copied some of the scatterplots from the previous 
section for ease of reference.
It is clear from the analysis above that the study participants held reasonably 
consistent perceptions regarding the strength of the degree modifiers. This can clearly 
be seen in the distribution of score clusters in the jittered scatterplot below (from 
figure 4.3):
 1 1 1 1--------------
2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
StrengthJ
Blue = REALLY Red = VERY Green = QUITE
Orange = RATHER Cyan = SOMEWHAT Pink = FAIRLY
A number of observations can be made about this scatterplot. It would appear that the 
‘stronger’ degree modifiers, i.e. those with higher strength scores, are more tightly 
clustered around the diagonal and are generally less scattered in their distribution. 
They also have the highest certainty scores relative to the other degree modifiers. 
Equally, the ‘weaker’ degree modifiers are noticeably more scattered, and with the
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exception of FAIRLY, have lower certainty scores. The diagonal clustering in itself 
suggests that as strength decreases, so does the certainty of the perception. In some 
regards this is a little surprising. It could be argued that one might expect a more 
normal distribution of scores across the interaction between strength as uncertainty. 
What this means is that stronger scores will be highly certain, more moderate strength 
scores will be more uncertain, but that very low strength scores will be highly certain. 
It is this last element that is contentious, i.e. arguably the lowest strength scores should 
have higher certainty scores as they tend towards one end of the scale, very much in 
the same way as the higher strength scores. A degree modifier that is clearly very 
weak in strength, e.g. ‘BARELY’, should be expected to return a high certainty score. 
Perhaps one reason for the distribution of scores in this study is the choice of the test 
degree modifiers themselves. Had a distinctly weaker or extreme (at the lower end) 
degree modifier been included, this phenomenon might have been captured. This is 
possibly one area of exploration for future studies.
The exception to the way that the scores are distributed is clearly the degree 
modifier FAIRLY. The way it contrasts clearly, at least in terms of its uncertainty 
scores, is intriguing. The strength scores associated with FAIRLY are not unsurprising 
given that it is a moderate to weak degree modifier, which tends to have a ‘lukewarm’ 
effect on any adjective. While its uncertainty scores are quite widely scattered, in 
overall terms FAIRLY is a degree modifier that clearly has a much higher level of 
certainty associated with it, particularly when compared with SOMEWHAT, which 
has similar strength scores. This is puzzling as it goes against the notion of the linear 
relationship between strength and uncertainty suggested by linear regression and by 
the observable distribution of the scores above.
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Paradis (1997: 147) points out that the strength of degree modifiers does not 
attract consensus. She refers to the fact that Leech and Startvik (1994: 113) contend 
that quite, rather, fairly, pretty all slightly intensify the meaning of a scalar adjective, 
whereas Collins (1990: 94) claims that they all reduce the strength of a qualitative 
adjective. These degree modifiers lack specificity in that they are “lexically bleached 
and semantically vague” (Paradis 1997: 147). It is clear from this analysis that the test 
participants answered in a highly consistent manner and that the only degree modifier 
that demonstrated any significant deviance from the rest of the group was FAIRLY. 
The exact reason for this is unclear, but the data itself was quite explicit about this 
fact.
Other than that, it can be observed that ‘stronger’ degree modifiers, i.e. those 
that intensify or emphasise the scalar strength of an adjective, attract high levels of 
certainty in those beliefs. Examples of these degree modifiers include VERY and 
REALLY. This can be seen in the close grouping in the scatterplots and the low 
degree of variance in the raw data.
‘Weaker’ degree modifiers, i.e. those that reduce the scalar strength of an 
adjective, attract lower levels of uncertainty, and with the exception of FAIRLY there 
appears to be a linear relationship between the reduction in strength and the reduction 
in certainty. As mentioned above, it would have helped to have included a pronounced 
telic modifier such as BARELY, as arguably this ‘weak’ degree modifier should have 
strong levels of certainty associated with it as it avoids being “lexically bleached and 
semantically vague (Paradis 1997: 147 from above paragraph).
Finally, the residual analysis established the integrity of the statistical model 
used for this research, in that it provided us with an estimation of the adequacy of a 
model for particular data, and the analysis clearly demonstrated adequacy in this
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regard. This is possibly an approach therefore that can contribute to similar analyses in 
future for other researchers, as would a more detailed and rigorous examination of the 
possible influences of degree modifier/adjective collocations.
With regard to the consideration of collocations as a possible area of research, 
I have one major concern about a purely quantitative approach to integrating the data 
from the analysis of collocations with those of the experimental study, whether from 
the data in this thesis or from a completely different study. It is clear even from my 
limited exploration of collocations in chapter 3 that collocations can occur for many 
reasons and that their effects (from the standpoint of social or psychological salience, 
for example) could possibly be very varied (although this would need to be established 
in more concrete terms). Moreover, the selection of degree modifiers and adjectives 
would need to occur from the outset with their collocations in mind, i.e. there is little 
point in choosing combinations that are highly incongruous. This is one area where I 
have to criticise my own selection of degree modifiers -  including SOMEWHAT 
caused some problems when it came to analysing collocations as the combination with 
adjectives were highly incongruous and consequently generated limited and 
uninformative results in terms of collocations frequency. Other degree modifiers (such 
as REALLY, discussed above) may have other properties that may influence how an 
analysis might be interpreted. My point therefore is that not all combinations can be 
treated as equivalent, yet an exclusively quantitative approach would do exactly that, 
as it would be difficult to build such considerations into the model assumptions. At the 
very least there would need to be a strong element of consideration about how an 
integrated experiment should be constructed, which combinations should be used, 




In many regards the findings of the experimental study in this thesis raises more 
questions than answers. It establishes (with one exception) a linear relationship 
between perceptions of scalar strength and uncertainty, and goes some way to 
identifying the ‘pecking order’ of the chosen degree modifiers in terms of their relative 
strength. It does appear that the adjective can influence the perception of strength more 
than uncertainty, although the ‘why’ questions remains unanswered. I believe this 
would involve a more detailed study bringing many other factors such as intonation 
and more complex representational scales into consideration.
The inclusion of a study of collocations in chapter 3 was particularly useful 
and definitely contributed to the depth of the research. However, this was included 
relatively late in the research, which meant that the study of collocations (chapter 3) 
and the study of perceptions of strength and uncertainty (chapter 4) could not be more 
integrated. I am convinced that the overall study would have benefited from a more 
integrated approach using both elements, whereas in its current form this thesis keeps 
the two reasonably separate. This is a frustration that the benefit of hindsight does not 
sate, and is a dimension that I would have liked to address. I have to some extent 
begun this process by including section 3.3.5 in the final version of this thesis, which 
looks at the issues in integrating the analysis of collocations with the experimental 
study, and by adding a new subsection (4.2.2) to the thesis to look at the combination 
of collocational frequency with measures of strength and uncertainty on a comparative 




Overall Research Findings and Conclusions
5.1 Future Work and Directions on Degree Modifiers
The exploration of the topic of scalar representation and of the complexities of degree 
modifiers is a rich research area and offers a real opportunity to bring a 
multidisciplinary approach. Research on degree modifiers is far more than just an 
academic exercise. Several important practical applications are available, some of 
which are immediately relevant to my own professional occupation as an occupational 
psychologist.
My first comment is that there is a great deal of unfinished business remaining 
from this particular thesis, and this could represent a particularly interesting area for 
doctoral research. Based on my experience with this research, I believe that an 
extension of this work would entail the following elements:
• An initial test to assess people’s judgement of the strength of an adjective 
(without the presence of a degree modifier)
• A follow-on re-test of the same adjectives, now combined a variety of 
specified degree modifiers. This would allow the researcher to measure the 
extent to which the degree modifier actually modified the strength of the 
adjective
• A robust formalism for explaining and measuring the process of belief 
revision under uncertain reasoning, including a computational element based 
on the data from the research experiment
• A more specific goal of using particular classes of degree modifiers (such as 
those described in section 3.2.4) to examine how these different classes 
interact with adjectives
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• A more detailed overlay of the collocational aspects of degree modifiers and 
the role of collocations in shaping prototypical notions of scalar centrality
• The inclusion of the important area of intonational aspects of degree 
modification, which is not an element that is included in this thesis
These are just some of the elements that I personally would include in further 
research. This is a potentially important area of research and there are many possible 
applications within the fields of linguistics, psychology and artificial intelligence.
One specific area where this research can be applied is in the important area of 
occupational psychometric testing. In the UK and Ireland the main accrediting body 
for clinical, educational, forensic and occupational psychologists is the British 
Psychological Society (BPS). Occupational testing normally involves two areas of 
assessment:
• Ability tests, which measure a person’s capabilities in areas such as critical 
numerical and verbal reasoning, deductive and inductive logic, etc. These are 
normally timed and administered under standardised test conditions, and the 
results are compared against an appropriate norm group.
• Personality profiling, which measures the natural preferences of the individual 
being assessed. This is not a ‘test’ in that the ability of the individual is not 
being measured, and they are not normally administered under test conditions. 
Theses assessments are also normally compared against an appropriate norm 
group.
Anyone who has Level A and B accreditation with the BPS will have been trained in 
the administration, scoring and analysis of both of these forms of assessment. Some 
assessments provide simple percentile scores or other similar quantitative outputs, and 
as such do not require a great deal of analysis or descriptive text. However, the second 
category in particular specifically uses degree modifiers in a highly prescribed 
manner, and there are strict protocols around their use.
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I will use an example of the OPQ32i, a popular and widely used personality 
profiling tool. OPQ stands for Occupational Personality Questionnaire, the number 32 
stands for the number of personality factors being assessed, and the T  at the end of 
the name means that the ipsative (forced choice) version of the assessment is being 
used. The assessment can be either administered online or in paper-based form. The 
output for the occupational psychologist to interpret is in the form of a visual 
representation of the score for each factor on a ten-point STEN (Standard Ten) scale.
Figure 5.1: Modified sample o f OPQ32i psychometric analysis output
5
rarely pressures others to change their 
views, dislikes selling, less comfortable 
using negotiation
•  *
Pe rs uas iv e  
• • •
enjoys selling, comfortable using negotiation, 
'  lik e s  to change other people ’s view
4
happy to let others take charge, dislikes 
telling people what to do, unlikely to take
Controll ing likes to be in charge, takes the lead, tells others 
•  *what to do, takes control■  •
the lead •  ■  '  1 * *
1
holds back from criticizing others, may 
not express own views, unprepared to 
put forward own opinions
1------- • , .Outjspofcen. . i  rfreely expresses opinions, makes disagreement 
clear, prepared to criticize others
6
accepts majority decisions, prepared to 
fo llow  the consensus •  0
In dependen t  Minded 
.  .  ■ |  ■ .
prefers to fo llow  own approach, prepared to 
• d isregard majority decisions
2
quiet and reserved in groups, dislikes Outgoing live ly and anim ated in groups, talkative, enjoys
being center o f attention 'a ttention
7
com fortable spending time away from 
people, values time spent alone, seldom 
misses the company o f others
•  •
Affi Native—
.  .  -  1 -  » , q jijoys o thers' company, likes to  be around people, can miss the company o f o thers
5
fee ls more com fortable in less formal 
situations, can feel awkward when first 
meeting p e o g l f ^ ^
•  •
Socially Confident fee ls comfortable when first meeting people, at 
•  eese in formal situations
5
makes strengths and achievements 
known, ta lks about personal success
•  •
M  r \ ^ i  o c t  
.  «— — »  .  .
dislikes d iscussing achievements, keeps quiet 
'  about personal success
6
prepared to make decisions w ithout 
consultation, prefers to make decisions 
alone •  •
Democrat ic  
.  .  . ---------- | —  .
consults widely, involves others in decision 
,  /nak ing , less likely to  make decisions alone
10
selective w ith sympathy and support, 
remains detached from others' personal 
problems
0 0
Caring sym pathetic and considerate towards others,
, K iP ip f i  ii and supportive, gets involved in others’ 
problems
The table shows part of the output that would be generated by the assessment, 
although the formatting is slightly out of line due to the need to fit it within the page 
width; the full version would be much longer and would cover 32 different personality 
traits. As mentioned above, there are prescribed phrases that must be used depending 
on the STEN score returned by the assessment. The report below based on the scores 
in the example, and is a standard sample report issues by Saville and Holdsworth, the 
publishers of this particular assessment tool. The headers below relate to the areas 
identified in the red right hand column in the table above, and are based directly on
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the scores recorded in the above example. I have marked the instances where degree 
modifiers are used.
In fluence
Mr. Sample is fairly moderate when it comes to his influencing style.
If called upon to take charge, negotiate or sell an idea, he emerges as 
similar to others. In fact, if anything he has a slight preference to 
avoid situations that call for him to take charge of others. Although he 
is extremely unwilling to take part in arguments and heated debates,
Mr. Sample still prefers to be reasonably independent in his approach.
He is as prepared as others to go his own way rather than follow the 
group consensus. While rarely one to voice his opinion, there are still 
some issues for him that he feels are not up for discussion or 
compromise.
S ociab ility
Mr. Sample is likely to be an extremely quiet person, tending not to 
contribute much to lively conversations. This doesn't mean, however, 
that he is particularly uncomfortable with others. When it comes to 
meeting strangers for the first time or when addressing a group, he 
tends to be as confident as most other people. He does not always 
require the company of others, if anything, he probably prefers being 
with other people a little more than spending time alone. His apparent 
ease in formal rather than informal situations suggests that he may feel 
less drawn to situations that are less well defined.
E m pathy
Mr. Sample is extremely concerned about the welfare and possible 
problems of others, trying to be a very caring and sympathetic listener.
This is linked to a moderate tendency to consult others when making 
decisions. Further, he is as likely to talk about his achievements as 
others. His very high level of concern for others' welfare and feelings
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is accompanied by a strong feeling that people should be trusted. This 
is likely to enable him to approach requests for help and support with 
a high degree of sympathy and concern. However, it does open the 
possibility of his being open to less deserving or less genuine appeals 
from those who may look to exploit his good nature.
There are in fact many more examples of degree modification and of scalar 
representation in these passages than I have actually indicated, but I hope that my 
point is nonetheless clear. Another aspect of this assessment to consider is that it 
ultimately is subjective, i.e. it is entirely based on self-report. The non-ipsative version 
in particular uses a Likert scale which is identical to that used in the study in this 
thesis, further evidence that this approach is valid for assessing subjective beliefs. The 
OPQ32i is formally recognised by the BPS as a valid and reliable assessment tool in 
areas such as selection and development.
The clear issue here is the use of degree modifiers (of all types) combined with 
a wide variety of adjectives to describe important information such as personality 
traits, upon which a decision to hire or promote an individual might be based, at least 
in part. Given current employment law, it is extremely important that such 
assessments are valid, reliable and consistent. These types of psychometric 
assessments can be part of extremely important decision processes for individuals and 
organisations, and thorough research into this topic is consequently important to 
ensure integrity; the integrity issue is not a question about the tools themselves, but 
rather how their results are presented through language. For this reason the use of 
degree modifiers within the wider sentential context also needs to be considered. 
Ultimately, if the description of the results is vague, inaccurate or ambiguous then the 
overall integrity of the tool may well be affected.
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The OPQ32i is just one of many dozens of occupational tests that are used 
globally. They can relate to personality profile, leadership and communicative styles, 
and many other key areas or individual and organisational behaviours. Their use is 
widespread and often influences areas such as assessment for selection, development, 
succession planning, career direction and redeployment. It is a growing area of 
business, and the reach of these forms of assessment are now beginning to impact high 
growth potential markets such as China, south Asia and Asia/Pacific countries in 
addition to well established markets in Europe and north America. Any research that 
can contribute to this important area is likely to be of considerable value to those 
companies who develop, publish and distribute psychometric assessments, not to 
mention the end users themselves.
Apart from this commercial application, any research that contributes to the 
deeper understanding of degree modifiers, particularly through the use of 
multidisciplinary research, will always be of value to the core area of linguistics, 
which in the past have benefited substantially by including knowledge and 
methodology from many other areas such as cognitive science, psychology, logic and 
artificial intelligence. Cognitive linguistics can equally contribute widely to these and 
many other areas, and future research into the intriguing area of degree modifiers and 
scalar representation will continue to bring new value and learning.
5.2 Conclusion
As with many postgraduates who pursue advanced degrees by research, I wish that I 
had known the final focal point of my research from the outset -  it would have made 
life so much easier and saved inordinate amounts of time. However, given the 
constraints of full-time employment and other substantial learning commitments, I am
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satisfied that this thesis will contribute at least in some way to an area that I find 
personally very interesting. The findings of this research, as mentioned above, have 
applications in both the academic and commercial spheres, and I hope will also fuel 
the interest of other researchers in taking this research further. The range and depth 
required to truly address even a finite aspect of scalar representation is considerable, 
and I have outlined in the above section some of the criteria that I would apply in 
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APPENDIX 1: TEST SENTENCES FOR RESEARCH STUDY
Very
1. The wall is very big. *
2. That lady is very nice. *
3. That will make her very happy.
4. His behaviour is very bad. *
5. That outcome is very likely. *
6. The exam is very difficult. *
7. Her argument is very weak. *
8. He is a very warm individual. *
9. She is a very kind person. *
Quite
1. The wall is quite big. *
2. That lady is quite nice. *
3. That will make her quite happy.
4. His behaviour is quite bad. *
5. That outcome is quite likely. *
6. The exam is quite difficult. *
7. Her argument is quite weak. *
8. He is quite a warm individual. *
9. She is quite a kind person. *
Really
1. The wall is really big. *
2. That lady is really nice. *
3. That will make her really happy.
4. His behaviour is really bad. *
5. That outcome is really likely. *
6. The exam is really difficult. *
7. Her argument is really weak. *
8. He is a really warm individual. *
9. She is a really kind person. *
Rather
1. The wall is rather big. *
2. That lady is rather nice. *
3. That will make her rather happy.
4. His behaviour is rather bad. *
5. That outcome is rather likely.
6. The exam is rather difficult. *
7. Her argument is rather weak. *
8. He is a rather warm individual. *
9. She is a rather kind person. *
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Somewhat
1. The wall is somewhat big. *
2. That lady is somewhat nice. *
3. That will make her somewhat happy.
4. His behaviour is somewhat bad. *
5. That outcome is somewhat likely. *
6. The exam is somewhat difficult. *
7. Her argument is somewhat weak. *
8. He is a somewhat warm individual. *
9. She is a somewhat kind person. *
Fairly
1. The wall is fairly big. *
2. That lady is fairly nice. *
3. That will make her fairly happy. *
4. His behaviour is fairly bad. *
5. That outcome is fairly likely. *
6. The exam is fairly difficult. *
7. Her argument is fairly weak. *
8. He is a fairly warm individual. *
9. She is a fairly kind person. *
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APPENDIX 2: SCALING TEST QUESTIONNAIRE
1. The wall is very bis 
[] [] [] D [] [] [] [] G G []
Least big Big Most big
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 
Most uncertain




2. That lady is quite nice




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 
Most uncertain




3. That will make her really happy





How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
[] [] [] [] D [] G [] [] D
Most uncertain Most Certain
[] [] 
Least bad
4. His behaviour is rather bad




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] D
Most uncertain Most Certain
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5. That outcome is somewhat likely
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] D [] []
Least likely Likely Most likely
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
6. The maths exam is fairly difficult
[] [] [] [] [] [] G D G 0 D
Least difficult Difficult Most difficult
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
7. That lady is very nice 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] D [] [1 □
Least nice Nice Most nice
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] G [] [] [] [] [J [3
Most uncertain Most Certain
8. That will make her quite happy 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] G
Least happy Happy Most happy
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
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9. His behaviour is really bad
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] D
Least bad Bad Most bad
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] D [] [] [] □
Most uncertain Most Certain
10. That outcome is rather likely 
[] [] [] G G [] [] [] [] D []
Least likely Likely Most likely
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
D [1 [] G [] 0 [1 [] [J I! U
Most uncertain Most Certain
11. The maths exam is somewhat difficult
[] [] [] [] [] [] G G [] [] []
Least difficult Difficult Most difficult
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [J [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
12. Her argument is fairly weak
[] [] [] [] [] [] G [] [] D []
Least weak Weak Most weak
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] 11 []
Most uncertain Most Certain
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13. That will make her very happy
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] G
Least happy Happy Most happy
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] D [] D 11 [] 11 [] [] 11 0
Most uncertain Most Certain
14. His behaviour is quite bad 
[] 11 [] D G [] [] [] [] [] D
Least bad Bad Most bad
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] D 11 G [] [] [] [] □
Most uncertain Most Certain
15. That outcome is really likely 
[] [] [] G [] G [] [] D [] []
Least likely Likely Most likely
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] D [] G 11 G 11 [] [1
Most uncertain Most Certain
16. The maths exam is rather difficult
[] [] [] 11 [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Least difficult Difficult Most difficult
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 0 D a n D □ Q □ (1
Most uncertain Most Certain
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17. Her argument is somewhat weak
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] G
Least weak Weak Most weak
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] □ [] U U [)
Most uncertain Most Certain
18. He is a fairly warm individual
[] [] 11 [1 [] D [I 11 D 0 □
Least warm Warm Most warm
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [1 [] [] D G [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
19. His behaviour is very bad 
[] [] [] [] 11 D □ 11 □ □ □
Least bad Bad Most bad
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
D [] [] 11 11 11 [ ] [ ] [ ]  □ []
Most uncertain Most Certain
20. That outcome is quite likely 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] G H [] □
Least likely Likely Most likely
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
a n n 1) □ o □ [) n a □
Most uncertain Most Certain
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21. The maths exam is really difficult 
[] [1 [] I! [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Least difficult Difficult Most difficult
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] □ 0 I! D [] [] [] [] [] □
Most uncertain Most Certain
22. Her argument is rather weak 
D [] [] [] D [] [] [] [] [] D
Least weak Weak Most weak
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] G U [] [] [] [] D [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain







How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] 11 
Most uncertain




24. She is a fairly kind person
[] [] 11 11 [] 11 
Kind
0 [] 11 
Most kind
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
[] 11 I! 11 11 11 [] D [] □
Most uncertain Most Certain
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25. That outcome is very likely 
□ I! I! [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Least likely Likely Most likely
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] G
Most uncertain




26. The maths exam is quite difficult 




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 
Most uncertain




27. Her argument is really weak 






How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
[] G D [] [] U U [] []
Most Certain
Least warm
28. He is a rather warm individual 
[] [] [] G [] 0
Warm Most warm
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 
Most uncertain
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Most Certain
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29. She is a somewhat kind person 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] G [] 0
Least kind Kind Most kind
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] G [] D D G [] G G []
Most uncertain Most Certain
30. The wall is fairly bis 
[] [] [] [] 0 0 D [1 0 [1 [3
Least big Big Most big
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] D [] [] 0 [] [] [] [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
31. The maths exam is very difficult 
[] [] [] [] G D G [] [] [] []
Least difficult Difficult Most difficult
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] □
Most uncertain Most Certain
32. Her argument is quite weak 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [J []
Least weak Weak Most weak
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] [] [] [1 [] [] [] [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
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33. He is a really warm individual
□ [1 U [] ii [J U □ [] □ []
Least warm Warm Most warm
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
□ □ [] [] [] [] [] [] D [] □
Most uncertain Most Certain
34. She is a rather kind person
□ 0 D n □ [] 0 D [] Q 0
Least kind Kind Most kind
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
□ □ □ □  0 [1 [] D D U []
Most uncertain Most Certain
35. The wall is somewhat bis 
D [] 0 [J D [] [] [J [] □ □
Least big Big Most big
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] D [] [] [] U [] [] [J D
Most uncertain Most Certain
36. That ladv is fairly nice 
[] [] □ G [] [1 [] [] □ [] D
Least nice Nice Most nice
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
□ □ □ n n D d n n d n




37. Her argument is very weak 






How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 




38. He is quite a warm individual 




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
□ [] 
Most uncertain




39. She is a really kind  person
[] [] 0 [] [] [] 
Kind
0 [] [] 
Most kind
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
[] 0 [] 0 [] [] [] [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
[] [] 
Least big
40. The wall is rather bis
[] [] [J [] []
Big
[] [] [] [j
Most big
[]
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []




41. That lady is somewhat nice




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
D []
Most uncertain




42. That will make her fairly happy




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
D D
Most uncertain
[] [] 0 [] [] [] []
Most Certain
Least warm
43. He is a very warm individual 




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 
Most uncertain




44. She is quite a kind person 
[] D [] [J G []
Kind




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 





45. The wall is really bis




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] D
Most uncertain




46. That lady is rather nice




How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 
Most uncertain




47. That will make her somewhat happy






How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?




48. His behaviour is fairly bad





How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
[] [] [] [] [J [] [] [] [] □
Most uncertain Most Certain
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49. She is a very kind person 
[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] D [] []
Least kind Kind Most kind
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] [] 0 [] [] [] [] [] D [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
50. The wall is quite bis 
[] [J [] D [] [] G D D D D
Least big Big Most big
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] D D G G G G G G G D




51. That lady is really nice





How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
G G [] G G [] G G G G
Most uncertain Most Certain
G G
Least happy
52. That will make her rather happy






How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made? 
G [] [] [] [] G G G G
Most Certain
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53. His behaviour is somewhat bad 
[] [] U [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []
Least bad Bad Most bad
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
[] tl D [] [] □ [] □ [] [] []
Most uncertain Most Certain
54. That outcome is fairly likely 
[] 0 [] 0 [] [] G [] [] [] G
Least likely Likely Most likely
How certain or uncertain are you about the judgement you have just made?
D D G G G G G D G G G
Most uncertain Most Certain
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APPENDIX 3: DATA TABLES FROM RESEARCH STUDY
BIG Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 9 10 9 9 7 5 7 7 5 7 3 4
V02 8 9 9 8 6 4 8 5 6 6 4 5
V03 8 9 8 9 8 6 8 5 5 8 3 5
V04 9 9 10 9 5 6 7 7 6 9 4 4
V05 9 9 9 8 6 5 6 6 7 7 5 3
V06 10 9 10 9 7 6 8 5 5 6 4 3
V07 9 9 9 10 6 7 9 8 6 6 3 4
V08 10 8 11 10 7 5 7 6 7 8 3 5
V09 9 10 9 8 8 3 6 7 5 5 4 3
V10 8 9 10 9 7 7 7 5 4 4 5 3
V11 8 10 9 9 7 6 7 6 4 6 3 4
V12 9 11 10 9 7 5 6 8 5 7 4 3
V13 8 8 10 10 6 4 8 5 3 6 5 4
V14 9 8 9 9 8 5 8 5 4 4 4 3
V15 8 9 7 8 9 5 7 7 5 3 3 2
V16 9 10 10 9 7 5 8 5 6 5 4 4
V17 9 9 9 9 6 6 9 5 4 6 4 4
V18 9 8 8 10 5 6 8 6 3 6 4 3
V19 9 9 9 9 6 5 7 5 4 5 4 4
V20 8 9 10 9 6 7 8 6 5 6 3 5
V21 10 10 9 8 7 6 8 6 4 7 5 4
V22 11 8 9 9 6 8 8 5 3 6 4 5
V23 9 9 9 9 7 9 7 5 5 5 3 6
V24 8 9 10 10 8 6 8 6 5 4 3 4
V25 9 9 8 8 7 5 9 7 4 6 4 3
V26 9 9 9 9 6 4 7 5 6 7 5 7
V27 9 8 9 9 6 6 6 5 4 5 5 4
V28 8 10 10 9 7 5 8 6 5 4 5 3
V29 9 11 10 9 6 5 7 5 6 6 4 5
V30 8 10 9 10 6 4 6 7 7 7 3 3
V31 10 9 9 9 7 6 5 5 4 5 4 3
V32 8 8 10 8 7 7 7 6 5 5 5 5
V33 9 9 8 9 7 6 8 6 4 6 4 5
V34 9 9 9 9 6 7 8 5 4 6 3 4
V35 9 9 9 8 5 7 7 5 3 5 3 3
V36 10 9 9 9 6 7 6 6 5 7 3 3
V37 9 9 10 9 5 6 8 5 4 6 4 5
V38 10 9 9 9 6 7 7 6 5 5 3 4
V39 9 10 9 8 7 8 7 5 4 4 3 5
V40 8 9 10 10 8 6 6 6 4 7 4 3
V41 9 9 9 9 7 5 7 7 5 6 5 5
V42 8 10 9 11 6 6 8 8 5 5 4 6
V43 8 9 9 9 6 7 7 6 4 6 3 4
V44 8 10 8 8 7 6 8 5 4 5 2 3
V45 9 8 9 10 6 7 8 6 3 7 4 6
V46 8 9 9 8 8 6 7 7 5 8 5 4
V47 10 10 10 9 5 6 6 5 4 6 4 6
V48 11 9 9 10 7 8 8 7 4 5 4 4
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V49 9 8 9 9 7 6 7 7 4 4 5 3
V50 8 8 9 8 6 5 7 5 5 6 4 5
V51 8 8 10 9 7 6 8 7 4 7 4 6
V52 9 8 9 9 6 7 7 6 3 6 3 4
V53 8 9 9 9 5 6 8 6 4 5 4 3
V54 8 9 10 9 8 6 6 5 4 7 4 5
V55 8 8 9 8 5 6 7 6 3 6 5 3
V56 9 10 8 9 7 7 6 7 4 5 4 5
V57 9 9 9 10 6 6 5 7 5 7 4 3
V58 8 10 10 10 7 7 6 6 5 5 4 5
V59 8 9 9 9 6 8 7 7 4 7 5 3
V60 8 10 9 10 5 6 6 7 5 6 3 6
NICE Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 8 8 8 8 8 6 8 8 3 3 4 4
V02 8 8 9 9 7 6 8 7 4 3 4 4
V03 9 9 8 8 7 6 9 7 5 4 5 4
V04 8 8 9 7 7 7 8 7 5 4 3 3
V05 9 8 8 7 7 6 8 7 3 4 4 3
V06 10 8 9 8 6 6 7 7 4 3 4 4
V07 9 9 9 8 7 7 8 8 5 4 4 3
V08 9 8 9 7 7 6 8 8 4 4 4 3
V09 9 8 8 8 5 6 8 8 5 4 3 3
V10 8 8 8 8 7 5 9 8 5 4 4 3
V11 8 8 10 9 6 6 8 7 4 3 4 5
V12 9 9 9 9 6 6 8 7 4 3 3 3
V13 9 8 9 8 7 7 8 6 4 4 4 3
V14 10 8 9 8 7 6 7 7 4 3 4 4
V15 8 8 9 7 7 6 8 7 4 3 4 4
V16 9 8 9 8 6 6 9 8 5 5 3 3
V17 8 9 9 8 6 5 9 7 5 4 4 3
V18 9 8 8 8 7 5 8 8 4 3 4 4
V19 8 8 9 8 6 7 9 8 5 3 3 4
V20 8 8 8 8 7 7 9 8 5 4 4 4
V21 9 8 9 7 8 7 9 7 4 4 5 3
V22 9 9 9 8 7 6 8 7 4 3 3 3
V23 9 7 9 8 7 6 8 7 4 3 4 3
V24 8 8 9 8 7 5 9 8 4 4 3 3
V25 9 8 8 7 6 6 8 8 4 4 3 4
V26 9 9 9 8 6 5 8 7 5 3 3 4
V27 8 8 8 8 7 6 8 8 4 3 5 3
V28 8 7 9 7 7 6 8 7 4 4 3 4
V29 8 9 8 8 6 5 8 8 4 3 3 3
V30 8 7 9 7 6 4 9 8 5 4 4 3
V31 9 8 8 7 7 6 8 8 4 3 3 3
V32 9 8 9 7 5 6 9 8 4 4 3 3
V33 9 8 8 8 6 5 9 9 4 4 4 3
V34 9 8 9 8 6 4 8 7 5 3 4 3
V35 8 8 9 9 5 6 8 9 4 4 4 3
V36 9 8 9 7 6 5 8 8 4 3 4 4
213
V37 9 8 8 7 6 5 9 8 4 4 4 3
V38 8 8 9 7 7 5 8 8 5 4 3 3
V39 9 8 9 8 6 6 9 9 5 3 3 4
V40 8 8 8 7 6 5 8 8 4 4 4 4
V41 9 7 9 8 7 6 9 8 5 3 5 3
V42 8 8 9 7 6 5 9 8 4 3 5 3
V43 8 8 9 8 6 5 8 7 4 3 3 3
V44 8 7 9 8 6 6 8 8 4 4 2 1
V45 9 8 9 7 6 5 8 8 5 4 2 3
V46 9 8 8 8 6 5 8 7 4 4 3 3
V47 9 8 9 8 6 5 9 8 4 3 4 3
V48 9 7 9 8 6 5 9 8 5 3 5 3
V49 9 9 10 8 5 5 9 9 4 4 4 4
V50 9 8 9 8 7 6 8 8 5 4 4 3
V51 9 9 10 9 7 5 8 8 4 4 5 3
V52 9 9 9 8 6 5 9 8 4 4 4 4
V53 9 8 8 8 6 5 8 7 5 3 4 4
V54 8 7 8 7 6 5 8 8 4 4 4 3
V55 8 7 10 8 5 5 8 7 5 3 4 3
V56 9 8 9 9 6 5 8 8 4 3 3 3
V57 9 7 9 8 6 5 9 8 4 4 3 3
V58 8 8 10 8 6 5 9 8 5 4 3 4
V59 8 8 8 8 6 5 9 9 4 3 4 4
V60 8 7 8 8 6 5 8 8 4 ......... 4 3 2
HAPPY Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 9 8 9 9 6 6 6 5 4 4 5 5
V02 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 4 4 5
V03 8 8 9 7 6 6 7 6 4 3 5 5
V04 8 7 8 8 7 6 6 4 4 3 6 5
V05 8 8 8 8 6 5 5 5 4 4 5 4
V06 8 8 8 7 7 6 7 5 4 4 4 4
V07 8 8 8 8 6 5 6 6 4 3 4 4
V08 8 7 8 8 6 6 7 6 5 3 5 4
V09 9 7 9 7 6 5 8 6 5 6 5 5
V10 8 7 8 7 6 5 7 6 6 5 5 4
V11 9 7 8 7 7 6 7 7 5 5 4 4
V12 8 8 9 7 5 5 6 6 5 4 4 3
V13 8 7 8 8 5 4 7 6 5 5 3 5
V14 8 8 8 7 6 5 8 6 3 5 4 3
V15 9 7 9 9 5 5 6 5 4 4 5 5
V16 8 7 8 8 7 5 8 5 5 4 5 5
V17 9 7 8 7 6 6 5 5 6 4 6 4
V18 8 8 9 8 6 5 7 4 5 5 5 5
V19 9 8 9 7 6 4 7 5 5 4 5 4
V20 8 7 8 7 7 5 7 5 5 5 5 5
V21 9 7 8 7 6 5 7 6 4 3 5 4
V22 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 4 5 3 4 4
V23 8 7 8 8 6 6 8 7 5 4 5 4
V24 9 7 9 9 6 6 7 7 5 3 5 4
V25 7 7 8 8 7 5 8 6 6 4 5 5
214
V26 8 8 8 7 6 3 7 5 6 5 6 5
V27 9 8 8 8 6 5 8 7 5 3 6 5
V28 8 8 8 7 6 6 7 6 6 4 5 4
V29 9 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5
V30 8 7 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 4 6 4
V31 8 8 7 7 5 5 7 5 4 4 4 4
V32 8 7 8 7 6 5 6 6 6 4 5 3
V33 8 8 9 8 7 5 6 6 5 5 5 4
V34 8 8 9 7 6 5 7 6 5 4 4 4
V35 9 8 8 8 6 6 7 7 5 4 3 3
V36 8 8 8 8 7 6 7 6 6 4 5 4
V37 8 7 8 8 6 6 7 6 5 4 5 4
V38 8 7 8 8 5 4 8 6 3 4 4 5
V39 8 8 9 7 5 5 7 7 5 4 5 5
V40 9 7 8 7 6 6 8 7 5 3 6 4
V41 8 7 8 7 6 6 8 6 6 4 5 4
V42 9 7 8 8 5 5 7 6 4 4 4 4
V43 8 7 8 7 6 5 8 6 4 4 5 4
V44 8 8 9 9 6 5 6 6 5 4 5 5
V45 9 9 8 7 5 5 7 7 5 5 4 4
V46 8 8 9 7 6 6 7 6 5 3 5 4
V47 8 7 8 8 7 6 7 5 5 4 5 5
V48 8 7 8 8 5 4 8 6 5 3 5 5
V49 8 8 8 7 6 4 7 6 4 4 4 5
V50 8 8 9 7 6 5 8 7 5 4 5 5
V51 9 9 8 8 5 5 7 6 5 3 5 4
V52 8 7 8 7 6 4 6 6 5 5 4 3
V53 8 8 9 9 5 4 7 6 5 4 3 3
V54 8 8 8 8 7 5 8 6 5 4 5 5
V55 7 7 9 7 6 5 7 6 3 3 5 4
V56 8 7 8 9 6 6 8 6 4 4 4 4
V57 8 7 8 8 6 6 7 6 6 4 6 5
V58 8 7 8 7 6 5 8 6 5 5 5 5
V59 9 8 8 7 7 4 8 7 5 4 4 4
V60 9 7 9 8 5 5 6 6 5 3 6 4
BAD Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 9 9 10 9 7 7 6 6 5 4 6 5
V02 9 8 9 8 8 6 7 7 5 5 6 5
V03 9 8 9 8 6 5 7 7 5 4 5 5
V04 8 8 9 9 8 7 7 6 4 4 5 5
V05 9 8 9 8 8 8 7 6 5 4 6 6
V06 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 6 5 5 5 5
V07 8 8 9 9 8 7 8 6 5 4 5 5
V08 8 8 9 8 8 8 6 6 4 4 6 6
V09 8 8 9 8 7 7 6 7 5 5 6 5
V10 9 7 9 8 7 6 7 7 4 4 6 4
V11 8 7 8 8 7 7 8 7 6 5 6 4
V12 9 8 9 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 5 5
V13 8 8 9 9 8 8 8 7 6 6 5 4
V14 9 8 8 9 7 7 8 7 6 4 6 6
215
V15 8 8 9 8 8 7 8 7 5 4 7 5
V16 9 8 9 9 6 6 7 7 6 5 5 5
V17 8 7 10 8 8 8 7 7 6 5 6 6
V18 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 5 6 5
V19 8 8 8 8 7 6 7 7 5 5 6 6
V20 8 8 9 8 8 6 7 6 6 5 6 5
V21 8 7 9 9 8 8 8 7 4 4 5 5
V22 8 8 10 10 9 5 7 6 5 4 6 5
V23 8 8 9 7 7 7 7 7 5 6 6 6
V24 8 7 9 8 8 7 8 7 6 5 6 6
V25 8 8 9 9 7 7 8 7 6 5 6 5
V26 9 8 9 8 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 5
V27 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 4 4 6 6
V28 10 8 10 8 8 7 8 7 4 4 6 5
V29 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 6 5 5 6 5
V30 8 8 9 9 8 7 8 7 6 5 6 6
V31 9 8 8 7 8 8 8 7 5 4 6 6
V32 8 8 9 9 8 6 7 7 5 5 6 5
V33 9 9 9 9 9 6 7 6 6 5 5 5
V34 9 8 9 8 7 7 8 6 5 5 6 4
V35 9 9 9 9 8 7 7 6 5 5 5 5
V36 9 8 9 7 8 8 8 7 5 4 5 5
V37 8 8 9 9 8 7 7 7 5 4 6 5
V38 8 8 9 8 9 7 7 6 4 4 6 5
V39 9 8 9 9 8 7 8 7 4 5 6 6
V40 9 7 10 8 7 7 7 7 5 4 6 6
V41 8 8 9 7 8 6 7 7 5 5 5 5
V42 8 8 9 8 8 7 7 6 5 4 5 4
V43 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 5 5 4 5 5
V44 9 8 9 8 9 7 8 7 6 5 6 5
V45 9 8 8 8 7 6 8 8 6 5 6 6
V46 9 8 8 8 7 7 8 5 4 4 5 5
V47 8 7 9 8 6 6 7 8 5 5 6 6
V48 8 8 9 9 6 6 8 7 5 5 6 5
V49 9 8 9 8 7 7 7 7 5 4 6 5
V50 9 8 9 8 7 6 7 7 6 6 5 6
V51 9 8 9 8 8 6 7 7 5 5 6 6
V52 8 8 8 8 8 7 8 7 6 5 6 5
V53 9 7 9 8 6 7 8 8 5 5 5 5
V54 8 8 9 8 8 7 8 7 6 5 6 5
V55 8 7 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 5 6 4
V56 8 8 9 9 8 7 8 7 6 4 6 5
V57 9 8 10 10 8 6 7 7 5 5 5 5
V58 9 8 9 8 7 7 7 6 6 5 6 6
V59 8 7 9 9 7 6 7 7 5 5 7 5
V60 8 8 9 9 9 7 7 6 5 5 6 5
LIKELY Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 10 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 6 3 7 5
V02 9 8 9 7 7 7 6 6 5 4 6 6
V03 9 7 8 8 7 6 7 6 4 4 6 6
216
V04 9 8 9 7 6 6 6 6 6 4 7 7
V05 9 9 9 7 8 5 5 5 6 3 7 6
V06 9 8 8 6 6 6 8 5 4 4 6 6
V07 8 7 8 7 8 6 6 4 5 3 6 6
V08 9 8 9 9 7 6 7 3 5 4 7 5
V09 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6
V10 9 8 10 8 8 8 7 6 6 4 7 6
V11 8 8 7 7 9 7 6 6 4 4 6 6
V12 9 8 8 7 6 6 7 6 5 4 7 5
V13 9 7 8 8 6 7 7 6 5 5 6 4
V14 10 9 8 8 8 5 7 7 4 3 6 5
V15 9 7 9 9 6 6 5 5 5 3 5 5
V16 9 8 9 8 7 6 7 5 5 4 7 7
V17 9 8 8 7 6 6 8 6 3 6 7 5
V18 9 7 9 9 7 6 7 7 4 3 7 6
V19 9 8 9 8 6 6 8 5 6 4 6 5
V20 9 7 9 9 6 7 7 5 4 4 7 6
V21 9 8 9 7 8 7 7 4 6 5 8 7
V22 9 8 9 9 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 6
V23 9 7 8 8 8 7 7 6 4 4 7 6
V24 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 5 4 7 5
V25 9 9 9 8 6 6 7 6 5 5 7 7
V26 9 7 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 4 8 5
V27 8 8 8 8 8 6 7 6 6 4 7 6
V28 8 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 6 5 7 6
V29 9 8 9 7 8 6 7 7 6 6 6 6
V30 8 7 9 8 7 6 8 8 4 4 7 6
V31 9 9 8 8 6 6 8 5 5 4 7 7
V32 8 8 9 8 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 6
V33 9 8 9 8 7 7 6 5 6 4 6 6
V34 8 7 8 8 8 6 5 5 4 4 6 5
V35 9 8 8 8 7 6 6 6 6 3 6 5
V36 8 8 8 8 8 6 7 6 4 3 7 5
V37 9 9 9 8 7 7 6 6 5 4 6 6
V38 8 8 9 9 7 6 8 5 6 6 6 6
V39 8 7 10 7 7 6 7 6 6 4 8 6
V40 8 7 8 8 5 6 7 5 6 3 7 7
V41 9 8 8 8 8 6 5 6 6 4 6 5
V42 9 8 8 8 8 6 7 5 6 6 6 4
V43 8 7 9 8 6 6 5 7 5 5 7 4
V44 8 7 9 9 7 5 7 5 5 5 7 6
V45 9 8 9 8 8 5 7 4 4 3 5 5
V46 8 8 9 9 6 6 7 6 6 4 8 6
V47 7 7 9 8 8 6 7 5 6 5 7 7
V48 9 8 9 8 8 8 6 5 5 4 8 7
V49 8 8 9 7 7 6 7 7 4 4 7 6
V50 9 8 7 7 6 6 7 5 5 4 6 5
V51 8 8 8 8 5 5 7 6 4 4 6 5
V52 8 7 9 7 7 6 6 6 6 4 7 5
V53 8 8 9 8 7 6 6 5 6 4 7 7
V54 9 8 10 9 7 6 7 5 6 3 6 6
V55 9 9 9 9 7 5 7 6 5 4 6 5
217
V56 8 7 9 8 6 5 7 6 4 4 6 4
V57 9 9 8 7 7 7 6 6 5 4 7 6
V58 9 8 9 9 6 7 8 5 5 4 7 7
V59 9 8 9 7 8 6 6 6 6 4 7 6
V60 10 9 8 8 7 5 7 5 6 6 6 6
DIFFICULT Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Som ewhat U Fairly U
V01 9 8 9 9 7 6 6 6 5 4 4 5
V02 9 9 8 9 7 6 7 6 5 5 5 5
V03 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 5
V04 10 8 9 8 8 6 7 7 4 4 5 6
V05 9 9 8 8 7 6 7 6 6 4 6 5
V06 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 6 5
V07 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 7 5 4 4 5
V08 9 9 9 8 8 7 7 6 4 4 5 5
V09 10 9 9 9 8 7 7 6 4 4 5 4
V10 9 9 8 8 8 7 7 7 5 4 4 4
V11 9 8 9 9 7 6 8 6 5 5 4 4
V12 9 9 10 9 7 6 7 7 5 5 5 4
V13 9 9 9 8 7 5 8 7 6 5 6 4
V14 9 9 9 9 8 7 6 6 5 4 5 5
V15 9 8 9 8 7 6 6 5 4 3 5 4
V16 8 8 9 9 7 6 6 6 4 5 6 5
V17 9 9 8 8 6 6 7 7 5 5 5 4
V18 9 8 9 8 7 6 8 7 5 3 4 3
V19 9 9 9 9 6 6 7 6 5 4 5 4
V20 9 8 10 10 6 7 6 6 5 5 5 4
V21 9 9 9 8 8 7 6 7 5 5 8 7
V22 8 8 9 8 7 6 8 6 6 4 5 5
V23 9 9 9 9 8 7 7 7 5 5 4 4
V24 9 8 9 9 8 6 7 6 6 5 5 4
V25 9 8 9 9 6 6 7 7 6 6 5 4
V26 9 8 9 9 7 6 8 6 6 6 5 5
V27 9 8 10 8 8 6 6 6 5 5 4 4
V28 8 8 9 9 8 7 7 6 5 4 6 5
V29 8 8 8 8 8 6 6 5 4 4 4 4
V30 9 7 9 9 7 6 6 6 5 4 5 5
V31 9 8 9 8 6 6 7 6 5 5 5 4
V32 9 8 9 9 7 6 7 6 6 5 6 5
V33 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 5 4 6 4
V34 9 7 10 8 8 6 7 6 5 5 4 4
V35 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 6 5 5 5 4
V36 9 9 9 8 8 6 8 7 4 4 5 5
V37 9 7 9 9 7 7 7 7 5 5 6 5
V38 10 9 9 8 7 6 8 7 6 5 4 4
V39 8 8 8 8 7 6 7 7 5 5 5 4
V40 9 9 9 8 5 6 7 7 6 5 5 5
V41 9 8 9 9 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 4
V42 9 8 9 8 8 6 8 7 6 5 5 4
V43 9 8 9 9 6 6 7 6 6 5 3 5
V44 9 8 10 8 7 5 6 6 5 4 5 5
218
V45 9 7 8 8 8 5 6 7 4 4 6 5
V46 9 8 8 8 6 6 7 6 6 5 5 4
V47 9 9 8 8 8 6 7 7 6 6 4 4
V48 9 9 8 8 8 8 7 5 5 5 5 5
V49 9 8 9 8 7 6 7 6 4 4 6 5
V50 9 9 8 8 6 6 6 6 5 4 5 4
V51 9 8 9 8 5 5 6 6 5 4 6 5
V52 9 8 9 9 7 6 7 7 5 5 4 5
V53 9 9 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 4 5 5
V54 9 9 9 8 7 6 7 6 6 5 4 4
V55 10 9 8 8 7 5 6 6 5 5 3 6
V56 9 9 8 8 6 5 7 5 5 4 5 4
V57 9 8 9 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 4 5
V58 9 9 9 8 6 7 7 7 6 4 6 6
V59 9 9 9 8 8 6 7 6 6 6 5 5
V60 9 7 9 9 7 5 7 6 6 5 4 4
WEAK Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 6 4 4 5 4
V02 8 9 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 4 5 4
V03 9 8 9 8 6 6 7 6 6 5 5 4
V04 8 7 9 7 7 6 7 6 5 4 4 4
V05 9 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 5 5 4 4
V06 8 8 9 8 6 6 7 6 5 4 5 7
V07 9 8 9 8 6 5 8 6 5 5 4 4
V08 9 9 9 7 6 6 7 7 5 4 6 7
V09 8 7 8 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 6 5
V10 9 8 9 8 6 6 7 6 5 5 5 4
V11 9 9 9 8 7 6 6 6 6 5 5 5
V12 8 7 8 8 6 5 7 6 5 4 4 4
V13 8 8 9 7 6 6 7 6 6 6 4 4
V14 9 8 9 7 7 6 7 6 6 6 5 4
V15 8 6 8 8 7 5 7 6 5 5 4 4
V16 8 7 8 8 6 5 6 5 5 4 3 4
V17 9 7 9 7 7 5 7 6 7 5 4 6
V18 9 8 8 8 6 5 6 6 5 5 4 4
V19 9 7 7 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5
V20 9 9 8 9 7 7 7 6 6 5 4 5
V21 8 8 7 8 8 6 7 7 6 5 4 5
V22 9 8 8 8 7 7 8 7 5 5 4 4
V23 9 8 9 8 8 7 8 7 5 4 5 4
V24 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 6 5 5 4 3
V25 8 8 8 8 7 6 7 6 6 5 5 5
V26 9 8 8 9 7 6 8 6 5 5 5 6
V27 9 9 8 7 7 6 7 6 6 5 6 4
V28 9 8 9 9 6 6 7 7 6 6 5 5
V29 10 8 9 8 7 6 6 6 5 4 5 4
V30 9 8 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 4 5 5
V31 9 9 8 8 7 6 7 7 5 5 5 4
V32 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 5 6 5 6 5
V33 8 8 9 8 6 6 6 6 5 4 6 4
219
V34 9 8 8 8 6 5 7 7 6 5 5 4
V35 8 8 9 8 7 5 6 6 5 4 5 5
V36 9 7 8 8 6 5 7 6 6 4 4 5
V37 8 8 8 7 7 6 7 6 6 5 5 6
V38 8 8 8 8 6 6 8 6 5 4 4 5
V39 9 8 9 9 6 5 6 6 4 4 5 5
V40 9 8 9 9 7 5 7 5 4 4 5 7
V41 9 9 8 7 6 5 7 6 6 4 3 5
V42 9 9 9 9 7 5 8 7 5 7 5 6
V43 8 7 9 8 7 6 7 6 5 4 5 4
V44 9 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 4
V45 9 9 8 8 7 5 7 5 4 5 4 5
V46 8 9 9 9 6 5 7 7 6 6 4 4
V47 9 7 9 8 7 5 7 6 6 5 5 4
V48 8 7 9 9 6 7 7 6 6 5 5 4
V49 8 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 4 6 3
V50 9 8 8 7 7 6 7 6 5 . 5 5 5
V51 8 7 8 7 7 5 7 7 5 7 5 4
V52 8 8 9 8 6 6 7 6 7 5 4 4
V53 9 8 9 8 7 5 7 6 5 5 5 4
V54 9 8 8 8 6 5 7 8 5 4 4 6
V55 8 7 9 9 7 5 7 7 6 6 4 4
V56 9 7 9 8 6 5 8 5 5 5 5 6
V57 9 8 8 7 7 5 6 6 6 5 5 5
V58 9 7 8 8 7 5 7 6 6 5 6 4
V59 8 8 9 7 5 5 6 6 5 4 5 6
V60 8 7 8 7 6 5 7 7 6 7 5 4
WARM Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 8 8 9 9 6 6 7 7 3 6 5 5
V02 9 9 8 9 7 6 8 8 5 5 4 5
V03 8 7 8 8 6 5 7 8 4 5 4 4
V04 7 8 8 8 7 7 7 8 6 4 3 3
V05 8 8 9 9 7 8 7 6 4 4 4 5
V06 8 7 8 8 6 6 7 7 5 6 5 5
V07 8 8 9 9 6 6 8 7 3 4 4 3
V08 9 8 10 8 7 6 7 6 4 7 4 6
V09 7 8 8 9 6 6 6 8 4 4 5 5
V10 8 8 9 9 6 5 7 8 3 5 5 5
V11 9 8 8 9 7 7 6 7 4 6 4 6
V12 8 8 9 8 7 6 7 7 4 5 5 4
V13 9 8 9 9 6 7 8 7 4 5 3 4
V14 9 9 9 9 7 6 7 7 6 4 3 6
V15 8 8 9 8 7 6 7 7 5 3 4 5
V16 8 7 9 10 6 6 7 6 3 4 4 5
V17 8 8 9 9 7 6 6 6 4 5 4 3
V18 8 9 9 8 5 4 8 6 6 6 4 6
V19 9 8 9 9 7 8 7 7 5 3 4 4
V20 9 8 9 9 7 6 6 7 3 4 5 6
V21 9 9 9 7 6 7 6 6 6 4 5 5
V22 7 8 9 8 8 6 8 8 5 6 4 5
220
V23 8 9 8 8 6 7 8 7 4 6 4 5
V24 9 8 8 7 6 6 7 7 5 6 3 4
V25 9 8 8 8 7 7 8 8 4 5 4 4
V26 9 9 9 9 6 6 8 7 5 3 4 4
V27 8 9 9 7 7 6 7 8 4 6 5 4
V28 8 8 9 8 7 6 7 9 6 4 5 3
V29 8 7 9 9 7 6 7 8 4 5 5 5
V30 8 8 9 7 7 7 8 8 6 4 5 5
V31 7 8 8 8 7 6 7 7 5 6 5 4
V32 8 8 9 8 8 6 7 6 4 5 6 5
V33 9 8 8 8 6 7 7 6 5 5 6 4
V34 8 7 8 7 6 6 8 7 4 5 5 4
V35 8 7 8 8 6 6 7 6 3 4 5 5
V36 7 7 7 8 6 7 7 8 5 5 5 6
V37 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 3 4
V38 7 7 9 8 7 7 7 6 5 5 4 3
V39 8 8 9 7 6 6 6 8 5 3 5 7
V40 9 9 9 8 7 6 8 6 3 3 4 3
V41 7 8 8 7 7 5 7 6 5 6 5 4
V42 9 8 9 8 7 7 8 7 5 4 3 5
V43 8 8 9 9 6 6 7 7 5 6 4 6
V44 8 7 8 8 7 6 7 6 3 4 4 5
V45 8 8 8 9 7 6 6 6 6 4 5 7
V46 8 7 9 9 7 6 7 6 3 6 4 5
V47 9 8 9 8 7 8 7 7 5 4 4 3
V48 8 9 8 8 6 6 8 6 5 6 3 5
V49 9 8 9 8 7 6 7 6 4 3 4 4
V50 9 9 8 9 7 7 7 8 5 6 5 3
V51 8 8 9 7 6 8 8 7 4 4 4 5
V52 9 8 8 8 6 6 7 7 6 4 5 5
V53 9 8 8 7 7 6 7 7 5 7 3 5
V54 7 8 8 8 7 5 8 8 5 3 3 4
V55 8 8 9 8 7 7 7 6 3 7 4 5
V56 9 8 8 8 7 7 7 8 4 4 3 5
V57 8 9 8 8 6 6 8 6 4 4 4 5
V58 9 8 9 8 7 6 7 7 4 6 4 4
V59 9 9 8 7 6 6 7 6 5 5 4 5
V60 9 7 8 9 6 8 7 6 5 6 5 6
KIND Very U Really U Quite U Rather U Somewhat U Fairly U
V01 8 5 8 8 6 4 6 3 5 3 3 2
V02 7 7 9 8 4 3 6 5 7 4 4 3
V03 8 8 9 7 6 3 6 4 4 4 4 5
V04 7 6 8 9 7 4 7 4 5 5 5 3
V05 7 7 9 8 4 4 7 5 4 3 6 3
V06 8 7 8 7 5 3 7 6 7 4 4 1
V07 9 8 9 7 6 4 7 6 6 3 3 4
V08 8 6 8 7 6 3 7 5 6 3 4 3
V09 8 9 9 8 4 3 6 6 5 2 5 3
V10 8 7 9 7 5 4 7 3 5 3 6 3
V11 8 7 8 8 5 4 8 6 6 4 4 4
221
V12 9 6 8 8 4 6 6 5 5 4 5 5
V13 8 7 9 8 6 4 8 4 4 3 5 3
V14 8 7 9 8 6 6 6 5 5 3 4 3
V15 9 8 8 7 6 6 8 5 4 3 4 4
V16 9 7 9 8 6 4 7 6 5 3 6 3
V17 9 8 9 8 7 3 7 5 5 3 4 4
V18 8 8 8 9 6 4 6 7 6 5 6 4
V19 8 7 9 8 7 3 8 5 5 5 5 2
V20 9 8 9 7 6 5 8 6 5 4 5 5
V21 8 9 9 8 7 4 7 6 4 6 6 4
V22 9 9 9 9 6 6 8 5 5 3 6 3
V23 8 7 9 8 7 4 7 5 6 3 5 3
V24 8 7 9 7 6 5 8 6 5 3 5 2
V25 9 7 8 9 7 6 8 6 5 2 5 4
V26 9 7 9 7 7 4 8 6 4 5 3 2
V27 9 8 9 8 5 6 7 5 6 3 5 3
V28 8 8 8 8 7 5 7 6 5 5 2 4
V29 8 9 9 8 5 4 7 5 4 4 5 3
V30 9 9 8 7 5 4 7 6 6 5 5 2
V31 8 7 8 8 6 5 6 5 5 5 4 4
V32 9 8 8 8 6 4 7 6 5 4 2 4
V33 9 7 8 8 7 5 7 7 5 2 6 3
V34 9 9 9 8 6 4 8 6 5 3 5 5
V35 9 7 9 8 7 6 7 7 6 4 5 3
V36 8 7 9 7 7 7 7 5 6 5 5 4
V37 8 7 8 8 5 4 9 5 5 4 4 3
V38 9 7 8 7 8 6 7 5 5 3 4 2
V39 9 8 9 8 5 7 7 5 5 4 6 5
V40 9 7 8 8 7 4 7 6 5 3 5 3
V41 8 8 8 9 5 6 8 6 4 4 5 2
V42 8 8 9 9 6 4 7 5 6 3 5 4
V43 9 7 9 7 7 4 7 5 4 2 5 4
V44 8 8 9 8 6 4 7 5 4 4 4 3
V45 9 8 8 8 7 5 8 7 4 3 5 3
V46 8 8 9 8 8 6 7 5 5 4 6 3
V47 8 8 9 7 7 5 8 6 4 3 5 4
V48 8 7 8 8 8 5 7 6 3 4 5 3
V49 9 7 9 9 6 4 7 5 5 3 5 3
V50 9 8 9 9 7 6 7 5 5 3 5 4
V51 8 8 9 8 7 5 7 5 5 3 4 2
V52 8 7 9 8 8 5 7 6 4 5 4 4
V53 9 7 9 7 6 6 8 7 5 5 5 3
V54 8 7 9 8 6 4 8 6 5 4 6 4
V55 8 7 9 8 8 6 8 6 6 4 4 3
V56 8 7 8 9 6 4 7 6 5 3 6 4
V57 9 7 9 9 8 6 6 5 4 3 6 3
V58 9 9 9 7 8 5 8 5 6 5 5 3
V59 9 8 9 7 6 5 7 5 5 3 4 3
V60 8 8 9 9 7 4 8 5 5 4 5 2
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APPENDIX 4: SYNTAX AND OUTPUT OF SPSS ANALYSIS
Mixed Model A nalysis













In tercept 1 1
WORD 9 8
PREFIX 6 5




STRENGTH 9 Identity 1
PREFIX * 










-2 Log Likelihood 8218.591
A kaike's Inform ation Criterion (AIC) 8360.591
Hurvich and T sai’s  Criterion (AICC) 8363.818
B ozdogan 's Criterion (CAIC) 8863.507
S chw arz 's  B ayesian Criterion (BIC) 8792.507
Fixed Effects
Type III T ests  of Fixed Effects
Source N um erator df D enom inator df F Sig.
In tercept ~T | 2041.922 1146.792 .000
WORD “ a] 335.497 18.580 .000
PREFIX ~~5] 950.065 80.275 .000
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Estimates of Fixed Effects
95% C onfidence Interval
P aram eter
Estim ate Std. Error df t Sig.
Lower Bound Upper Bound
In tercep t 6.2375 .3342 500.799 18.665 .000 5.5809 6.8940
[WORD=1] 1.9682 .3156 311.166 6.237 .000 1.3474 2.5891
[WORD=2] 1.2777 .2763 261.332 4.624 .000 .7336 1.8218
[WORD=3] 2.0404 .2962 285.002 6.889 .000 1.4575 2.6234
[WORD=4] 2.3189 .2896 267.050 8.007 .000 1.7487 2.8891
[WORD=5] 1.9351 .3174 289.417 6.096 .000 1.3103 2.5598
[WORD=6] 2.2462 .2825 288.941 7.951 .000 1.6902 2.8023
[WORD=7] 3.0869 .3000 309.088 10.291 .000 2.4967 3.6772
[WORD=8] 2.6879 .3130 319.202 8.587 .000 2.0720 3.3038
[WORD=9] 0 0
[PREFIX=1] -3.3337 .4814 596.530 -6.925 .000 -4.2791 -2.3883
[PREFIX=2] -2.6847 .4736 689.415 -5.668 .000 -3.6147 -1.7548
[PREFIX=3] -4.7816 .3483 871.083 -13.729 .000 -5.4651 -4.0980
[PREFIX=4] -5.1221 .3903 768.363 -13.125 .000 -5.8882 -4.3560
[PREFIX=5] -5.7374 .3086 718.511 -18.589 .000 -6.3434 -5.1314
[PREFIX=6] 0 0 •|
Covariance Parameters
E stim ates of C ovariance P aram eters
Param eter Estim ate Std. Error
R epeated  M easures VC diagonal 1 .8525 .1630
VC diagonal 2 .4668 8.656E-02
VC diagonal 3 1.6102 .2991
VC diagonal 4 1.8006 .3619
VC diagonal 5 3.3708 .7416
VC diagonal 6 1.1951 .2536
VC diagonal 7 .8785 .1815
VC diagonal 8 .5915 .1665
VC diagonal 9 CO co 8.113E-02
VC diagonal 10 .9756 .2918
VC diagonal 11 .3371 6.587E-02
VC diagonal 12 1.5478 .3125
VC diagonal 13 .7869 .1542
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VC diagonal 14 .4386 8.138E-02
VC diagonal 15 .5706 .1081
VC diagonal 16 .5051 9.306E-02
VC diagonal 17 .4890 8.977E-02
VC diagonal 18 2.1098 .4276
VC diagonal 19 .4486 .1166
VC diagonal 20 1.0360 .2143
VC diagonal 21 .6010 .1193
VC diagonal 22 .3723 6.852E-02
VC diagonal 23 .2472 4.554E-02
VC diagonal 24 1.3217 .2609
VC diagonal 25 .3281 6.063E-02
VC diagonal 26 .4667 8.570E-02
VC diagonal 27 .6310 .1266
VC diagonal 28 .8970 .1669
VC diagonal 29 .7659 .1407
VC diagonal 30 1.1044 .2296
VC diagonal 31 .6542 .1288
VC diagonal 32 .2803 5.155E-02
VC diagonal 33 .3988 7.524E-02
VC diagonal 34 .3382 6.357E-02
VC diagonal 35 .3688 6.825E-02
VC diagonal 36 .9943 .1908
VC diagonal 37 .4923 9.031 E-02
VC diagonal 38 .3709 6.789E-02
VC diagonal 39 .5375 .1009
VC diagonal 40 .3561 6.532E-02
VC diagonal 41 .5680 .1060
VC diagonal 42 1.0255 .1930
VC diagonal 43 .3746 7.130E-02
VC diagonal 44 .5086 9.322E-02
VC diagonal 45 .6473 .1216
VC diagonal 46 .8682 .1682
VC diagonal 47 2.2196 .4593
VC diagonal 48 1.0539 .1956
VC diagonal 49 .6620 .1213
VC diagonal 50 .6448 .1271
VC diagonal 51 1.1365 .2094
VC diagonal 52 .7283 .1351
VC diagonal 53 1.0073 .1945
VC diagonal 54 7.9544 1.6375
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STRENGTH ID diagonal 5.961 E-02 .1027
WORD * STRENGTH ID diagonal 9.039E-03 5.071 E-03
PREFIX * STRENGTH ID diagonal 6.849E-02 4.498E-02



























Components 54 SUBJECT 60
Total 86 82
Information Criteria
-2 Log Likelihood 8109.541
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) 8273.541
Hurvich and Tsai's Criterion (AICC) 8277.853
Bozdogan's Criterion (CAIC) 8854.374
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC) 8772.374
Fixed Effects
Type III Tests o f Fixed Effects
Source Numerator df Denominator df F Sig.
Intercept 1 2094.355 1129.346 .000
WORD 8 399.512 20.047 .000
PREFIX 5 1086.214 80.777 .000
STRENGTH 1 2419.476 203.330 .000
WORD * STRENGTH 8 543.664 14.780 .000
PREFIX * STRENGTH 5 735.407 35.455 .000
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Estimates of Fixed Effects
95% Confidence Interval
Parameter




Intercept 6.1324 .3471 563.024 17.667 .000 5.4506 6.8142
[WORD=1] 2.0888 .3318 427.430 6.296 .000 1.4367 2.7409
[WORD=2] 1.3999 .2904 289.842 4.820 .000 .8283 1.9716
[WORD=3] 2.2578 .3118 350.814 7.242 .000 1.6446 2.8710
[WORD=4] 2.5226 .3041 308.953 8.294 .000 1.9241 3.1210
[WORD=5] 2.1557 .3341 381.208 6.452 .000 1.4988 2.8126
[WORD=6] 2.4361 .2966 332.833 8.214 .000 1.8527 3.0195
[WORD=7] 3.3588 .3154 400.453 10.650 .000 2.7388 3.9788
[WORD=8] 2.9190 .3300 440.003 8.845 .000 2.2704 3.5676
[WORD=9] 0 0
[PREFIX=1] -3.4642 .4880 653.133 -7.099 .000 -4.4224 -2.5060
[PREFIX=2] -2.7547 .4812 754.409 -5.724 .000 -3.6995 -1.8100
[PREFIX=3] -4.8749 .3529 957.044 13.812 .000 -5.5675 -4.1822
[PREFIX=4] -5.2883 .3948 858.183 13.395 .000 -6.0632 -4.5134



































































Estimates of Covariance ParametersI ' 1 ■ " -----
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Repeated Measures VC diagonal 1 .8527 .1628
VC diagonal 2 .4614 8.515E-02
VC diagonal 3 1.6104 .2991
VC diagonal 4 1.8134 .3639
VC diagonal 5 3.4554 .7662
VC diagonal 6 1.1769 .2477
VC diagonal 7 .8527 .1745
VC diagonal 8 .6301 .1836
VC diagonal 9 .4374 8.135E-02
VC diagonal 10 .8924 .2724
VC diagonal 11 .3333 6.448E-02
VC diagonal 12 1.5544 .3149
VC diagonal 13 .7922 .1559
VC diagonal 14 .4343 8.038E-02
VC diagonal 15 .5694 .1079
VC diagonal 16 .5027 9.256E-02
VC diagonal 17 .4880 8.968E-02
VC diagonal 18 2.1098 .4282
VC diagonal 19 .4375 .1150
VC diagonal 20 1.0413 .2176
VC diagonal 21 .6002 .1193
VC diagonal 22 .3701 6.803E-02
VC diagonal 23 .2455 4.514E-02
VC diagonal 24 1.2945 .2540
VC diagonal 25 .3250 5.992E-02
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VC diagonal 26 .4641 8.515E-02
VC diagonal 27 .6231 .1250
VC diagonal 28 .9009 .1677
VC diagonal 29 .7621 .1398
VC diagonal 30 1.0819 .2219
VC diagonal 31 .6509 .1284
VC diagonal 32 .2780 5.104E-02
VC diagonal 33 .3969 7.489E-02
VC diagonal 34 .3379 6.353E-02
VC diagonal 35 .3669 6.787E-02
VC diagonal 36 1.0057 .1931
VC diagonal 37 .4884 8.941 E-02
VC diagonal 38 .3696 6.768E-02
VC diagonal 39 .5395 .1014
VC diagonal 40 .3545 6.499E-02
VC diagonal 41 .5624 .1045
VC diagonal 42 1.0239 .1918
VC diagonal 43 .3689 6.984E-02
VC diagonal 44 .5047 9.234E-02
VC diagonal 45 .6430 .1206
VC diagonal 46 .8622 .1669
VC diagonal 47 2.2500 .4694
VC diagonal 48 1.0578 .1958
VC diagonal 49 .6629 .1215
VC diagonal 50 .6271 .1219
VC diagonal 51 1.1442 .2111
VC diagonal 52 .7374 .1370
VC diagonal 53 1.0409 .2050
VC diagonal 54 7.5655 1.5753




Intercept 1 1797.110 641.069 .000
Adjective 8 284.495 21.832 .000
Degree Modifier 4 1084.402 9.970 .000
STRENGTH 1 2160.249 325.162 .000
Adj * STRENGTH 8 336.951 14.069 .000
Degree Modifier * 
STRENGTH 4 906.369 1.755 .136
a Dependent Variable: Uncertainty 
Estimates of Fixed Effects (b)
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95% Confidence
Parameter Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. Interval
Lower Upper
Bound Bound
Intercept 1.0461 .3290 304.508 3.179 .002 .3986 1.6935
[ADJ=1] 3.4447 .3693 280.386 9.328 .000 2.7177 4.1717
[ADJ=2] .4652 .3006 246.517 1.548 .123 -.1267 1.0572
[ADJ=3] 1.3498 .3216 301.510 4.197 .000 .7168 1.9827
[ADJ=4] 2.1076 .3110 265.853 6.776 .000 1.4952 2.7200
[ADJ=5] 1.9934 .3420 331.152 5.829 .000 1.3206 2.6662
[ADJ=6] 1.7251 .3103 295.457 5.559 .000 1.1144 2.3358
[ADJ=7] 2.6219 .3405 358.490 7.701 .000 1.9524 3.2915
[ADJ=8] 2.1160 .3826 325.669 5.531 .000 1.3634 2.8686
[ADJ=9] 0(a) 0
[DM=1] 2.0000 .4793 664.399 4.173 .000 1.0590 2.9411
[DM=2] 2.5781 .4784 739.103 5.389 .000 1.6389 3.5173
[DM=3] .7190 .3342 882.741 2.151 .032 6.31 IE- 02 1.3750
[DM=4] .2635 .3830 799.202 .688 .492 -.4883 1.0152
[DM=5] 0(a) 0
STRENGTH .4475 5.428E-02 506.560 8.245 .000 .3409 .5542
[ADJ=1] * 
STRENGTH -.2569 4.706E-02 349.460 -5.459 .000 -.3494 -.1643
[ADJ=2] * -




STRENGTH -.1254 4.415E-02 381.939 -2.840 .005 -.2122 3.8577E-
02
[ADJ=4] * -
STRENGTH -.1493 4.204E-02 340.884 -3.551 .000 -.2320 6.6609E-
02
[ADJ=5] * 
STRENGTH -.1989 4.497E-02 392.826 -4.424 .000 -.2874 -.1105
[ADJ=6] * -
STRENGTH -.1044 4.136E-02 353.787 -2.523 .012 -.1857 2.3004E-
02
[ADJ=7] * 
STRENGTH -.2646 4.558E-02 416.892 -5.805 .000 -.3542 -.1750
[ADJ=8] * -









STRENGTH 1.027E-02 6.531 E-02 935.078 .157 .875 -.1179 .1384
[DM=3] * -









a This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
b Dependent Variable: Uncertainty.
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DM = Degree Modifier
ADJ = Adjective
Degree modifier 1 Very Adj 1 Big
Degree modifier 2 Really Adj 2 Nice
Degree modifier 3 Quite Adj 3 Happy
Degree modifier 4 Rather Adj 4 Bad
Degree modifier 5 Somewhat Adj 5 Likely
Degree modifier 6 Fairly Adj 6 Difficult
Adj 7 Weak
Adj 8 Warm
Adj 9 Kind
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